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**A STUDY OF PUBLIC SERVICE MOTIVATION:
THE KOREAN EXPERIENCE**

A Dissertation

**Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the
Degree of Doctor of Philosophy**

With a

Major in Political Science

In the

College of Graduate Studies

University of Idaho

by

Young Joon Choi

December 2001

Major Professor: Florence A. Heffron

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
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
AUTHORIZATION TO SUBMIT
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
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Abstract

Most studies on Public Service Motivation (PSM) confirmed the prevalence of PSM in the public sector and its positive impact on job-related behaviors. The literature review, however, revealed that methodological weaknesses in those studies preclude definitive conclusions. In addition, the scope of the studies remains limited, and no study has been conducted outside the U.S. This study was designed to address the problems, first with increased methodological rigor, second, by extending the scope of PSM research to unexplored areas: the potential impact of PSM on government employees' conception of roles and responsibilities expressed through four administrative values: neutrality, proactive role, efficiency, and social equity, third, in the Korean culture, to determine the cross-cultural viability of PSM theory.

For this study, two independent surveys of Korean nationals were conducted. To examine PSM's prevalence in the public sector, 154 Certified Public Accountants (CPAs) from government, non-profit, and private organizations were surveyed. A second survey involving 413 Korean national government employees was conducted to investigate the behavioral implications of PSM. The effect of PSM on government employees' conception of roles and responsibilities were also measured.

Analysis of Survey 1 revealed greater prevalence of PSM among government employees and confirmed it as an important basis of them. The analysis of Survey 2 found PSM to positively affect job satisfaction and organizational commitment; this implies that empirical evidence, beyond normative argument, exists for PSM as integral in higher quality management. Study data showed that government employees with higher PSM also supported proactive role and social equity and advocated efficiency and neutrality more

strongly. Thus, PSM was seen to affect the quality of public service by impacting government employees' conception of roles and responsibilities.

Additional comparison of this study with Naff and Crum's on U.S Federal government employees concluded that the behavioral implications of PSM empirically confirmed in the U.S. also exist in Korea. These results suggest that PSM theory may be cross-culturally viable. Both the theoretical and practical implications of the research findings were discussed in relation to motivation theory, rational choice theory, market-oriented reform movements, and current civil service reform movements in Korea.

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I used to wonder whether the time would ever come when I would write acknowledgments. In that sense, the numerous helpers who allowed me to experience this touching moment are my heroes. By naming them, I would like to express my thanks to them. In the whole process of this project, I am deeply indebted to Dr. Florence Heffron, my major professor. Her insightful guidance helped to frame the dissertation, and her keen criticisms have always been good stimuli. The members of my committee, Dr. Chris Stream, Dr. Patrick Wilson, and Dr. Te Whan Hahn, deserve my special gratitude. Their valuable advice found its way into my work in many ways. The serious academic attitude of the young professors was also a good model for a genuine scholar.

In conducting the research, many friends of mine provided me with their generous assistance. I'm especially grateful to Min Sup Lee, my former and current colleague; Hyun Duk Park, my brother in law; Su Wan Chang, an Assistant Division Director of the Ministry of Government Administration and Home Affairs; Young Man Byun, an Assistant Division Director of the Ministry of Commerce, Industry, and Energy; Keun Sup Jang, a Division Director of the Ministry of Labor; Song Dae Lim, a CPA with the law firm of Kim & Jang; and to the friends who aided in distributing and collecting the surveys. Also, I owe a lot to those who responded to the surveys: 154 CPAs and 413 government employees. Without their truthful responses, nothing could have been achieved. Special thanks should go to Mrs. Phyllis Van Horn. She improved the quality of English in this work with magical touches.

Gratitude from the bottom of my heart is reserved for my parents, Do Won Choi, my father, and Young Ja Her, my mother. Their endless love of and pride in me has always made

me feel safe and comfortable and ready for another challenge. No words can describe how much I am obliged to my wife, Mi Suk Park. Owing to the sacrificial love of my better half, I was able to focus on the study. Finally, I cannot omit the encouragement and joy my little angels presented to me. Yon Sei, my son, and Se Rin, my daughter, were considerate of their dad. While refreshing me with their innocent smiles, they understood that their dad was busy. I apologize to them for having so little “daddy time.”

Although things were not always easy and smooth, this time of study in Moscow, Idaho, was fruitful. But a degree is only the birth certificate of a new Ph.D. Because I fully understand that a birth certificate does not guarantee a wonderful adulthood, I have made a promise to myself that I will keep the academic ardor that I used to feel on my way home from the library in the cold but fresh air of Idaho almost every night. Like the beautiful memory of bright stars sparkling in dark blue sky, I will vividly cherish in my heart the passion for scholarship that began at the University of Idaho.

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Chapter I: Introduction

Motivation theories, seeking a win-win situation designed to link the employees' drives for satisfying their unmet needs to efforts to accomplish the organization's goals, have received extensive attention in the field of organization theory. Under the circumstances of ever-increasing competition for markets and resources, successful motivation practices are important not only for raising productivity but also for gaining easy access to limited high-quality human resources, since potential employees are attracted to organizations demonstrating success in fulfilling their employees' needs. The study and the application of motivation theory occupy the center of modern organizational management.

However, some scholars have questioned the validity and usefulness of existing motivation theories (Perry and Porter 1982, Shamir 1991). Among the shortcomings of the theories Shamir identifies are: an individualistic bias, the total exclusion of values and sense of moral obligation from conceptions of intrinsic motivation, and an assumption of the existence of strong situations. First, in viewing individuals as rational maximizers, especially as in Vroom's Expectancy Theory, most motivation theories lack a valid explanation for behavior that transcends self-interest. As a consequence, second, virtually no motivation theory recognizes values and moral obligations as intrinsic motivators. Shamir argues the important roles social norms play in motivation processes have been largely ignored. Third, by "strong situations" Shamir means the necessity of "clear and specific goals and of reward-performance expectancies for individual motivation" assumed by most current motivation theories (406). His point is that many motivation theories give little attention to more realistic situations with which organizations in the real world are faced.

Looking carefully at Shamir's criticisms, it is more likely that these shortcomings will become apparent in the public sector than in the private sector. In the public sector, we expect the employees to seek the public interest. However it may be defined, the public interest must be more than simple pursuit of private interests. Frederickson and Hart (1985) argue that there is a moral dimension to public service defined as a "patriotism of benevolence" and that public servants guard regime values, including ensuring that all citizens have the right to their basic values. Furthermore, strong situations, characterized by clear goals, abundant rewards, and reward-performance linkage, are not likely to be as prevalent in public organizations (Perry and Porter 1982).

The criticism of current motivation theories, which have been developed based largely upon research in business organizations, comes down to an indictment of those theories for their lack of theoretical validity and practical usefulness in the public sector. The concept of public service motivation (PSM) was developed as a new kind of motivation theory, with the primary focus on the public sector, to better explain and guide employee behavior and motivation management.

Then, what is the distinguishing feature of PSM? What has been studied about it? Have the studies contributed to expanding our knowledge of motivation in the public sector? What is the implication of PSM for public management?

Statement of Problem

The relationship between public administration and business administration has been affected by the relationship between public administration and politics. As the Wilsonian politics-administration dichotomy finds more advocates, the similarities, rather than

dissimilarities, between public administration and business administration are emphasized. To the extent that public administration is thought to be closer to business administration than to politics, public employees are considered the same as their counterparts in private organizations; thus, managerial principles and techniques developed in business administration are applied to public administration. One of the implications for motivation is that the use of a monetary incentive system, for example, which is prevalent in the private sector, will bring into public organizations a market-like efficiency and improved effectiveness.

Starting in the early 1960s, however, some scholars began to publish evidence that the two sectors might be different (Warner et al 1963, Guyot 1962, Kilpatrick, Cummings, and Jennings 1964). Their work represented the findings that public employees placed the highest value on worthwhile public service, and that their reward orientation was different from that of employees in the private sector, who typically gave higher ratings to financial reward. However, their promising research was not developed further until Rainey picked up the issue again almost two decades later (Crewson 1997). Rainey (1982) showed that there is difference in reward orientation between public and private employees: public employees put a great emphasis on altruistic or ideological goals, such as helping others or doing something worthwhile for society, and put less weight on monetary rewards than did their counterparts in the private sector.

The argument has a long history in political science and public affairs that public service is more than a job because public servants deal with common problems with a broad range of impact as perceived by the whole community, thus involving a higher level of ethics. This assertion, that public service is a special calling and that those who answer the call have a

higher level of public service motives, still appears in the modern literature (Frederickson and Hart 1985, Kelman 1987, Staats 1988, Perry and Wise 1990, Wise 1999). Consequently, Public Service Motivation (PSM) theories have attempted to identify, measure, and understand the public service ethic.

Although the amount of literature on PSM is still small, this important field has been accumulating a slowly but steadily growing body of empirical study since Rainey's pioneering work. The studies have been conducted along two lines. The first is to test the core of the normative argument. Do public employees show a higher level of public service motives, as the literature has suggested? Since the question needs a referent group for comparison, it is understandable that most researchers (Rainey 1982, Wittmer 1990, Gabris and Simo 1995, Crewson 1997, Houston 2000) have answered the question through a comparative analysis of employees from both public and private sector. The results of all the research, with the exception of Gabris and Simo's, confirmed that public service motives were prevalent among public sector employees. The second research area is to investigate the behavioral implications of PSM, focusing on job satisfaction (Rainey 1982), organizational commitment (Crewson 1997), organizational effectiveness (Lomzek 1990), whistle blowing (Brewer and Selden 1998) and performance (Naff and Crum 1999). According to the general findings, PSM had a positive impact on all of these variables. That is, the PSM level is higher in public employees than in their counterparts in the private sector, and public employees with higher PSM scores are more satisfied with their jobs, more committed to their organizations, and work better.

At first glance it seems that PSM literature shows a high level of agreement on these major research topics. Unfortunately, however, very little, if any, consensus exists on

techniques for measuring PSM, or even on a definition. While most researchers seem to share the core image of PSM as a motive to serve the public interest, they fail to agree on how to conceptualize, operationalize, and measure PSM. In fact, the researchers construct their theories with somewhat different building blocks but nevertheless labeling them as PSM. Without a concept arrived at through deliberate argumentation and carefully conceptualized and precisely operationalized measurement, it is difficult to compare research results and to accept them as cumulative evidence. Despite much valuable research to this point, PSM theory can be said to be grounded on an unstable and shaky basis. Second, some scholars deny the concept of PSM (Gabris and Simo 1995). A lack of consensus on the concept and measurement and the existence of a challenging argument lead to the conclusion that PSM is a still nascent theory. Third, most of the research which studied the positive effect of PSM on the organizational variables has some methodological problems such as arbitrary measurements of the work-related variables and sampling error.

Fourth, the studies have focused only on the inside of the organization. In public administration, however, because the ultimate objective to serve the general public, the implication of PSM for the nature of public service should be reviewed. For example, if we say PSM “makes a difference,” how is that defined? Do we mean more efficient delivery of public service or fairer service? Which image do we envisage—neutrally competent bureaucrats or proactive public servants? In other words, the question becomes whether PSM affects government employees’ conception of their roles and responsibilities. It is still left unexplored.

Finally, PSM has never been tested beyond the U.S public sector setting. To confirm its claim as 'science,' PSM theory must be validated in other public environments, beyond that of the single U.S setting.

Purpose of the Study

The purpose of this study is to test the existing PSM argument and to explore the impact of PSM on government employees' conception of roles and responsibilities in the Korean public sector. This will involve critical investigation to see if PSM is more prevalent in the public sector and if it has positive effect on job satisfaction and organizational commitment. This will be determined by using the full version of Perry's construct of PSM which, as shall be discussed, is the practically best option at this point as a measurement of PSM. Research on the relationship between the role conception of government employees and PSM can shed light on unexplored areas of PSM theory. In addition, testing PSM theory in Korea can broaden its applicability as a scientific theory of motivation.

To further this purpose the following three general research questions will be asked in the Korean setting:

1. Do public employees show higher levels of PSM than their private sector counterparts?
2. Is there a positive relationship between job satisfaction and organizational commitment and PSM?
3. Does PSM affect government employees' conception of roles and responsibilities expressed and measured in terms of four major values of public administration: neutrality, proactive administration, efficiency, and social equity?

Limitation of Study

The first limitation of the study derives from the fact that most measurement of the survey data is perceptual; perceptual measurement might not represent actual organizational actions or objective organizational factors, so there is always a danger of individual perceptual bias and social desirability bias. However, the utility of data originating from perception should not be downplayed, because “people live in an objectively defined environment, but they perceive a subjectively defined environment, and it is to this psychological ‘life space’ that they respond” (quoted in Stehr 1997, p. 75).

A second potential limitation is the difficulty of translating the survey questions from English to Korean. Subtle meaning or nuance might be lost or slightly altered. To minimize this possibility, some Korean public administration scholars who received their Ph.D degrees from the universities in English-speaking countries were consulted.

Significance of the Study

As noted earlier, PSM theory argues for a distinguishing theory of motivation for public employees. This has been ignored by most other current motivation theories. If the PSM argument is valid, then managers in the public sector cannot manage their employees and organizations efficiently and effectively without understanding PSM. This study can also help to extend the study of PSM beyond the organizational setting. Looking at the dynamics of government employees’ role conception through PSM may open up new areas of exploration—the implications of PSM on the quality of public service.

With increasing budgetary constraints, concerns about the quality of the governmental workforce and the government’s ability to compete for its share of the qualified labor pool

have increased. To make matters worse, such factors as many regulations on public management, rigidity in the use of financial rewards, and constant bureaucrat-bashing make public organizations look less attractive. Public organizations have no apparent advantage over private organizations in the war for securing the best and the brightest. PSM can provide public organizations with a differential strategy for recruiting new blood with public spirit.

Although it goes by various names—“new public management, civic regarding entrepreneurship, post-bureaucratic paradigm, and reinventing government” (Behn, 1998, p300)—the major aims of current government reforms are to ‘run government like a business’. If administrative reforms center on management, and management, especially human resource management, in turn depends on motivation, then what implications can PSM provide for the reform movements?

Rational choice theory has been a powerful influence in the social sciences which have adopted its fundamental assumption that every individual behaves in a way that maximizes his self-interest. Since PSM argues for a much broader human motivational base, this study can help to overcome the narrowness and over-simplification of the rational choice theory and justify the uniqueness of public administration by identifying and emphasizing the different motivational base underlying public spirit (Simon 1998).

Many scholars argue that motivation theories are culturally bound (Hofstede 1982, Robbins 1997, Perry 2000). Addressing the issue directly, this study will test the applicability of PSM in a different cultural environment, while partially fulfilling the traditional demand for a comparative study in public administration (Dahl 1947).

Organization of the Study

This study consists of six chapters. Following Chapter I, Introduction, Chapter II deals in great detail with existing research on PSM. Chapter III provides a brief explanation of the Korean civil service system. Some aspects of Korean government employees directly related to PSM are also covered. Chapter IV presents the research methodology with a detailed description of the methods and procedures that were used in conducting the research and collecting and analyzing the data. Chapter V reports the data analysis and the findings pertinent to the general research questions. Finally, Chapter VI summarizes the findings and suggests theoretical and practical implications of the results.

Chapter II: Literature Review

The purpose of this chapter is to provide a theoretical background against which the general research questions of this dissertation can be studied. To do so this chapter will be organized in two parts. Because it is very crucial to understand how PSM is defined and measured in each study, the first part will review existing research on PSM with special attention to PSM concept and measurement. Through critical evaluation, a better measurement for PSM will be suggested for this study. In the second part, literature that is directly related to the three research questions will be reviewed.

Three Approaches to PSM Measurement

The theory of PSM, like general motivation theory, is based on need theory, in which unsatisfied needs play a central role in human behavior by creating tension, which stimulates drives within an individual. These needs cause the individual to exert effort to attain particular goals that, if attained, will satisfy that need and lead to the reduction of tension (Robbins 1997). An organization can utilize the employees' drives to achieve its own objectives by first determining what the employees need, and then making the satisfaction of their needs contingent on behaving the way it wants them to behave (Heffron 1989). It becomes necessary to measure the public service motives in the context of "a type of human need" (Wise 1999).

Reflecting Rainey's argument (1982, 1997) that PSM is a very elusive concept, measuring PSM involves a lot of complexities; there are as many different measurement methods as there are scholars. Even so, all of the existing methods can be categorized into three approaches.

The first and still the most popular approach involves addressing the measurement problem of PSM indirectly. This approach, focusing on the reward rather than on the need itself, is grounded on the assumption that there is a particular set of matches between a need and a reward. For example, a hungry man will strongly respond to food as a reward. Given the difficulty involved in measuring PSM directly, this approach uses reward preferences as a mirror image of the motives. To measure PSM, the scholars using this approach examine what types of incentives respondents prefer. Then, based on their observation, they draw inferences about PSM. Most research on PSM conducted so far, especially comparative analyses between the public and private sector, falls into this category.

This approach has developed since Rainey's study (1982). A purpose of Rainey's study was to examine the validity of Buchanan's use of job involvement scale as an alternative measurement of PSM. Buchanan, using job involvement scale as a measurement, argued that public managers showed lower levels of job involvement than private managers and that, thus, public service motivation was at very low level (1975). Rainey measured PSM by directly asking a sample of middle managers from both the public and private sectors to indicate their preferences for the reward of "engaging in meaningful public service." He found that the public managers had significantly higher scores than the private managers and that the scores were correlated to public managers' job satisfaction levels, but found no relationship to job involvement scores. On the basis of the results, Rainey concluded that PSM was not the same variable as job involvement. Wittmer (1991) also tried to capture the elusive concept of PSM using this reward preference approach. Using a survey method, he found that the managers in public and hybrid organizations preferred being helpful to others and engaging in community service, while managers in private organizations preferred higher

pay and status and prestige. He emphasized these dissimilarities with the title “Serving the People or Serving for Pay” (Wittmer 1991, p 369).

Gabris and Simo (1995) have been the only scholars who reject PSM. They asked a small group of employees from public, non-profit, and private organizations about twenty rewards, including security, money, helping, and comfort. According to the results, differences existed only on three rewards: competition, authority, and community, which were ranked as more important by the public and non-profit employees (Gabris and Simo 1995, Table 5). Gabris and Simo also asked the respondents to rank each employment sector in terms of its capacity for providing exciting, challenging, and fulfilling work opportunities. Their assumption here was that, if PSM existed, the public sector employees would give their sector the highest ranking among the respondents. However, the results ran counter to the expectation: 52 percent of the public-sector employees ranked the private sector best, whereas the majority of employees both from the non-profit and private sector ranked their current sectors highest (Gabris and Simo 1995, Table 7). Based on these research findings, Gabris and Simo concluded that the “Motive to serve the general community is not monopolized by any particular sector” (p.49).

Crewson’s and Houston’s works differ from the previous works in two aspects. First, previous researchers focused mainly on intrinsic rewards designed to elicit and capture PSM as a higher need; Crewson and Houston added another feature of PSM: a negative relationship between PSM and extrinsic rewards which were believed to match lower needs. Second, Crewson and Houston analyzed existing national surveys rather than conducting their own.

Based on the assumption of “the dual nature” of PSM—a term employed by Brewer and Selden to describe the characteristics of PSM related positively to intrinsic rewards and negatively to extrinsic rewards—Crewson (1997) quantified PSM as an individual’s service orientation minus economic orientation. He categorized such items as being useful to society, helping others, and a feeling of accomplishment as “intrinsic” or “service orientation” while job security, high pay, promotion, and performance awards came under the category of “extrinsic” rewards or “economic orientation.” Crewson investigated the question of whether public employees showed higher preferences for intrinsic rewards and lower preferences for extrinsic rewards than private employees by analyzing the results of several existing national surveys. He reported that in 1989 the General Social Survey (GSS) public employees placed a higher importance on being useful to society and helping others, whereas private employees valued job security and promotion more highly. However, there was no difference in the importance given to high pay (Crewson 1997, Exhibit 1). He also analyzed a 1994 survey conducted by the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE). He found that while the public employees put more emphasis on the intrinsic rewards, employees in both sectors did not show any difference in the value they placed on extrinsic rewards such as job security, high pay, and promotion (Crewson 1997, Exhibit 1). After analyzing GSS between 1973-1993 he concluded that the reward preferences between the public and private employees remained consistent over those two decades. He also showed that his composite measurement of PSM was positively related to organizational commitment, arguing that “profit-searching firms are likely to be dominated by economic-oriented employees while public-service organizations both public and non profit, are likely to be dominated by service oriented employees” (Crewson 1997, p.516).

Finally, Houston's research shows the characteristics of the reward preference approach to PSM more clearly. Accepting Crewson's definition and measurement of PSM, Houston understood PSM as "a reliance on intrinsic rewards over extrinsic rewards" (Houston 2000, p. 714). Then, focusing on GSS he analyzed the differences in reward preference priorities between the sectors for each of the following five rewards: high pay, job security, promotion, short work time, work that is important and gives feeling of accomplishment. Because he assumed PSM should be positively related to intrinsic rewards and negatively related to extrinsic rewards simultaneously, he hypothesized that, if PSM exists, the public sector employees would place less importance on high income, short working hours, job security, and promotion, while they would place more importance on a feeling of accomplishment than the private sector employees.

He then conducted a multivariate analysis which differentiated his work from the previous research based on univariate analysis. Various demographic variables such as age, gender, and income levels were employed as control variables to single out the net effect of the sector difference on the dependent variable. The results partially supported his hypotheses. The public employees put more emphasis on meaningful work, but the p value was quite high ($p = .07$), implying that the relationship was marginally significant. Although the private employees placed more emphasis on high income and short working hours, as expected, the public employees valued promotion more highly, and there was no statistically significant difference in preference for job security. Despite this, he concluded that "These findings are in line with previous research that suggests public service motivation, characterized by a priority of intrinsic rewards over extrinsic rewards, is descriptive of public sector employees" (Houston 2000, p. 725).

The second approach to PSM measurement develops a PSM scale composed of statements which have been carefully chosen through extensive theoretical review. Perry and Wise (1990, p. 368) defined PSM as “an individual’s predisposition to respond to motives grounded primarily or uniquely in public institutions and organizations.” Later, Wise (1999, p. 343) modified this as “...needs to perform acts of public service and to contribute to the advancement of the quality of life in society.” Based on a previous theoretical framework, Perry and Wise (1990) organized PSM into three categories; rational, norm-based, and affective. Rational motives are grounded in individual utility maximization. Perry argued that participation in the process of policy formulation belongs in this category. / Norm-based motives derive from social values and norms and include a desire to serve the public interest and to fulfill civic duty. Affective motives, based on emotional responses to various social contexts, include love of humanity and personal sacrifice for others.

Perry (1996) later established his PSM measurement scale with four factors and 24 statement items. Meanwhile the U.S Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB) included six items of Perry’s PSM scale in the 1996 Merit Principles Survey which covered a government wide sample of federal employees. According to Naff and Crum, who analyzed the impact of PSM on organizational variables using the data set, PSM was found to positively affect job satisfaction, outstanding performance and attitude toward NPR while it was also found to lower turnover intention (1999).

The third approach can be called a get-around method because it avoids the measurement question itself and links PSM to observable behavior. Brewer and Selden (1998), after a critical review of PSM literature, argued that PSM was a complicated and multi-faceted concept, and that a precise scale of measurement needed to be developed. Yet, they did not

use the reward preference approach, nor did they construct their own measure. By showing that whistle-blowers were more likely to be motivated by regard for the public interest than non whistle-blowers, they linked whistle blowing to PSM as a core behavior. They then examined the impact of PSM not only on reward preferences but also on job commitment and job satisfaction, using the 1992 Merit Principles Survey conducted by the MSPB. They ultimately focused on whistle blowing rather than on PSM itself. They found that whistle blowers reported higher levels of job commitment and job satisfaction, higher performance ratings, were higher achievers, and worked in higher performing organizations than did inactive observers (non whistle-blowers). They also found that whistle blowers were less likely to prefer job security. However, no difference in preference for monetary rewards was reported between the two groups.

Problems of the Approaches

The reward preference difference approach deserves special attention because a majority of research on PSM has depended on it. The problem with Rainey's measure of PSM as the difference in response between public and private managers to engaging in meaningful public service is that the two groups may simply understand the term differently. That is, the business managers may not perceive public service as a part of their roles, even if they have the same level of public service motives as public managers (Rainey 1982, Wittmer 1991). This demonstrates the importance of the kind of reward as well as how the question is worded.

Wittmer's research used being helpful to others and opportunities for community service to measure PSM. Although he found that both rewards were rated more highly by the public

and hybrid managers than by the private managers, as he hypothesized, all the groups placed the least or near least importance on opportunities for community service as a preference (Wittmer 1991, Table 2). As to this unexpected result Wittmer himself explained “The relatively lower rankings for this item may, in part, result from the potential ambiguity of the wording; it may be interpreted as different from helping others, in spite of the fact that both items were intended to measure similar preferences” (p. 379). Also, given the argument that PSM is a complicated and multi-faceted concept (Rainey 1982, 1997; Brewer and Selden 1998), efforts to elicit PSM with a couple of reward items are not likely to yield satisfactory responses.

Gabris and Simo’s argument to “forget about public sector motivation by and large” is not convincing, despite their findings about reward preference for community good, which Wittmer considered as one of the key items in the measurement of PSM (p 49). Their other key survey question, which asked the respondents to indicate a sector that they expected would provide the most exciting, challenging, and fulfilling opportunities, is also problematic as a test tool for PSM. The assumption would be valid only if PSM is solely responsible for the difference in respondents’ perceptions of work opportunities across the sectors. However, this is not likely to be the case, at least in the private sector. Public employees with a higher level of PSM may rate the public sector best while those with a lower level of PSM may rate the other sector best. That is, the question may have been valid if responses had been compared within the public sector. In the private sector it is very likely that other factors rather than PSM will affect perception on whether the current employment sector provides the most exciting, challenging, and fulfilling opportunities. Therefore, it is hasty and illogical

to reject the entire PSM concept based on the responses to a question that seems to tap different sources.

Studies made on the dual nature of PSM (Crewson 1997, Houston 2000) bring up more questions about the validity of their understanding and measurement of PSM. First, we can examine their discussion on intrinsic rewards which are expected to draw PSM as a higher need. At first, Crewson showed in the 1989 GSS, that public employees put more emphasis on a job that allowed them to help other people and that was useful to society than did private employees (1997, Exhibit 1). The job characteristics as intrinsic rewards conform to the criteria that Rainey and Wittmer used in their research. However, Crewson, analyzing other survey results, used the items "Getting a feeling of accomplishment from your job" (1979 Federal Employee Attitude Survey) and "Work important and gives a feeling of accomplishment" (1973-1993 GSS except for 1989) interchangeably with those altruistic rewards. Houston, whose research is based on an analysis of GSS from 1992 to 1994, regards a greater emphasis on work that is important and provides a feeling of accomplishment as a direct sign of a higher PSM. Although it seems reasonable to understand PSM as a higher need and, in that sense, some parts of it might respond to properly stated intrinsic reward questions, does PSM perfectly match with motivation for work that is important and gives a feeling of accomplishment? That they may not be identical concepts becomes clear when a survey includes both items. In a survey conducted on America's best and brightest of the class of 1988, respondents gave high scores to both small and large business in providing opportunity for challenging work and personal growth while giving low scores for service to society. The opposite pattern was found in the respondents' evaluation of public organizations, i.e., Federal, state, and local government and the military (Volcker

Commission 1989, p.106-110). They expected that the public agencies would ensure opportunity for service to society but not for challenging work and personal growth.

Moreover, a large body of counter-evidence shows that there is no difference in reward preferences for a feeling of accomplishment between private and public employees, or even that people who value intrinsic rewards more highly, including a feeling of accomplishment, strongly prefer private sector employment. Again, Rainey found no difference among his samples in the preference for many intrinsic rewards, such as a sense of worthwhile accomplishment, and a good feeling about oneself as a result of one's work (1982, Table 1). According to the Volcker Commission report, the top graduates highly valued challenging work and personal growth rather than pay and promotion. However, they did not see public service as providing those intangible and important rewards. The report lamented "Our sample ranked the Federal Service, state and local governments, and military fourth fifth, and sixth, respectively out of six possible employment alternatives posed in our survey in terms of providing challenging work and the opportunities for personal growth" (1989, p.107). Consequently, a majority of the graduates sought their employment in the private sector.

Crewson and Houston used these items interchangeably neglecting to differentiate two dimensions of the significance of a job. A feeling of accomplishment and of doing an important job is a crucial aspect of the relationship between a job and a job-holder. Helping other people and doing a job that is useful to society relate to another dimension of the importance of a job: the relationship between job and society. The former dimension of work has received much academic attention in business administration especially from organization humanists (Herzberg 1966, McGregor 1965, Hackman and Oldham 1980). In the field of public management, it is also an important issue (Lovrich 1987). In public

administration, however, perceived meaningfulness of a job in light of service to the public is as much or even more important because the ultimate goal is service to the public. If PSM receives special attention in public administration because it encourages public employees to care about the public interest that transcends concern about themselves, then the two dimensions should be distinguished conceptually. Although whether or not they go together—that is, if a public servant who strongly prefers a feeling of accomplishment retains a higher level of PSM—should be investigated through solid empirical tests, there is evidence that that is not necessarily the case as shown above. In the same vein, Rainey, rejecting job involvement as a proper measurement of PSM, states, “The emphasis in the job involvement scale on absorption in one’s own job may actually conflict with an emphasis on service to clients, broad social goals,…” (1982, p.298).

The argument that PSM is negatively related to extrinsic rewards raises other difficult questions. Crewson’s and Houston’s argument for the dual nature of PSM is based on research by Kilpatrick, Cummings, and Jennings (1964), Schuster (1974), Solomon (1986) and others. Those works conclude that public sector employees give lower rating to financial reward than their counterparts in the private sector. However, the low regard for monetary reward may be a rather common characteristic of public employees, rather than direct evidence of PSM (Brewer and Selden 1998).

It can be argued that money is fungible and that the functions money can play in the private sector may be different from those in the public sector. In addition to providing purchasing power for the satisfaction of basic needs, money plays an important symbolic role for most people as recognition of one’s skill and performance (Rainey 1997). Monetary rewards such as high salaries and large bonuses prove one’s worth, both to the recipient and

to others (Heffron 1989). Therefore, in private corporations where excellent performers and unusual achievers are encouraged by the wide use of monetary rewards, giving higher priority to financial rewards may be another expression of accomplishment.

Finally, the comparative methods combined with the interpretation that regards a low rating for extrinsic rewards in the public sector as an indication of higher PSM may have a pitfall. Crewson and Houston ignore the fact that situations can affect reward preferences, and that employees in both sectors do not always face the same circumstances. Suppose, for example, that a downsizing movement is sweeping mainly or more strongly throughout the public sector. Job security may be the top priority of most public servants during such a period of reduction in force even if they have a higher level of PSM on average than private employees. Situations may change government officials' perceptions of other extrinsic rewards. Regarding a significant change in federal employees' satisfaction with pay, which rose from 28 to 42 percent and then to 50 percent in 1989, 1992, and 1996, respectively, MSPB reported "Maybe in 1996 Federal employees who had survived their organizations' downsizing efforts were satisfied by virtue of the fact that they were still getting a paycheck" (1998, p.28). In such a case, without controlling for specific situation, identifying less emphasis on extrinsic rewards as an indication of PSM may be misleading. Judging from the problems discussed above, the dual nature approach to PSM concept seems less tenable.

The direct approach also involves some theoretical issues. First, the reliability and validity of Perry's PSM measurement scale comprised of 24 statement items in the following four sub-scales: attraction to public policy, public interest, compassion, and self-sacrifice should be considered. As for reliability, Perry (1997) reports an acceptable degree of internal consistency of his PSM construct. The values of the coefficient alpha were .77, .69, .72, and

.74, respectively, in the order of the sub scales. Validity refers to measuring what we think we are measuring (King et al 1994). To assure validity, a scale should be backed up by a sound theoretical framework and extensive literature review in the relevant field. Then the construct has to prove its “ability of a measuring tool to truly tap the information we seek” through empirical tests (Jones and Olson 1996). Perry’s PSM scale has met those requisites to a reasonable degree. Building on Knofe and Wright-Iask’s framework, he comprehensively embodied normative arguments on PSM in his construct. Then using confirmatory factor analysis he tested whether each of the sub scales and items matched well and made his construct more sophisticated through careful modifications (Perry 1996). Perry himself studied antecedents of PSM by using his construct (1997). Naff and Crum, who analyzed the Merit Principles Survey which employed a part of Perry’s scale (six items out of twenty four), said “It is likely that the magnitude of the relationships we found would have been even greater had we been able to include Perry’s entire scale on our survey,” thus strongly supporting the scale as a good measure of PSM (1999, p 14).

It has been debated, however, whether rational motives can serve as a base of PSM. Rainey (1982) and Brewer and Selden (1998) argue that PSM can be rooted only in prosocial behavior. From this perspective, the motivational force that induces individuals to perform meaningful public service—for example, public, community, and social service—by definition, does not reconcile well with rational motives. The argument seems to the point judging from the fact that PSM has come into the academic spotlight because it fosters behavior oriented to the common good in the public employee’s mind.

The get-around approach to the measurement of PSM has contributed to broad understanding of many features of PSM, by measuring PSM through the observable behavior

of whistle blowing. However, it is at best an indirect attempt and at worst avoidance of the important measurement issue. Because, as Brewer and Selden admit, “whistle blowing represents an extreme test of PSM,” (1998, p. 435) their hypotheses deal with whistle blowing rather than PSM. Moreover, given the relationship between whistle blowing and PSM, whistle blowing is a narrower concept than PSM. Therefore, it is questionable whether their findings can be directly generalized to other more moderate behavior which encompasses PSM but does not go as far as the whistle blowing.

Evaluation of the Approaches

With the discussion on the three approaches to measurement for PSM and their problems in mind, which is a better, if not the best, at this point? The get-around approach has a critical weakness to be used as a measurement because it needs specific and observable behavior as an intermediary.

If PSM is crucial motives to serve for the public interest and contributes to the quality of program and policy through its positive effects on the public employees' behavior, PSM can have definite implications for better human resource management. Information about the relative attractiveness of specific rewards for employees with a higher level of PSM would help to retain them. Further, consistent efforts to develop the incentive system would attract more new recruits with higher PSM. Because the reward preference approach to PSM underlies most research on this issue, for better evaluation of the approach, special attention should be given to how reliable the research results produced by the scholars who adopted this method have been.

The researchers, especially those focusing on the double nature of PSM, have distinguished intrinsic rewards from extrinsic rewards while virtually ignoring differences in each category. A systematic review of their research findings shows a more complicated picture concerning the relationship between PSM and various rewards than that suggested by the simple dichotomous analyses of rewards. There is extensive research on differences in reward preferences between public and private employees (Newstrom, Reif, and Monczka 1976; Schuster 1974; Bellante and Link 1981; Baldwin 1987, Rawls and Nelson 1975; Midani 1991). All of the studies, however, were not studied with regard to PSM.

Because this discussion centers on an examination of the relationship of PSM with preferences for diverse rewards, Table 1 was created based mainly on the works studied in the context of PSM. ² One characteristic of PSM we can quickly observe is that PSM is positively related to intrinsic reward items such as public interest, helping others, community service, and work that is useful to society in a consistent manner. Even in the survey of Gabris and Simo' who denied the concept of PSM, public employees placed more importance on community service (1995, Table 5).

In contrast, the relationships between PSM and other intrinsic rewards are not clear. The positive relationship, shown in Crewson's and Houston's study, between PSM and preference for work that is important and gives a feeling of accomplishment disappears in Rainey's research.

Regard for specific extrinsic rewards in terms of the relationship with PSM varies from study to study. The rating given to monetary reward does not appear to be stable, despite Houston's assertion that "One of the most enduring images is that public sector employees are less motivated by financial rewards than are private employees," (2000, p 714). Brewer

and Selden, Crewson and Gabris and Simo failed to prove it. Researchers also disagree on the relationship of PSM to preferences for job security and promotion.

Table 2-1: The Relationships of PSM and Various Reward Items

Scholars	Reward Items	Relationship with PSM	Note
Kelman	Money	–	Argument
Perry and Wise	Money	–	Argument
Rainey	High Pay Promotion Job Security Public Service Helping Others Accomplishment Good Feeling From One's Work	– • • + + • •	Original Survey
Wittmer	High Pay Job Security Status and Prestige Helping Others Community Service	– – – + +	Original Survey
Gabris and Simo	High Pay Job Security Competition Authority Community Service	• • + + +	Original Survey
Crewson	High Pay Promotion Job Security Service to Society Helping Others High Pay Promotion Job Security Service to Society Helping Others Accomplishment	• – – + + • • • + + +	1989 GSS 1994 IEEE 1979 FEAS
Brewer and Selden	Money Job Security Public Interest	• – +	1992 MPS
Houston	High Income Promotion Job Security Short Work Hours Accomplishment	– • + – +	1991, 1993, and 1994 GSS

Note: + means a positive, –means a negative, and • means no relationship

Much more interesting is that Crewson's picture of PSM with respect to preferences for extrinsic rewards is totally different from Houston's. Although administered at different times (Crewson used the 1989 survey while Houston analyzed the 1991-1994 except for 1992) their research is based on the analysis of the same survey, GSS. Crewson found PSM is negatively related to promotion and job security. He reported no relationship between PSM and high pay. In Houston's analysis a low regard for high income was a feature of PSM. However, as for promotion and job security, he found no significant relationship and even a positive relationship with PSM, respectively. 3

The scholars who used the same methods do not agree on PSM in terms of reward preferences. Then, how can the reward preference approach be used as an objective and reliable measurement for PSM?

Throughout this dissertation, PSM will be measured with Perry's PSM construct. The first justification for the decision is that Perry's measurement scale has fewer problems despite some theoretical concerns. The most serious theoretical challenge to Perry's measurement scale is the argument that a rational basis cannot serve as a factor of PSM. As a rational base for PSM, Perry suggests participation in the formulation of public policy. Perry argues that people experience this motive when they participate in the policy process because they feel "public policy making can be exciting and dramatic and can reinforce one's image of self-importance" (Perry 1996). It would appear that PSM is understood and approached in a similar vein in the research done by Crewson, Houston, and Gabris and Simo. In other words, PSM is analyzed from the narrow perspective of job-person relationship. However, the "desire to participate in the formulation of good public policy"—to which Perry ascribed rational motive—is linked to society as well (Kelman 1987, p. 80). That is, individuals, by

involving themselves in the public policy process, contribute to the public good as a way of satisfying their personal needs (Wise 1999). 'Rational' here may mean that a regard for the public interest coincides with the concern for personal utility maximization. Therefore, it is different from the concept of sheer self-interest in rational choice theory, because sheer self-interest directs behavior primarily toward selfish ends at the expense of the common good, so that "pursuit of self interest in the political process creates catastrophe" (Kelman 1987, p. 82). This alleviates some of the concern about employing the factor of attraction to public policy in measuring PSM. Second, even the scholars who used the other approaches admit that of the three approaches to PSM measurement the direct method is the most methodologically advanced and sophisticated (Brewer and Selden 1998, Houston 2000). Third, Perry's construct is specially designed to capture the diverse aspects of the characteristic of PSM responding to intrinsic reward items such as public interest, helping others, and community service, which is found to be consistent in the reward preference approach.

The Prevalence of PSM in the Public Sector

Because PSM represents a universal characteristic that transcends the public sector (Brewer and Selden 1998), it is not expected to be found exclusively in the public sector. In that sense, PSM is not the sector-based concept understood by Gabris and Simo. However, many scholars argue that PSM should be more prevalent in the public sector (Perry and Wise 1990, Crewson 1995, Wise 1999), because government is supposed to serve the public interest directly; thus, by providing individuals with outstanding opportunities to perform meaningful public service, government careers allow individuals with higher PSM to better

fulfill their public service motives. That is to say, PSM is identified as a feature of public employees that distinguishes them from their private counterparts. Consequently, it is clear that whether or not the argument is viable hinges on the public's perception of government. Government organizations should be perceived as different from private ones not only in terms of the nature of their tasks, but also as a workplace where public employees can satisfy their service motives to a reasonable degree.

Unfortunately, three trends, both in theory and in practice, have undermined the differentiated positive perception of the public sector for several decades. The first challenge came from rational choice theory. Also termed "public choice theory," "social choice theory," "game theory," "rational actor models," "positive political economics," and "the economic approach to politics," rational choice theory is a general term representing any theory from voter turnout to coalition building which adopts the assumption of self-interest and the logic of micro economics (Green and Shapiro 1994). In the view of a rational choice theorist, public officials are simply personal utility maximizers incessantly using their positions for their own purpose. Niskanen's argument that public bureaucrats will seek to increase the size of their agency's budget (1971) or discretionary budget (1991) corresponds with that assertion. The theorists also argue that government can do nothing right (Todaro 1996), because of the belief that economic efficiency, considered to be the public good and ultimate goal, can be attained only through competitive markets and profit-based incentive systems. Conversely, a bureaucracy lacking those indispensable mechanisms is doomed to fail (Goodsell 1983). As everyone is pursuing goals connected with self-interest and the size of the public sector is ever increasing, the net result is not only an inefficient allocation of sparse resources, but also a reduction in individual freedom (Todaro 1996).

The image of the government and public employees envisaged by rational choice theorists is totally different from that proposed by PSM scholars. In this regard it is understandable that the latter have expressed deep concern about the negative picture of government and public employees painted by rational choice theorists. Steiner (1990) demanded that students be clearly informed that rational choice theory describes how some people behave but not how they should behave. Kelman went further, maintaining:

The cynicism of journalists—and even the writings of professors—can decrease public spirit simply by describing what they claim to be its absence. Cynics are therefore in the business of making prophecies that threaten to become self-fulfilling. If the norm of public spirit dies, our society would look bleaker and our lives as individuals would be more impoverished. That is the tragedy of “public choice” (1987, P. 93).

The civil service reform movement since the 1980s has also diluted distinctive features of government organizations. Under the powerful influence of rational choice theory, which holds that minimal government is the best government and market strategies are the only means to correct the failure of government (Hoogerwerf 1992), the main goals of the reform movement focused on downsizing and running government like a business (Peters and Savoie 1994, Todaro 1996, Box 1999). While privatization and contracting out were widely adopted to cut the size of government, the terminology and practices of the private sector, such as user fees, service to customer, and pay for performance, permeated into public management. In the context of this reform movement, the public-private distinction has become essentially obsolete and management has become generic across sectors (Box 1999)

Another element in the reform of civil service is bureaucrat bashing; the constant reference to the private sector for insight into better management strengthened public suspicion of bureaucrats and traditional public administration (Peters and Savoie 1994).

President Reagan initiated his anti-bureaucratic rhetoric from the very beginning of his term:

in his 1981 Inaugural Address, he said “In the present crises, government is not the solution to the public; government is the problem” (quoted in Terry 1997, p. 55). Four years later, Reagan’s attitude had not changed: right after his second inauguration, he was reported as saying, “The best minds are not in government. If they were, business would hire them away” (quoted in Clark and Wachtel 1988, p. 15).

In sum, public employees have been described as, or criticized for, being dangerous manipulators of political power, intolerable oppressors of the individual, or bungling, poor performers (Goodsell 1983). Government organizations, in turn, have been, at best, a necessary evil and, at worst, groups of villains (Terry 1997). In contrast, private corporations are always examples of excellent performance. Public employees have been ceaselessly told to model themselves on their private sector counterparts. Taking the three trends into consideration, the difficult question of whether or not PSM is more prevalent in the public sector involves the complex issue of the public’s perception of government and its employees. To address this question, an empirical test armed with methodological rigor is strongly demanded.

Most of the efforts made to test the argument for the prevalence of PSM in the public sector empirically found that PSM was more prevalent in the public sector (Rainey 1982, Wittmer 1991, Crewson 1997, Houston 2000). Despite support from the majority of studies, however, it is still hard to conclude definitively that PSM is more prevalent in the public sector, for the following reasons: first, the studies, as already discussed, are grounded in a problematic conceptualization and definition of PSM. The second reason is associated with a sampling problem: because each sector, though seemingly generic, includes a variety of professions that can be very heterogeneous, a critical issue in the study using an inter-sector

comparative method centers on the issue of controlling for possible independent variables other than sector difference by securing matching groups to the highest degree possible. However, as Crewson noted, it might be nearly impossible to control simultaneously for such a large number of factors as: organizational styles, occupations, mission, benefit structures, and external constraints. (1997, p. 504). The second best option under these circumstances would be to focus on one factor which seems to have a critical effect on the dependent variable, as suggested by the work of Nalbandian and Edwards. Their research showed that profession is a crucial independent variable affecting value preferences (Nalbandian and Edwards 1983). Most studies, except for Crewson's analysis of an IEEE survey administered to members within the same profession, lack this important criterion; Gabris and Simo, for example, completely ignore this issue, omitting a description of the organizations from which their samples were drawn.

With the methodological flaws of the previous research in mind, it is difficult to say that the question has already been answered. This dissertation tries to avoid these methodological pitfalls, first by using Perry's full version of the PSM scale and then by securing comparable samples through a careful research design.

The Relationship of PSM to Job Satisfaction and Organizational Commitment

The implications of PSM for public employees' work related behavior have received much attention. From their review of the literature, Perry and Wise have proposed some potential behavioral implications of PSM. They expected that PSM would be positively related to job satisfaction, organizational commitment, performance, and retention. Employees with a higher level of PSM, according to them, would be more satisfied,

committed, and productive members of their organizations. This dissertation will focus on the potential impact of PSM on job satisfaction and organizational commitment, the most intensively studied variables in organizational research.

Job satisfaction is defined as an individual's feelings about his or her job and various aspects of it (Rainey 1997). A serious problem in the study of job satisfaction involves the unwillingness of researchers to make use of previously developed satisfaction questionnaires, thus resulting in the practice of developing a new satisfaction scale for each study. Because different ways of measuring job satisfaction imply different definitions, Locke once noted that there exist over 3,500 studies of job satisfaction without any clear agreement on how it is defined (quoted in Rainey 1997, p. 245). That is a clear indication that the selection of precise measurement is a very crucial factor in any study involving job satisfaction.

In this regard, the Job Descriptive Index (JDI), developed by Smith, Kendall, and Hulin, is considered by many scholars to be the most reliable, valid, and widely used measure of job satisfaction (Watson, Watson, and Stowe 1985; Landy and Trumbo 1980; Rainey 1997). The JDI measures job satisfaction in terms of five principal aspects of a job: the specific work itself, pay, opportunities for promotion, co-workers, and supervision (Smith, Kendall, and Hulin 1969). While a simple measure, usually using few questions, i.e., "Are you satisfied with your job?" is vulnerable to measurement error by allowing interference from the other aspects of job satisfaction, the JDI can not only focus on a specific facet, but also elicit a balanced measurement of job satisfaction.

With regard to the correlates of job satisfaction, diverse demographic variables have been reported including gender, education level, length of tenure, and rank in the hierarchy. However, researchers do not agree on the directions of impact of such variables on job

satisfaction. For example, young women showed higher levels of job satisfaction than young men in Hamilton and Wright's study (1986); however, several other studies by Blackburn and Bruce (1989) and Daley (1988) found little relationship between gender and levels of job satisfaction. While the same studies found little relationship between age and job satisfaction, Tschirhart found age to positively affect job satisfaction (1998). Study results on the effect of educational level on job satisfaction also diverge. Hamilton and Wright reported a positive relationship between the two variables, while Naff and Crum (1999) found a negative relationship.

The same can be reported for tenure and rank; because unhappy people tend to leave, and people who achieve higher levels would be expected to be happier, tenure and rank are generally found to be positively related to job satisfaction. In some organizations, however, longer-term employees feel under-compensated for their long service. When employees feel they have hit a ceiling on their opportunities for promotion or pay raises, job satisfaction is found to be negatively related with tenure and rank (Rainey 1983). Although the relationships between job satisfaction and other correlates remain inconclusive, demographic variables should be controlled in order to ascertain a clearer relationship between job satisfaction and PSM.

In addition, job characteristics should be taken into account as potential correlates of job satisfaction because, according to motivation theorists, especially content theorists, they are the most important factor affecting job satisfaction. For content theorists, motivation occurs when employees' unmet needs are satisfied. The theorists argue that human needs are universalistic and that, following Maslow's humanistic tradition, higher needs are more powerful and important. The higher needs, in turn, can only be satisfied with intrinsic

rewards which come from the job itself. That is, a job itself that provides opportunity for self-expression, creativity, challenge, and responsibility becomes intrinsic motivator (Heffron 1989). Then, it is very natural, from the viewpoint of content theorists, that job satisfaction and motivation hinge on the contents of the job they hold. In this context, job enrichment has been prescribed to motivate employees (McGregor 1960 and Herzberg 1966). Hackman and Oldham furthered the study on job enrichment and developed Job Characteristic Model (JCM) that captured job enrichment with five core job dimensions: skill variety, task significance, autonomy, task identity, and feedback (1976). Much research has been conducted based on the model, and most of them confirmed that job characteristics affected behavioral outcomes including job satisfaction (Robbins 1997) and motivation (Lovrich 1987). In this study, the effects of job contents or job characteristics on job satisfaction were controlled using Hackman and Oldham's sophisticated measurement scale.

As consequences of job satisfaction, absenteeism and turnover have been extensively studied because they are likely to increase personnel cost and to negatively affect organizational effectiveness. Scholars have reported an inverse relationship between absenteeism and job satisfaction (Scott and Taylor, 1985). Research on the turnover-job satisfaction relationship, like that of absenteeism-job satisfaction, is based on the assumption that dissatisfied workers are more likely than satisfied workers to terminate employment, and thus low satisfaction scores should predict high turnover (Lawler 1973). Caster and Spector (1987), through a meta-analysis of 47 studies of the job satisfaction-turnover relationship, reported a mean correlation between job satisfaction and turnover of $-.23$.

Despite extensive studies, however, the relationship between performance and job satisfaction at an individual level still remains an open question. Schwab and Cummings

(1970) identified three major perspectives as follows: first, satisfaction causes performance ($s \rightarrow p$); second, performance causes satisfaction ($p \rightarrow s$); and third, the satisfaction-performance relationship is moderated by a number of other variables. Although no theoretical position has received resounding empirical support, it seems that job satisfaction will continue to attract scholarly attention, because the relationship offers enough intuitive appeal and practical importance to remain a topic of interest (Petty, McGee, and Cavender 1984, Heffron 1989, Rainey 1997).

In the meantime, there has been extensive research comparing job satisfaction levels between the public and the private sectors; with the results too mixed for a decisive conclusion. More than thirty years ago, Paine, Carroll and Leete (1966) and Rhinehart and his collaborators (1969) reported that groups of business managers showed generally higher job satisfaction than federal managers. Lackman (1985) also found higher levels of job satisfaction among CEOs in the private sector than among high-ranking public managers. In Smith and Nock's study (1980), which analyzed a large social survey, blue-collar workers in the public sector showed more job satisfaction than their counterparts in the private sector, while among white-collar workers, the trend was the opposite. Blund and Spring (1991), examining levels of job satisfaction for MPA graduates employed in the public, private, and non-profit sectors through their own survey, found that their sample respondents reported greater satisfaction with pay and promotion opportunities in the private sector than in either the public or non-profit sectors. With regard to work satisfaction or satisfaction with supervision or co-workers, no significant differences were noted among the sectors.

On the other hand, numerous studies have found comparable levels of job satisfaction in both the sectors, or even higher job satisfaction in the public sector. The U.S Office of

Personnel Management reported that public employees retain the same level of job satisfaction as private employees (OPM 1979). Lewis (1990) found, through an analysis of GSS from 1982 to 1988, that public employees are as satisfied with their job as is the general public, while professionals and managers in the public sector reported even higher levels of job satisfaction. Utilizing the Youth Cohort of the National Longitudinal Survey, Steel and Warner (1990) showed that young public sector employees manifest significantly higher levels of job satisfaction than their private sector counterparts.

Do the comparative studies on job satisfaction have any meaningful implications for the current concern about the relationship of PSM with job satisfaction? As discussed earlier, Gabris and Simo (1995) tried to solve the question from this perspective. Under the assumption that public employees with higher levels of job satisfaction will rate the public sector high as a satisfactory work place, they attempted to measure PSM in terms of positive perceptions of the current employment sector. However, the studies comparing job satisfaction levels between the public and private sector shed little light on the relationship between job satisfaction and PSM, although they are valuable in their own right. This is not only because their research results are still far from conclusive, but also because they did not incorporate PSM as an important variable. The main purpose of the comparative research on job satisfaction in the both sectors has been to test the hypothesis that public employees experience lower levels of job satisfaction than their private sector counterparts. This dissatisfaction has allegedly been pervasive due to both external factors such as bureaucrat bashing, and internal constraints, such as rigid management.

Several studies directly addressed the relationship of job satisfaction and PSM. In Rainey's study, his sample of public managers who put more emphasis on meaningful public

service as a reward also showed higher levels of job satisfaction. The correlation coefficients were high enough to be statistically significant. In other words, public managers who gave a high value to the importance of meaningful public service were also found to retain higher levels of satisfaction with work, supervision, coworkers, and promotion. Brewer and Selden also found there was a statistically significant difference in job satisfaction levels between whistle-blowers and inactive observers. Because they linked whistle-blowing to PSM, they concluded that PSM had a positive effect on job satisfaction (Brewer and Selden 1998, Exhibit 5). Naff and Crum also found that a positive relationship between the two variables remained after controlling for other demographic variables (1999, Table 3).

Although studies provide somewhat reliable evidence that PSM has a positive effect on job satisfaction, before reaching a definitive conclusion we must carefully examine some methodological problems involved in each of them. First, all the studies are based on their own definitions and measurements of PSM, a fact that has been noted as problematic. They also measured job satisfaction with different measures; while Rainey was the only researcher who used the JDI index, Naff and Crum employed the simple question method and Brewer and Selden adopted an index composed of four items. Important demographic variables were not controlled for in Brewer and Selden's study. No study other than Rainey's employed job characteristics as possible antecedents of job satisfaction. These methodological problems might be trivial; sometimes measurement issues may be inevitable, especially for the studies using existing survey results. However, such issues still pose stumbling blocks in the construction of cumulative evidence on the relationship between job satisfaction and PSM. One of the contributions this study attempts to bring to this area is to overcome the shortcoming of existing studies.

Organizational commitment is another work-related attitude considered important in this study. The concept of organizational commitment, referring to the psychological linkage between an individual and his or her organization, is commonly defined as “the relative strength of an individual’s identification with and involvement in a particular organization” (Mowday, Porter, and Steers 1982, p 27). Porter et al (1974) characterized it as having three components: (1) a strong belief in and acceptance of the organization’s goals, (2) a willingness to exert considerable effort on behalf of the organization, (3) a definite desire to maintain organizational membership.

Scholars show much higher levels of agreement on the measurement issue of organizational commitment than of job satisfaction. Even so, there are still a large number of commitment measures, including the Ritzer-Tricer Scale (1969), the Hrebiniak-Alutto Scale (1972), the Organizational Commitment Questionnaire (OCQ: Mowday 1979), the Affective Commitment Scale (ACS: Jackson 1970), and the Continuance Commitment Scale (Meyer and Allen 1984). Thus the choice of a valid and reliable measure is a crucial issue in the study of organizational commitment, too. Of the scales, OCQ has been recognized as the most valid and reliable measure (Ferris and Aranya 1983, Angle and Pery 1981). Furthermore, most empirical research on commitment during the past decades has used OCQ (Balfour and Wechsler 1991).

According to Balfour and Wechsler (1991), scholars have identified as many as twenty-five potential correlates of commitment in the studies using the OCQ. Steer (1997) grouped those antecedents of organizational commitment into three general categories: (1) personal characteristics, (2) individual’s work experiences (3) job characteristics. A majority of the studies using the concept of organizational commitment has paid attention mainly to the first

category, personal characteristics. Although it is almost impossible to take all of the possible antecedents into consideration, controlling for only demographic variables does not seem to be adequate. Considering that commitment to an employing organization is in part a function of socialization which, in turn, is affected by interactions with other members, some additional relevant variables that can capture those impacts seems necessary. In this context, the second category, an individual's work experiences were included in many studies (Buchanan 1974, Lomzek 1985). As in job satisfaction, job characteristics were also identified as potential independent variables of organizational commitment (Steer 1977, Crewson 1997).

Organizational commitment, understood as ties between employee and an organization, has widely been identified as lowering undesirable organizational behavior such as turnover and tardiness. Mathieu and Zajac (1998) summarized the empirical findings of 124 studies; the results illustrated that organizational commitment correlated negatively with tardiness (average coefficient, $-.12$), turnover (average coefficient, $-.28$), and the intention to leave one's job (average coefficient, $-.46$). Similarly, Mowday, Porter, and Steer (1982) suggested that highly committed employees can facilitate organizational goal attainment because they are motivated to go to work. Some scholars went one step further, arguing that employees with higher levels of organizational commitment will perform their jobs more willingly and voluntarily (Eisenberger, Fasolo 1990). It is in this regard that scholars link PSM to organizational commitment. Because PSM is a need to serve the public interest, public employees with higher levels of PSM are more likely to be identified with, involved in, and tied to the government organizations whose mission is supposed to serve the general public.

Along the same lines, Romzek argued that “commitment among public sector employees can also be a way to fulfill a public service motivation” (1990, p. 377).

If the argument for the positive relationship between organizational commitment and PSM is combined with the assertion that PSM is more prevalent in the public sector, it seems likely that public employees would manifest higher levels of organizational commitment than private employees; however, empirical studies show that this is not necessarily the case. Buchanan (1974), and Flynn and Tannenbaum (1993) found that their sample of public managers showed lower organizational commitment than that of their counterparts in private corporations. As is the case with job satisfaction, however, the comparative degree of organizational commitment in the public and private sector is not consistent. Steinhaus and Perry (1996) showed, through an analysis of GSS, that there was no significant difference in organizational commitment levels in both sectors. Thus, the comparative studies do not provide any clue to the question of whether PSM has a positive impact on organizational commitment among public employees. Only two studies tackled this issue. Brewer and Selden, showing that their sample of whistle-blowers reported higher levels of job commitment than inactive observers, interpreted that finding as a sign of a positive relationship between PSM and organizational commitment (1998, Exhibit 5). In Crewson’s more elaborate research, he used the 1979 Federal Employee Attitude Survey to show that PSM had a positive and independent impact on organizational commitment in his OLS regression analysis (1997, Exhibit 3).

However, their studies have obvious methodological flaws. Once again it should be noted that their PSM concepts are highly debatable. In addition, the measures used to gauge organizational commitment are also problematic. Brewer and Selden, using the term ‘job

commitment', included three survey items to measure the concept: (1) My values and the organization's values are similar, (2) My organization inspires me to perform well, (3) Most of my interests are centered around my job. The first two items are a part of the OCQ and the third is a part of a Job Involvement Scale. However, organizational commitment and job involvement are not necessarily the same concept. Thus, it would appear that Brewer and Selden mixed heterogeneous items and used the composite value as a measurement of job commitment. If, as they said, Buchanan's Job Involvement Scale (1975) closely paralleled their job commitment measurement (p. 425), the finding conflicts with Rainey's (1982), which showed no relationship between PSM and job involvement. A final problem with Brewer and Selden's study is that they did not take any control variables into consideration. Likewise, Crewson's study is not free from the measurement issue. He created a measure of organizational commitment by combining statements touching on diverse work-related attitudes such as job satisfaction, turnover, and organizational commitment (1997, p. 507).

The small number of studies addressing the implications of PSM for organizational commitment, added to the methodological problems involved in the studies, signify that the issue is far from resolved, and that further efforts, with greater attention to methodology, are needed.

The Implication of PSM for Government Employee's Conception of Roles and Responsibilities

Government employees' roles and responsibilities have long been a burning issue between two schools of thought. Following Wilson's argument that the functions of politics and administration are separate and that public administration is the study of business, one

school of thought proposes efficiency as the central value of public administration. The roles and responsibilities demanded from government officials focus on the implementation of policies made by legitimate representatives in as neutrally competent a way as possible. Neutral competence has been traditionally defined as “the ability to do the work of government expertly, and to do it *according to explicit, objective standards* rather than to personal or party or other obligations and loyalties” (Kaufman 1956, p. 1960, emphasis added). Therefore, it becomes important to faithfully follow clearly defined rules, regulations, and procedures. Even in cases of unclear directions or lack of directions it does not allow bureaucrats to use discretionary power or to apply moral principles of their own (Gawthrop 1998). The recent reform movement which relies heavily on private sector management techniques and methods is in the same line in that it is based on the assumption of the policy-management dichotomy, and its ultimate goal is to achieve efficiency in the public sector (Peters and Savoie 1994).

The other school of thought emerged with the arrival of the New Deal. Having observed the decline of the capacity of the legislative body to handle complex social problems on the one hand, and the expanding power of the executive branch on the other hand, scholars such as Dimock, Appleby, and Waldo criticized the politics-administration dichotomy. While they emphasized the political nature of public administration, the functions of policy making, they based the legitimacy of public service on executive control (Ingraham and Rosenbloom 1990). Under the conditions of positive government, Frankfurter argues that public servants are asked to think and do “what ought to be done instead of merely doing that which must be done” (quoted in Gawthrop 1998, p. 764). Carnevale calls the performing of the positive role “working beyond contract” (quoted in Wise 1999, p. 349). But, to what end is the proactive

role in policy making advocated? How far can it be admitted? This philosophy puts emphasis on administrative values not only as an overarching guideline for administrative action but also as a form of internal control (Ingraham and Ban 1988). Although scholars diverge in proposing specific values, there is little disagreement that the guiding values should be based on democracy, and that democracy as an abstract concept must be transformed into an empirical reality through public administration. One of the most influential efforts came from the scholars of the new public administration. Suggesting that the narrow efficiency and neutrality do not address larger democratic issues, Frederickson (1971) proposed social equity as the third pillar of public administration. Similarly, Harmon, proposed that administrators take a more affirmative and activist stance and play as advocates for disadvantaged groups (1971). The debate on the nature of government employees' roles and responsibilities has two dimensions: neutrality versus proactive administration and managerial efficiency versus social equity (Selden et al 1999).

The debate in the field of empirical theory is as heated as that in the realm of normative research. Maranto surveyed more than seven hundred high-level careerists and political appointees from fifteen federal organizations. Using his neutrality items, he showed that a dominant portion of the government employees accepted neutrality as a principle norm (Maranto and Skelly 1992). In contrast, through Q methodology—qualitative method used to investigate the attitudes and viewpoints of subjects—Selden et al revealed five different concepts existing among public servants of their roles and responsibilities. Their conclusion was that the role conception of neutrality reported by Maranto and Skelly was perceived not only by a small number of the respondents, but that they were the most dissatisfied group (194).

Then, how can PSM relate to government employees' conception of their roles and responsibilities? PSM, as a need to serve the public, presupposes a personal interpretation of the public interest. For public employees, it is likely to form, foster, and develop an image of model public service in their minds, which is directly linked to the public interest as they perceive. A portrait of an ideal public servant envisaged by them is a specific set of roles and responsibilities of government employees that are chosen from the administrative value dimensions discussed above. Thus, PSM can affect government employees' conception of roles and responsibilities in this way. There had been no academic review on the possible relationship between government employees' conception of their roles and responsibilities and PSM until Selden et al and Wise raised the issue recently. The researchers relate PSM to government employees' proactive and equity-oriented roles rather than neutral and efficiency-oriented attitudes. Selden et al argue that

...scholars should focus attention on the steward of the public interest and practical idealist roles because they support the long-standing claim that many public administrators are motivated by a strong public service ethic and a desire to further the public interest...(Selden et al 1999, p.194).

They introduce some exemplary statements representing each role type made by their respondents, public employees working at various levels of government organizations.

Individuals belong to the stewards of the public interest type say that

I view myself as an active participant in government rather than an order follower...Social service organizations often serve as a giant curtain shielding the general public from the harsh realities of a world they pay taxes not to see (Selden et al 1999, p.186).

The following comments are from the public employees named as practical idealists:

We cannot be neutral and get the job done...Bureaucrats are responsible to the people, not to anyone else. Legislators look for their own gains both politically and personally ...(Selden et al 1999, p.190).

Explaining why PSM is significant in the study of public administration, Wise also asserted that

“Public service motives have the potential for advancing the democratic state...if ‘good’ public administration means rule-based, efficient, economical, and professional management, then it is incompatible with an emphasis of values, education, and engagement... public service motives are the underpinning for the uniqueness that defines the public service culture... [Public service motives] are the platform from which public servants bring values and engagement to the work” (1999, p. 350-51, emphasis added).

Although no empirical study has been conducted with focus on the relationship between PSM and government employees’ conception of roles and responsibilities, it may be useful to refer to several comparative analyses of attitudes of bureaucrats and the general public.

Goodsell (1983), through analyses of many existing survey results, found that bureaucrats were just ordinary people sharing similar demographic characteristics, political opinions, and personal attitudes with ordinary people.

Lewis (1990), following Goodsell’s course of study, investigated whether bureaucrats were more likely to favor an expansion of government and less committed to traditional values than the general public by analyzing the GSS between 1982-1988. According to his findings, government employees were no more likely to favor raising government spending or to have confidence in the people running government institutions. They also were as religious as the general population. However, there were differences in attitudes toward some important issues. Bureaucrats were less likely to favor laws regulating private behavior such

as abortion and divorce. They showed more tolerance for unpopular minorities, i.e., homosexuals, militarists and communists. Government employees also were more sympathetic to the rights of African Americans.

Because the main purpose of those studies was to test the argument for negative images of government bureaucracy described in rational choice theory and bureaucrat bashing, their research focus does not fit well with the research questions of this dissertation. Nor did they include PSM as an independent variable, so it is impossible to clearly identify the relationship between PSM and government employees' conception of roles and responsibilities. However, Lewis' study appears to imply that PSM might be related to more liberal attitudes and, in that sense, further to equity oriented role conception.

On the other hand, Crewson (1997) attempted to assess the implications of PSM on public policy and political attitudes in a similar way as Lewis. Using the 1989 GSS he examined whether PSM can make difference in opinions about scope of government roles. He found that his service-oriented respondents and economic-oriented respondents had similar opinions on the levels of government spending on general problems, welfare, and health. Although he incorporated PSM as an independent variable in his study, Crewson's research is of little use to the current research question. His concept of service orientation does not reflect PSM well. The survey items he used to elicit respondents' public policy and political attitudes do not seem to be well designed for the purpose; there are only three questions and too basic and general in nature. Neither can they be used for an indication of government employees' role conception.

Efforts to evaluate the real value of the arguments of Selden et al and Wise are still lacking. This dissertation tries to fill the research gap by seeking the answer to the question

whether and, if so, how PSM can affect government employees' conception of roles and responsibilities.

Summary

In this chapter, research on PSM was critically reviewed. First, the issue of definition and measurement of PSM was analyzed. Without a widely accepted concept and well-devised measurement, it is impossible for PSM theory to develop into a new motivation theory. Through the literature review, three different approaches were identified: reward preference (or indirect) method, direct method by developing PSM construct, and get-around approach. Reward preference approach attempts to measure PSM in an indirect way, focusing on rewards rather than on PSM itself on the premise that there is a particular set of matches between a need and a reward. However, despite a consensus that PSM is a higher need, scholars failed to reach an agreement on which types of intrinsic incentives should be matched with PSM. Neither was empirical evidence conclusive about the relationships of PSM to extrinsic incentives. The second method addresses the measurement issue directly by constructing a PSM scale. Although it may be the right way, building a valid and reliable measurement can be a difficult challenge. The third approach depends on certain observable behaviors for the measurement of PSM. Although it avoids the measurement issue, PSM embraced in other behaviors cannot be captured easily. After detailed explanation and evaluation of the features of each approach, Perry's PSM construct was selected for this study.

The second part of this study examined the works that were related to the research questions proposed in the previous chapter. It was observed that most pro-PSM arguments on

the prevalence of PSM in the public sector and positive effect of PSM on government employees' job satisfaction and organizational commitment were far from convincing; because of methodological pitfalls such as problematic measurement of key variables, sampling error, and omission of potential antecedents, their empirical evidence was shaky. To avoid the common mistakes, a wide range of strategies including employment of Perry's PSM construct and controlling for profession as a crucial correlate of PSM was discussed. Also, the literature review drew a number of potential antecedents that should be incorporated to see the net effect of PSM on job-related attitudes. Finally, despite heated debate on government employees' conception of their roles and responsibilities, virtually no academic research deals with the issue from the perspective of PSM. Since government employees' value orientation in relation with their jobs are likely to affect the quality of their services, it was pointed out that the research gap should be closed.

Note

1. Perry and Wise once broadly included participation in the process of policy formulation, commitment to a public program because of personal identification, and advocacy for special interest in rational motives. Later, Perry (1997) narrowed his focus only to an attraction to public policy making.

2. Reward items that were important or received different preferences between public and private respondents in each study are only included in Table 1.

3. That does not mean Houston argues that the higher an employee's PSM level is the more highly he or she rates the importance of job security. Because he assumes the prevalence of PSM in the public sector, if following his logic, more emphasis on job security put by the public employees can not but imply that job security is a feature of PSM.

Chapter III: Understanding the Korean Bureaucracy

This chapter is designed to help to understand the Korean bureaucracy, the subject of this study. Since a bureaucracy is created and developed in peculiar environmental settings like any other social system, the first part will take a look at the stages the Korean bureaucracy has gone through from the viewpoint of political history. The second part will deal with the current Korean civil service system. Data from diverse sources will be utilized to provide a balanced understanding of how the system actually operates. With regard to PSM concept, scholarly works and surveys that have theoretical and practical relevance to the research questions will be reviewed in the third part.

Historical Background

Long Tradition of Confucianism and Bureaucracy

During the Chosun Dynasty (1392-1910), one of the longest in human history, Confucianism was accepted as the fundamental ruling ideology. Because all the political, social, and economic institutions and systems were developed on the basis of Confucianism, it is necessary to briefly describe Confucian ideas in order to understand the political culture and bureaucracy of Chosun.

Confucianism presupposes the existence of a grand order in the universe, a concept similar to that of Providence or Natural Law in Western philosophy (Lin 1994). Human beings not only have an obligation to lead their lives guided by natural order, but they are also able to find true happiness and peace only by so doing. Even a king, if he tries to oppose this order, is doomed to lose the kingship. The other ideological pillar of Confucianism is the

family ethic, considered the most crucial factor in maintaining social order and stability. The family is the basic unit of society. It has two dimensions: one vertical, and the other horizontal. The former consists of the parental solicitude for their children and the children's respect for their parents. The horizontal dimension refers to fraternity among siblings. Loyalty to a head of state is a different version of respect for parents. Mutual understanding and cooperation among people is an extension of fraternity. A nation is understood as an enlarged family (Kim 1984).

Under Confucianism, the king should be a person who identifies and subjects himself to the grand order, as well as internalizing the virtues of the family ethic. He not only rules people but also edifies them so that they can live up to their moral capacity. Mencius, another eminent Chinese philosopher, developed Confucianism into a people-based political thought. He argued that a nation's subjects, the ordinary people, should be considered as more important in political life of a nation than the nation itself or even the king. Because the ultimate goal of Confucianism is the realization of the grand order in the real world, indicated by the degree to which people live in peace and order through enlightenment of their human nature and morality, he maintained, people are object whereas the nation and the king are instrumental (Mencius, quoted in Kim 1984, p. 247). That notion of 'people-based' political thought is closer to the 'for the people' rather than the 'by the people' principle of democracy.

Ruling for the people becomes possible when the emergence of despotism can be prevented by established institutions. That is the function of bureaucrats in an ideal Confucian nation. Because even a philosopher king can make mistakes, administration

should be conducted through consultation with bureaucrats, who aid a king, while also serving as a counter balancing group.

The Chosun Dynasty rulers of Korea followed the teaching more faithfully than any other dynasty, even in China. Dopyunguisasa, the highest decision making body of the Dynasty, was composed of high ranking bureaucrats working for the various ministries. They discussed important issues, made decisions, and ordered them to be implemented under the name of the king. Kings in the Chosun Dynasty, especially in the earlier era, played a nominal role except for retaining military power (Kim 1984).

However, the bureaucrats were different from the nobles who had ruled during the previous Koryo Dynasty and who maintained their status mainly by relying on ascribing factors such as inheritance. Bureaucrats in the Chosun Dynasty emerged as the ruling class through *Kwager*, an open and competitive civil service examination for recruitment of government officials. Although there was some class-based discrimination of applicants, it was by merit that they were recruited as government officials and incorporated into a ruling class of bureaucrats. Although *Kwager* was adopted by the Koryo dynasty in 958, the practice had been a complementary way to hire government officials until Taejo, the first king of Chosun, ordered its establishment as the primary recruitment policy, fully based on merit (Lee 1991). Though the primary test which is designed to select the administrative class, bureaucrats, was the most important, secondary tests were administered to recruit lower level officials for clerical and technical jobs. That is, in principle, government officials in the Chosun Dynasty, at all ranks, were expected to pass *Kwager*.

Bureaucrats, having passed the primary test, were given royal gifts from the king in person and allowed to celebrate their success in their hometowns. Passing *Kwager* was

considered to be a great honor to their families and a guarantee of a worthwhile and affluent life. Bureaucrats were an object of envy among ordinary people. There were 18 grade levels in the Chosun bureaucracy ranging from Prime Minister, at Grade 1, to the lowest clerical jobs, at Grade 18. The most qualified applicant for the primary test could start his career from the 12th. Before it was annulled in 1894, the primary tests produced 15,194 bureaucrats during 503 years (Lee 1991).

Chosun had a quite high-quality bureaucracy through *Kwager*. Lessons of Confucianism also encouraged bureaucrats to participate in administration and the edification of the population in general. Partly owing to these strengths and efforts, Chosun survived for nearly six centuries. However, bureaucrats also left their negative legacies. The origin of authoritarianism in politics and administration in Korea is commonly ascribed to the bureaucrats of the Chosun Dynasty. Bureaucrats fostering less informed people for their good has produced the term which is still quoted in a negative sense: because a public official is superior to ordinary people, the latter should follow the guidance of the former.

Bureaucrats as Agents for Change

With the advent of Japanese colonial rule in 1910, the Chosun Dynasty disappeared. Japan ruled Korea for 36 years (1910-1945), and the subsequent Korean War (1950-1953) destroyed what remained of the Korean economy which had already suffered from Japanese looting. The first Republic of Korea led by President Seung-Man Lee, however, was more interested in maintaining its power rather than undertaking nation building, an urgent task of any newly independent country. Developing a coalition with capitalists, the Lee

administration's policies tipped to their advantage. Money for retaining political power was thus illegally funded and secured. As the unhealthy ties between political leaders and the capitalists deepened, so did corruption. In the Korean bureaucracy, the spoils system largely encompassed the merit system. Less qualified or unqualified people were hired only for their political loyalty to high ranking political leaders, and bureaucrats who had formerly cooperated with Japan succeeded in surviving politically. Caught in manipulating the result of the presidential election, the Lee administration was overthrown by the civil revolution of April, 1960.

The second Republic of Korea, however, did not last long. Although the Myun Chang's administration started out with a high rate of support, it was soon enmeshed in political struggles between factions. Furthermore, explosive public demonstrations mainly encouraged by the citizens' realization of their political power went beyond the administration's political and administrative capability. In the middle of social disorder and political unrest, a military coup by General Chung-Hee Park and a group of military officers in May, 1961, brought the third Republic of Korea.

The leaders of the military coup promoted the modernization of Korea, with economic development as their goal. They brought many military officers into government, and simultaneously replaced the corrupted and politically appointed bureaucrats with young, able, and ambitious people. Through the consistent contact with the U.S. military and the methodical discipline instituted since the Korean War, the military regime came to be armed with more advanced management skills and better quality human resources than the private sector. Moreover, the military could be mobilized efficiently and immediately. In the new bureaucracy, the spoils system of the 1950s was replaced by a strong merit system in early

1960s. A new generation of young bureaucrats equipped with planning and managing skills joined the government and was quickly promoted. Major banks were nationalized and the cozy relations between politics and business were cut off. The Economic Planning Board (EPB) was established, and a five-year plan for economic development was drawn up. Having all the resources and policy tools, the Third Republic of Korea initiated government-led economic development; the Park administration adopted an outward-looking economic development strategy.

In other words, the administration decided to participate in the world capitalist economy. By fully taking advantage of huge demand in the world market, it was hoped to stimulate exports, thereby rapidly creating jobs in the domestic economy. In this sense, it was a free market approach based on the free trade theory of relative advantage. However, the government set the goals and priorities in investment and induced private corporations to follow the national strategy, an export-driven strategy for economic development. The government also invested in social overhead capital. Therefore, the strategy that emerged was a peculiar combination of market economy and strong government control of private corporations (Choi 1989). Right after the implementation of this economic plan, the Korean economy began to grow rapidly. Table 3-1 shows the growth rate of the Korean economy during the 1960s and 1970s.

In addition, the size of the Korean civil service also started to increase. Bureaucrats played important roles in national development, which demanded expansion of the civil service. Table 3-2 shows the growth of the Korean civil service during that period.

Table 3-1: Major Indicators of Korean Economic Growth in 1960s and 1970s

Year	GNP Per Capita (US \$)	GNP (Billion US \$)	GNP Growth Rate (%)	Exports (Million US \$)	Rate of Unemployment (%)
1960	80	1.95	1.1	33	11.7
1961	82	2.10	5.6	41	12.2
1963	100	2.72	9.1	87	8.2
1965	105	3.01	5.8	175	7.4
1967	142	4.27	6.6	320	6.2
1969	210	6.63	13.8	623	4.8
1971	285	9.37	9.1	1,132	4.5
1973	396	13.50	14.0	3,271	4.0
1975	591	20.85	6.8	5,003	4.1
1977	1,028	37.43	10.7	10,047	3.8
1979	1,662	62.37	7.0	14,705	3.8

Note: GNP Per Capita, GNP, and Exports are current prices. GNP Growth rate is calculated based on the previous year's GNP.

Source: Song, Byung-Nak. 1994. Pp. 60-61.

Table 3-2: Growth of Korean Civil Service in 1960s and 1970s

Year	Total Number of Government Employee	Number of New Recruits
1963	271,725	18,539
1965	305,316	17,082
1967	359,955	27,267
1969	398,050	16,132
1971	436,636	19,338
1973	452,054	13,481
1975	478,562	12,118
1977	519,110	16,408
1979	564,058	23,400

Source: Korea Institute Public Administration, Public Administration Statistics Database.

In the process of quick economic development, the EPB and the Ministry of Finance (MOF) became symbols of the positive roles of the Korean bureaucrats. The EPB was in charge of economic planning, policy coordination, and evaluation of economic performance, and the MOF decided and implemented fiscal and monetary policies. Table 3-3 indicates that bureaucrats even occupied politically appointed positions to a considerable extent, including

the offices of the Minister and Vice Minister of the two most powerful and influential government organizations.

Table 3-3: The Portions of Political Appointees from Bureaucrats in EPB and MOF

Period	Minister, EPB and MOF: (%)	Vice Minister, EPB and MOF: (%)
1950s	18.8	47.6
1960s	21.3	78.2
1970s	38.1	100.0

Source: Chung, Jung Kil. 1989. P 77.

Elite bureaucrats were also called in to serve in the Office of President from the economic-related Ministries (Chung 1988). In this way, the function of Korean bureaucrats in the 1960s and 1970s was conceived as being agents for change.

Challenges to the Bureaucracy

In the 1960s the Korean economy relied heavily on light industries such as shoes and textile goods. During the next decade, Korea's desperate efforts to develop heavy and chemical industries reflected a desire for a higher form of economic structure, capital intensive and having a high output-capital ratio. That was because President Chung-Hee Park strongly believed that Korea would remain in the periphery or semi-periphery of the capitalist system without solid bases of heavy and chemical industries which were utilizing cutting-edge technologies of that time. However, heavy and chemical industries require immense investment and high risks, partly because it takes a long time to reach a break-even point and to make profits. For those reasons, when private corporations were reluctant to enter into the industries, the Korean government developed and implemented a series of industrial policies designed to encourage them to do so. For private enterprises which followed the government direction, various types of special favors and preferential financing

were given (Choi 1989). Entry barriers and barriers to rival importing goods were set up to protect them, and activities of labor unions were strictly controlled. However, regulations which could negatively affect the production of those industries were avoided: regulations on environment and market monopoly were virtually non-existent, and customer protection was not dealt with as important. Around the late 1970s various types of negative side effects caused by this government-driven development strategy began to emerge. Although the objective of the industrial transition policy was achieved, market function for efficient resource distribution was heavily damaged. Equality of income distribution worsened. The Gini coefficient g was .34 in 1965, but it rose up to 0.39 in 1976 (Lee 1984).

Under the circumstances, an increasingly persuasive and widely-supported argument held that the government-led development strategy should be critically reviewed and mitigated for stable development in the long term. The issue of the adjustment of proper functions of the government bureaucracy began to be discussed. Such a discussion included transferring concerns of government from the economy to environment and welfare. Those arguments, basically in line with Neo-Liberalism that sees a competitive market as the source of material growth, and that prefers limited government, became the bases of policy guidelines of the Fifth Republic of Korea in the 1980s led by President Doo-Hwan Chun, who came to power in another military coup in 1980. Stabilizing the economy replaced the national goal of fast growth. For that purpose, the Korean government adopted a belt-tightening policy and tried to decrease its influence and intervention in the economy.

On the other hand, as people's desire for democratization became stronger after a quarter century of military rule, so did demand for control of the bureaucracy. The traditional authoritarian administrative culture was criticized; in truth, it was hard to deny that

bureaucrats focused mainly on achieving the objectives handed down by the political leaders under the assumption that it was beneficial for the public interest, and for all Koreans (Chun 1988). Bureaucrats were more responsive to political leaders than to the citizens in the less democratic regimes under the guidance of the three consecutive Presidents all of whom had been with the military. It was in the late 1980s that various measures to secure citizen participation in government policies, including a local system of autonomy, began to be legislated. However, liberalizing the economy through deregulation did not make as much progress as expected; bureaucratic control and regulation hardly shrank. (Choi 1989).

The Young-Sam Kim administration which came into power in 1993 put forward the motto of “small and efficient government,” reflecting the criticisms from economic circles that the outdated economic policies and bureaucratic over-regulation frequently caused tremendous transaction costs and lowered private companies’ competitiveness. Right or wrong, since that time the concern has spread that bureaucrats were less competent than their counterparts in the private sector, and that they dealt with business in a passive manner. In the meantime, the two former Presidents Doo-Hwan Chun and Tae-Woo Rho were indicted for accepting enormous bribes. In less than two years, even a son of President Young-Sam Kim was arrested on a similar charge. The public’s suspicion of political leaders thus heightened. A part of that mistrust was transferred to the bureaucracy, and subsequent small-scale corruption cases involving government officials dropped public confidence in the civil service even further.

The Asian economic crisis in the late 1990s led the current Dae-Joong Kim administration to launch sweeping administrative reforms. Now, taking it for granted that the bureaucracy is inferior to the private sector in terms of productivity and performance, the

administration is trying to bring market-like efficiency into the government by adopting measures designed to generate competition in the public sector.

As we briefly saw, the civil service used to be a most respectable occupation in Korea. During the 1960s and 1970s, the Korean bureaucrats were considered to be agents for change. In recent years, however, they have been criticized for alleged incompetence, administrative misconduct, and undesirable work attitudes such as risk-averse tendencies. In short, the Korean bureaucracy has experienced an extreme range of evaluations by the public in less than thirty years. Now, it faces many challenges: to provide its services more efficiently, to be more responsive to the citizens needs, and to redress such negative legacies of rapid economic development as unequal income distribution.

The Korean Civil Service System

In this section, various aspects of the Korean civil service system will be introduced. Statistics, survey results, and other data that are helpful for an understanding of how the system operates in reality will be presented wherever available.

Central Personnel Agency

Before the creation of the Civil Service Commission (CSC) in 1999, the Ministry of Government Administration and Home Affairs (MOGAHA) had been the central personnel agency in Korea. Now the two government organizations share the functions of personnel administration with the CSC in charge of developing the basic policies for personnel management and pay systems. With this authority, the CSC is now responsible for supervising the “Open Competitive Position System” and the “Performance Related Pay Program” that were recently launched as major reform initiatives in personnel administration.

The CSC also inspects personnel actions and supervises personnel management of executive agencies. The MOGAHA's responsibilities related to civil service management include making manpower plans for the civil service, managing the civil servants' welfare and pension system, and running training programs to foster competent and reliable civil servants (The CSC 2000).

Classification of the Civil Service

There are two kinds of civil service systems in Korea: national and local. However, because the local government civil service system generally follows the main stream of the national system, only the former will be described. National civil servants belong to one of two classifications: Career Service and Non-Career Service. Career service employees are hired according to performance and qualifications and are expected to have a life-long job commitment. Their status is guaranteed and protected by law. Career service is categorized into three areas: General Service, Special Service, and Technical Skill Service. The General Service refers to the civil servants who work in the area of technology, research, and advisory or general public service administration. They occupy the largest portion of the civil service personnel. While most of them are vertically divided into nine grades, there are only two grades for the research and advisor services: senior researcher and researcher, senior advisor and advisor. Judges, public prosecutors, the foreign service, the police, the fire service, educational service, and so forth belong to the special service category. Civil servants who provide simple and technical skill service are blue-collar workers. Table 3-4 shows the typical hierarchy in the General Service and titles or functions of each grade.

Table 3-4: Titles or Functions of the Korean Bureaucracy

Grade	Titles or Functions	Numbers
1	Director of Office or Deputy Vice Minister	125
2-3	Director of Bureau	1,072
3-4	Director of Division	6,015
4-5	Assistant Director of Division	24,329
6-9	Clerical Official	247,524

Note. Civil servants in Grade 3 and 4 can be placed in two positions in different levels. To distinguish civil servants who are in the same grade but hold different titles, their titles will be added wherever necessary. For example, grade 3 (Director of Division) or (Director or Bureau). Numbers include all the civil servants of general service, national and local government. Of civil service, the civil servants of the research and advise series are excluded, the number of whom is 10,753.

Source: MOGAHA, 2001b. p. 67.

Non-Career Service refers to all national civil servants who are not covered by Career Service. Their status is not guaranteed by law. This category includes: Political Service, Excepted Service, Contracted Service, and Labor Service. Political service is civil servants elected or appointed by political leaders. Civil servants belonging to the Excepted Service category have no permanent job status, but are paid salaries equivalent to those in the General Service area. Contracted Service includes scientists, technicians, and other experts who work under contracts with government organizations for specified terms under three years. Labor Service refers to those engaged in physical work. As of May 1, 2000, the total number of the Korean government employees is 859,555. The national government employs 549,502 (63.9 %), and 310,053 (36.1%) work for various levels of local governments (MOGAHA 2001b)

Recruitment

In principle, everyone in the Career civil service should be employed through an open competitive entrance examination for which MOGAHA is responsible. In cases in which an open competitive entrance examination is inadequate, a non-competitive entrance exam may

be employed. However, such cases should satisfy the conditions and follow the procedures stipulated in the National Service Act because they are exceptions for merit principle.

The open competitive entrance examinations are categorized into three types according to the employed grades: the Senior Civil Service examination for Grade 5, the Open Competitive Entrance Examination for Grades 7 and 9. The first exam is an important method for recruiting competent persons for middle management positions within executive agencies (The CSC 2000). Until now, the examinations, Senior Civil Service Examination for Grade 5 or ordinary examinations for Grades 7 and 9, have been very rigorous. Table 3-5 shows how competitive the Senior Civil Service Examination has been.

Table 3-5: Competitiveness of the Senior Civil Service Examination

Year	Number of Applicants	Number Employed	Competition Rate
1963	1,485	40	37:1
1965	694	28	22:1
1970	1,897	27	70:1
1975	4,499	100	44:1
1980	11,352	187	61:1
1985	12,908	100	129:1
1990	13,719	173	79:1
1995	15,660	183	86:1
1999	14,691	182	81:1

Note: The Examination is offered every year.

Source: Korea Institute Public Administration, Public Administration Statistics Database.

An entrance exam does not require prerequisite academic preparation, but, because the Korean civil service system is oriented to the establishment of a career system, there is an age limit: between 20 and 35 for Grades 5 and 7 and between 18 and 28 for Grade 9 (The CSC 2000).

Training, Performance Appraisal, and Promotion

Training services are provided with a view to increasing civil servants' knowledge and skills, and motivating them to perform well. A noteworthy feature is the Government Fellowship Program for Overseas Study which sends promising young officials to

universities and research institutes in advanced countries for post-graduate study as well as on-the-job training (The CSC 2000). According to a survey which was conducted on the national civil servants, it is a very popular program, and considered by civil servants to be a crucial component for increasing their productivity (Chung 1996). For other domestic training programs, there is much room for improvement, however. Criticisms include such points as: trainees have frequently been selected by taking turns, the programs have been inadequate for providing cutting-edge knowledge, and training results have not been effectively linked to career development (Park 1999).

Performance of civil servants is evaluated periodically. For civil servants of Grade 5 and below, the appraisal occurs every six months in June and December. Criteria of the appraisal include: the quality of work, the quantity of work, and contribution to the organization. Civil servants of Grade 4 and above are evaluated once a year, in December. For their appraisal, Management by Objectives (MBO) is used. Traditionally, the results of this performance appraisal had been used as data for promotion decisions, but with the adoption of a performance related pay system, they came to be utilized as data for an annual merit incremental program for civil servants for Grade 3 (Director of Bureau) or higher, and for a performance bonus program for civil servants for Grade 3 (Director of Division) or below. For many reasons, performance appraisal, especially for the Grade 5 or below, has been widely criticized. First, because civil servants did not have any access to the results of the evaluation, it failed to function as a feedback tool to improve performance. ² Second, partly because of a lack of discussion between evaluators and those evaluated, and partly because public jobs rarely have easily measurable output criteria, evaluations have been based on evaluators' subjective opinions or worker seniority.

While in principle, promotion is based on the performance evaluations, seniority, and training record, in practice, seniority has been the most important factor. It takes a very long time for Korean government officials to be advanced to an upper level—for example, twice or three times the period required in the related laws—because the era of quick growth of the government has almost ended. Understandably the levels of satisfaction of Korean government officials with promotion are very low; the problems embedded in performance appraisal, training, and seniority are transferred to the promotion process. Table 3-6 shows the perceptions of Korean civil servants of the fairness of promotion and performance appraisal processes.

Table 3-6: Perceptions of the Fairness of Promotion and Performance Appraisal

Management Area	1992		1995		1998	
	Unsatisfied	Satisfied	Unsatisfied	Satisfied	Unsatisfied	Satisfied
Promotion	42.1 %	8.6 %	53.7 %	18.0 %	39.0 %	15.3 %
Performance Appraisal	38.2 %	8.1 %	56.5 %	16.2 %	43.2 %	12.8 %

Source: Park, KyungHyo. 1999. p.7.

Compensation

In principle, pay for civil servants is determined by such factors as the standard cost of living, the pay level of similar work in the private sector, and the financial burdens of government (The CSC 2000). In reality, the impact on the levels of pay in the private sector has been strongly considered as a crucial factor. It is believed that government pay decisions have affected those in private corporations. A civil servant's pay is composed of a basic salary, allowances, and welfare expenses. The basic salary represents remuneration for services rendered during regular working hours and occupies the largest portion of the whole salary. The allowances refer to additional remuneration paid according to position and the living condition of individuals. Welfare expenses include household support payment,

commutation payment, for example (The CSC 2000). Variable performance-related pay portions and performance bonus for civil servants which were introduced by the performance related program will be explained later.

In Korea, the civil servants' pay levels have been much lower than those in the private sector. That is, the comparability principle in deciding the pay for civil servants has not been faithfully observed. Table 3-7 compares the pay levels in both sectors.

Table 3-7: The Comparison of Pay and Its Increase Rate between the Government and the Private Sector

Item	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998
Ratio	73.9	80.2	82.2	81.7	82.0	84.8	82.9	87.7	87.2
Private*	18.8	17.5	15.2	12.2	12.7	11.2	11.9	7.0	-2.5
Public*	13.9	12.7	9.8	3.0	6.2	6.8	9.0	5.7	-4.1

Note: Ratio 100.0 means public employees are paid as much as private employees. The ratio is reported to drop to 70.4, when the levels of pay in the government are compared to those of financial conglomerates in Korea such as Samsung and Hyundai.

* represents annual pay increase rates in the both sectors.

Source: Park, Kyung Hyo. 1999. p. 6.

Although there is no important information on the criteria of the comparison—grade, kind of job, or education level, for instance—it demonstrates a general picture of the low levels of civil servants' compensation. Also, the table compares the pay increase rates between the private and public sectors. The increase rate of civil servants' salaries has always fallen behind that of their private counterparts. The government has suggested a guideline for pay increase in the private sector as an economic policy to maintain national competitiveness. Under the circumstances, the government has not been able to increase the civil servants' pay levels for fear that it would lead to an even higher rate of pay increase in the private sector. In other words, not only the government employees' absolute pay level, but also the increase rate has been lower than those in the private sector (Jin 1995).

In a survey administered to 108 government officials in Grade 4 and 5 working for the various ministries, who were recruited through the Senior Civil Service Examination, 47.6 percent identified a low salary level as the most unsatisfactory aspect of their job (Dong-A daily newspaper 2001 b). Considering that they are paid better for their ages because they started their career at Grade 5, the satisfaction level among other civil servants is likely to be much lower.

The Government Civil Servant Pension System was established in 1960 to guarantee pensions to civil servants on retirement. Funding for the pension system comes from contributions both from civil servants and the government as the employer. Each contributes 7.5 percent of the basic salary each month. After twenty years of service, a government employee is qualified to receive a pension. The civil servant can choose between two types of pension plan: a monthly pension and a lump-sum allowance plan (The CSC 2000). Before the recent revision of the Government Civil Servant Pension Act, a civil servant was able to receive a pension at retirement, regardless of age. The amount is to be based on the final salary. However, with the revision of the act, a civil servant is required to reach age 60 to claim the pension. The average pay of the last three years before retirement, rather than the pay of the last year, is used as criterion for determining the amount of the pension (MOGAHA 2001 a). Benefits from the pension are declining.

Duties and Responsibilities

Because civil servants are considered to be “public servants,” their duties and responsibilities are comprehensive and extensive, and include the duty to obey laws and orders of their superiors, to be kind and impartial, and to protect the confidentiality of

sensitive government information. Civil servants are also obliged to give total effort to their missions. Labor unions are not yet allowed for government officials. Participation in any political activity is prohibited, with the exception of the political service.

When civil servants fail to duly execute their duties, responsibility is assigned through procedures prescribed in the National Civil Service Act. If civil servants cause damage to the government by failing to execute their duties properly, they are required to assume indemnity responsibility by the National Compensation Act and related laws (The CSC 2000). When the unlawful act of a government employee constitutes a crime, he or she is treated as a civilian and is punished by criminal laws. However, in some cases such as bribery, the penalty can be aggravated to the civil servants.

Administrative Reform Measures in the Personnel Management

The Asian economic crisis in 1997 was an unprecedented challenge to Korea. The Young-Sam Kim administration in its last stage of the term did not have any effective measures to deal with the crisis, except for requesting a bail-out from the International Monetary Fund (IMF). It was up to the next new administration to get Korea out of the economic predicament. Right after his inauguration in February 1998, current President Dae-Joong Kim initiated a sweeping administrative reform, and ascribed the causes of the crisis to the failure of the previous government to liberalize the economy: despite the Young-Sam Kim administration's reform movement toward "small and efficient government," it had retained unnecessary bureaucratic regulation and control on the economy, thereby hindering creativity and entrepreneurship in the market which is the very source of economic growth. On top of that, the diagnosis of the new government continues, the government became too

big to manage its business efficiently, which, in turn, placed burdens on the private sector (quoted in Park and Kim 1998, p. 30).

Under the circumstances, it was understandable that the administration widely accepted the goals and strategies of New Public Management and Reinventing Government both of which are strongly market-oriented reform movements. The Dae-Joong Kim administration set the goals of far-reaching administrative reform as follows: customer-driven administration, entrepreneurial government, and performance-based management. For the purposes, a readjustment of the scope of government and an introduction of competition in the government administration were adopted as core strategies (Park and Kim 1998, Kim 1999). The government was to lessen its economic intervention leading to greater freedom and latitude for private corporations. Consequently, it was expected to focus its concern and resources on such policy areas as welfare, the environment, and education, where market principles do not function strongly enough to provide public goods in optimal quantity and quality (Lee et al 1997). The reform also demanded that the government organizations should be managed like a business. The Dae-Joong Kim administration downsized the public work force by 81,955 through two waves of a reshuffle of government organizations. One out of seven in the national government and one out of five in local government had to leave their workplaces (Chosun daily newspaper 1999).

With regard to personnel administration, the open competitive position system and the performance related pay program were newly instituted to bring into the government competition, which was thought to be the golden key to market-like efficiency. The newly established CSC is in charge of successful implementation of the reform measures in public personnel administration.

A civil servant who passed the Senior Civil Service starts his or her career from Grade 5. In other words, the Grade 5 used to be the highest grade level for a new recruit. Grade 4 or above were to be filled only by promotions. With the advent of the open competitive position system, each ministry must designate 20 percent of positions in grade 3 or higher as open competitive positions in order to appoint the best qualified expert. As soon as a designated position becomes vacant, the minister is to publicly announce necessary procedures for application; anyone outside or inside the ministry is eligible to apply. To guarantee fair competition a selection board established in the ministry should review the applicants. If a civilian is selected, he or she works as contracted service. When a civil servant is chosen, he or she should not be transferred for three years (The CSC 2000)

The performance related pay program includes the Annual Merit Incremental Program and the Performance Bonus Program. In both programs, Grade S, Grade A, and Grade B are given to the civil servants whose performance is rated top 10%, top 30%, and top 70%. Those who belong to bottom 30% get Grade C, and they are denied any performance-related pay.

Civil servants in Grade 3 (Director of Bureau) or higher are paid according to the Annual Merit Incremental Program. Their pay consists of two portions: the fixed pay portion and the variable performance-related portion. The variable pay portion is paid according to the appraisal grade which is determined on the basis of the performance appraisal result of the MBO (The CSC 2001). The amount of the variable pay portion which civil servants actually receive is determined by multiplying the basic amount of the variable pay portion by the performance pay rate. 3

For civil servants in Grade 3 (Director of Division) or below, the Performance Bonus program applies. Appraisal grade is determined by the result of MBO for civil servants in Grade 4 or higher, while for civil servants in Grade 5 or below, an ordinary performance appraisal is used. The actual amount of performance bonus which civil servants can be awarded is determined by multiplying the performance bonus rate by the basic amount of the bonus, which is basically the same as the basic salary of each grade. ◀ All the measures of the administrative reform were employed to boost productivity by creating competition in the government; competition for a high ranking government job among experts outside and civil servants inside in the open competitive position system, and competition for monetary incentives among government employees in the performance related pay program.

The Bureaucracy and the Research Questions

Some general background information on the Korean bureaucracy, the subject of this study, has been offered from historical and institutional perspectives. The rest of this chapter will review some works related to the research questions in order to better understand the Korean bureaucracy with regard to PSM.

Although no research has been conducted directly employing the PSM concept in Korea, a few studies and surveys have dealt with the Korean bureaucrats' motives for their career choice. In a survey administered by the Korea Institute of Public Administration (KIPA) in 1992, 2,900 government employees including local government employees, education employees, police, and technical service workers reported the reasons for their career choice as: job security (34 %), family's recommendation (18.8%), service to the nation (14.8%), working conditions (10.7%), and difficulty in seeking private sector jobs (8.8 %) (Seo 1992,

p.24). The category “service to the nation” may approach the PSM concept, but it does not seem to be predominant.

Another survey conducted on national government officials showed a slightly different picture: the top five reasons for entering the civil service were job security, prestige of government service, service to the nation, opportunity to affect public affairs, and social status (Chung, 1996). Because the items given to both groups of respondents are not identical, it is difficult to compare them. However, judging from such reasons as prestige of government service, service to the nation, and opportunity to affect public affairs, the government employees surveyed may be thought to make their job choice out of a sense of PSM. However, the primary motive was job security. In another survey conducted by Dong-A daily newspaper in 2001, 61 percent of 105 young government officials in their 30's in Grades 4 and 5, who were recruited through the Senior Civil Service Examination said they chose the public service career because working for the government appealed to them. Only 18.1 percent of them put forward job security as their motive (2001 b). These rather conflicting survey results make it difficult to determine not only how important the role of PSM is in the career choices of Korean public servants, but also whether PSM is more prevalent in the public sector.

Although no information is available on the effect of PSM on organization commitment and job satisfaction, which is the second research question, several studies provide useful background knowledge on the important work-related variables. Song studied the relationship between the passive, risk-averse work style and organizational commitment in government organizations. He found that organizational commitment was negatively related to the dependent variable. In other words, organizational commitment was found to have the

effect of lowering the negative work style, and was, in turn, affected by job characteristics and satisfaction with supervisor. That is, the more easily the public servants can get feedback about their work, the more they feel they are doing a significant job, and the more satisfied they feel with their supervisors, the higher their levels of organizational commitment (Song 1998). Another study which focused on finding the antecedents of organizational commitment also identified job characteristics as an important independent variable. In addition to that, social recognition was found to have a strong positive effect on organizational commitment (Cho 1997). On the other hand, Kim compared the levels of passive and risk-averse work styles between the public and private sectors. He found that government organizations, both national and local, showed higher levels of those undesirable work styles than private corporations (Kim 1996). Although, by combining the results of Kim's and Song's studies, one may reason that the levels of organizational commitment are lower in the public than in the private sector, no comparative research has been conducted as yet to test the hypothesis.

With respect to job satisfaction, when asked "What makes you feel good about your job?" the public servants in the Dong-A daily newspaper survey (2001 b) set forth a sense of duty to work for the public interest (42.9 %) and participation in important decision making and implementation of government policies (34.3 %). However, as already shown, Korean government officials' satisfaction levels with pay and personnel management are quite low, an opinion confirmed when they were asked a general question about how they felt about their jobs as government officials. Public employees working for the national government answered: very satisfied (0.8 %), satisfied (16.1 %), neutral (48.7 %), dissatisfied (30.4 %), and very dissatisfied (4.0 %). The low satisfaction levels among Korean government officials

were reflected in their responses to the question “What would you do if your children wanted to become government employees?” Table 3-10 shows their responses. It is noteworthy that the positive portion of their responses declined while the negative portion increased.

Table 3-8: Government Employees' Recommendation of Civil Service to Their Own Children

Year of Survey	Strongly Encourage	Encourage	Neutral	Discourage	Strongly Discourage
1992	5.7 %	35.8 %	38.7 %	13.6 %	3.0 %
1996	3.2 %	19.9 %	42.5 %	23.5 %	10.8 %

Note: 1992 survey was conducted by KIPA. The other one is administered by Cho on 500 national government employees of general service in 1996.

Source: Cho, Kyung Ho. 1997. p. 69.

In relation to the role of government officials, the Korean bureaucrats were found to perceive that they were actively participating in policy processes. In a study based on a survey of 99 national government officials in Grades 4 and 5, 72.7 percent of respondents referred to career civil servants while 43.4 percent of them mentioned political appointees in responding to the question of who had influence on the policy processes in their ministries. Although the respondents were mid-level bureaucrats, they also recognized their role more as policy makers (35.4 %) than as technicians (18.2%) who mainly implement and make factual decisions (Park and Kim 1991). That means that the majority did not perceive their roles as simply following directives or implementing policies given by the political appointees. In a similar study based on 64 bureaucrats in Grade 3 or higher, the respondents reported that they made more policy decisions than did political appointees (Park 1993). Asked to evaluate the importance of thirteen values in performing their jobs in public administration, over 500 government officials working for the national government responded as follows: (1) quality of life, (2) reasonableness, (3) equity, (4) responsibility, (5) efficiency, (6) political neutrality, and so forth (Chung 1996, p, 189). It is worthwhile to note that equity was

considered to be more important than efficiency and political neutrality. In sum, the Korean bureaucrats seem to perceive that they play an important role in policy processes, and that they placed a high regard on equity. However, no research has studied the perceptions of their roles and responsibilities from the viewpoint of PSM, which is one of the research questions of this study.

Note

1. Gini coefficient is a tool to measure the degree of unequal (or equal) distribution of income. It is designed to have a value between 0 (perfectly equal distribution) and 1 (perfectly unequal distribution). Therefore, the bigger the coefficient is the more unequal distribution of income is.

2. Now, government officials can know the results of their performance appraisal at least indirectly based on the amount of their performance bonus.

3. Grade S, Grade A, and Grade C are entitled to 10%, 7%, and 3% of performance pay rate each. A civil servant in grade 2 who got grade S, for example, is paid by the formula as follows: 10% X the basic amount of variable pay portion, which is currently 14,824,000 won. 1/12 of the determined amount of variable pay is paid every month. (The CSC 2001)

4. The operating standard for the performance bonus for the civil servants in grade 3 (Director of Division) or below is as follows.

Table 3-9: The Operating Standard for Performance Bonus

Grade	Basic amount of bonus	Grade (S): Top 10 % Performance Bonus Rate: 150 %	Grade (A): Top 30 % Performance Bonus Rate: 100 %	Grade (B): Top 70 % Performance Bonus Rate: 50 %	Grade (C): Bottom 30 % Performance Bonus Rate: 0 %
3	1,561,100	2,341,650	1,561,100	780,550	Nothing
4	1,391,700	2,087,550	1,391,700	695,850	Nothing
5	1,204,700	1,807,050	1,204,700	602,350	Nothing
6	1,031,500	1,547,250	1,031,500	515,750	Nothing
7	868,300	1,302,450	868,300	434,150	Nothing
8	715,600	1,073,400	715,600	357,800	Nothing
9	600,100	900,150	600,100	300,050	Nothing

Note: Performance bonus is paid once a year. Exchange rate: 1 US \$=1,331 Korean Won as of July 25, 2001.

Source: The Civil Service Commission 2001.

5. Plural responses were allowed.

Chapter IV: Research Methodology

This chapter describes in detail the research methodology employed in this study. In the first part, seven hypotheses are introduced which were formulated to answer the three research questions. Descriptions of and explanations for the variables composing the hypotheses as well as the measures operationally quantifying the variables follow. Interpretation procedures of the original English version of the survey items into Korean version are also discussed. The second part describes data collection methods. Because this study is based on the responses from two surveys, procedures for the sampling and the administration of the surveys are presented. Finally, the third section explains data analysis methods, including such issues as the levels of measurement of the variables and the statistical methods used for data analyses.

Hypotheses

Research Question 1 investigates whether PSM is more prevalent in the public sector than in the private sector, with a hypothesis as follows:

Hypothesis 1: Public employees show a higher level of PSM than private employees.

The null hypothesis would show there is no difference in PSM scores between public and private employees. Rejection of the null hypothesis would prove that PSM is more prevalent in the public sector in the Korean setting.

The independent variable is the sector, private or public, in which each respondent is currently working. The dependent variable is PSM, nominally defined as an individual's predisposition to respond to motives grounded primarily or uniquely in public institutions

and organizations. More specifically, PSM is defined as the need to perform acts of public service and to contribute to the advancement of the quality of life in society.

To measure the levels of PSM, Perry's PSM construct (1996) was utilized. Each item was measured by a Likert-style 7-point scale, in order to give respondents more options to avoid a response pattern (Jones and Olson 1996). Respondents were asked to indicate their agreement or disagreement with the following statements, on a continuum ranging from Strongly Disagree (1) to Strongly Agree (7).

[Public Service Motivation Items]

Attraction to Policy Making

1. Politics is a dirty word.
2. The give and take of public policy making doesn't appeal to me.
3. I don't care much for politicians.

Commitment to the Public Interest/Civic Duty

1. It is hard for me to get intensely interested in what is going on in my community.
2. I unselfishly contribute to my community.
3. I consider public service my civic duty.
4. Meaningful public service is very important to me.
5. I would prefer seeing public officials do what is best for the whole community even if it harmed my interests.

Compassion

1. It is difficult for me to contain my feelings when I see people in distress.
2. Most social programs are too vital to do without.
3. I am often reminded by daily events how dependent we are on one another.

4. I am rarely moved by the plight of the underprivileged.
5. To me, patriotism includes seeing to the welfare of others.
6. I have little compassion for people in need who are unwilling to take the first step to help themselves.
7. There are few public programs that I wholeheartedly support.
8. I seldom think about the welfare of people I don't know personally.

Self-Sacrifice

1. Doing well financially is definitely more important to me than doing good deeds.
2. Much of what I do is for a cause bigger than myself.
3. Serving other citizens would give me a good feeling even if no one paid me for it.
4. Making a difference in society means more to me than personal achievements.
5. I think people should give back to society more than they get from it.
6. I am prepared to make enormous sacrifices for the good of society.
7. I am one of those rare people who would risk personal loss to help someone else.
8. I believe in putting duty before self.

Previous research has revealed that some demographic variables affect the level of PSM.

Taking the previous findings into consideration, this researcher employed the following demographic variables as control variables: age, tenure, education level, gender, and income. Race, which is irrelevant in the ethnically homogeneous Korean setting, was not included.

The second research question, whether or not PSM has a positive effect on job satisfaction and organizational commitment, will be answered by testing the following two hypotheses.

Hypothesis 2: There is a positive relationship between job satisfaction and PSM.

Hypothesis 3: There is a positive relationship between organizational commitment and PSM.

The independent variable in Hypotheses 2 and 3 is PSM, which was measured in Hypothesis 1. Job satisfaction, the dependent variable in Hypothesis 2, can be defined as an individual's feelings about his or her job and various aspects of it. For the reasons discussed in Chapter II, this study measured job satisfaction by using the Job Descriptive Index (JDI) developed by Smith, Kendall, and Hulin. This index measures job satisfaction in terms of five principal aspects: the work on the present job, pay, opportunities for promotion, supervision, and co-workers (Smith, Kendall, and Hulin 1969).

Respondents were asked to think of these five facets of their jobs and respond to the following items by checking one of three options: Y (yes) if the item describes a specific aspect of their jobs, N (no) if it does not, or ? (neutral) if they are uncertain or undecided about the match between the description and their jobs.

[Items relating to Work Satisfaction]

- | | | | |
|-----------------|---------|-----------------------------------|---------|
| 1. Fascinating | () | 2. Routine | () |
| 3. Satisfying | () | 4. Boring | () |
| 5. Good | () | 6. Creative | () |
| 7. Respected | () | 8. Uncomfortable | () |
| 9. Pleasant | () | 10. Useful | () |
| 11. Tiring | () | 12. Healthful | () |
| 13. Challenging | () | 14. Too much to do | () |
| 15. Frustrating | () | 16. Simple | () |
| 17. Repetitive | () | 18. Gives sense of accomplishment | () |

[Items relating to Pay Satisfaction]

1. Income adequate for normal expenses ()
2. Fair ()
3. Barely live on income ()
4. Bad ()
5. Income provides luxuries ()
6. Insecure ()
7. Less than I deserve ()
8. Well paid ()
9. Underpaid ()

[Items relating to Satisfaction with Opportunities for Promotion]

1. Good opportunities for promotion ()
2. Opportunities somewhat limited ()
3. Promotion based on ability ()
4. Dead end job ()
5. Good chance for promotion ()
6. Unfair promotion policy ()
7. Infrequent promotions ()
8. Regular promotion ()
9. Fairly good chance for promotion ()

[Items relating to Satisfaction with Supervision]

- | | |
|-----------------------------|--------------------------------|
| 1. Asks my advice () | 2. Hard to please () |
| 3. Impolite () | 4. Praises good work () |

- | | | | |
|------------------------|-----|-----------------------------|-----|
| 5. Tactful | () | 6. Influential | () |
| 7. Up-to-date | () | 8. Insufficient supervision | () |
| 9. Has favorites | () | 10. Provides feedback | () |
| 11. Annoying | () | 12. Stubborn | () |
| 13. Knows job well | () | 14. Bad | () |
| 15. Intelligent | () | 16. Poor planner | () |
| 17. Around when needed | () | 18. Lazy | () |

[Items relating to Satisfaction with Co-Workers]

- | | | | |
|-------------------------|-----|---------------------|-----|
| 1. Stimulating | () | 2. Boring | () |
| 3. Slow | () | 4. Helpful | () |
| 5. Stupid | () | 6. Responsible | () |
| 7. Fast | () | 8. Intelligent | () |
| 9. Easy to make enemies | () | 10. Talk too much | () |
| 11. Smart | () | 12. Lazy | () |
| 13. Unpleasant | () | 14. Gossipy | () |
| 15. Active | () | 16. Narrow interest | () |
| 17. Loyal | () | 18. Stubborn | () |

The total job satisfaction rating will be scored as follows: for positive concepts, 3 points are assigned to a Y, 0 Points to a N, and 1 Point to a ?. Reversed coding was used for negative concepts, for example, Boring (Y=0, N=3, and ?=1). Some demographic variables were included as control variables that have been identified in other studies as affecting job satisfaction to single out the net effect of PSM on job satisfaction: education, age, gender, length of tenure, and rank in the hierarchy. Also, as discussed in the literature review five dimensions of job characteristics—skill variety, task identity, task significance, autonomy,

and feedback—were measured using Hackman and Oldham's Job Diagnostic Survey (JDS) (1980), and their effects on job satisfaction were cancelled out. 2

The dependent variable in Hypotheses 3 is organizational commitment, defined as the relative strength of an individual's identification with and involvement in a particular organization. With this nominal definition in mind, organizational commitment was operationally measured by the 15-item Organizational Commitment Questionnaire (OCQ) (Mowday et al, 1979). Respondents were asked to indicate their agreement or disagreement with the following statements, from Strongly Disagree (1) to Strongly Agree (7). Angle and Perry (1981) reported a very high level of internal consistency in the questionnaire (Cronbach's alpha = .90) in their study.

[Organizational Commitment Items]

1. I am willing to put in a great deal of effort beyond what is normally expected in order to help this organization be successful.
2. I talk up this organization to my friends as a great organization to work for.
3. I feel very little loyalty to this organization.
4. I would accept almost any type of job assignment in order to keep working for this organization.
5. I find that my values and the organization's values are very similar.
6. I am proud to tell others that I am part of this organization.
7. I could just as well be working for a different organization as long as the type of work was similar.
8. This organization really inspires the best job performance I can give.
9. It would take very little change in my present circumstances to cause me to leave this organization.

10. I am extremely glad I chose this organization to work for over others I was considering at the time I joined.
11. There's not much to be gained by sticking with this organization indefinitely.
12. Often, I find it difficult to agree with this organization's policies on important matters relating to its employees.
13. I really care about the fate of this organization.
14. For me, this is the best of all organizations for which to work.
15. Deciding to work for this organization was a definite mistake on my part.

As suggested in the literature review, potential correlates of organizational commitment found in the studies using the OCQ were employed as control variables. They are classified into three categories: (1) personal characteristics (2) individual's work experiences (3) job characteristics. First, with regard to personal characteristics, the demographic variables included as control variables in the test of Hypothesis 2 were reused. Second, related to the work experiences, the criteria of peer group cohesion, group's negative attitude toward the organization, personal importance, respect from citizens were included. 3 Finally, to capture job characteristics, the five dimensions measured and used in hypothesis 2 were reused in the test of Hypothesis 3.

Hypotheses 4 through 7 investigate the effect of PSM on government employees' conception of roles and responsibilities.

Hypothesis 4: Government employees with a high level of PSM are less likely to support the principle of neutrality.

Hypothesis 5: Government employees with a high level of PSM are more likely to advocate proactive roles.

Hypothesis 6: Government employees with a high level of PSM are likely to have less regard for efficiency.

Hypothesis 7: Government employees with a high level of PSM are likely to put more emphasis on social equity.

The independent variable is PSM. The dependent variable is each respondent's conception of roles and responsibilities, defined as "a set of job-related values and attitudes that provides the public administrator a stable set of expectations about his or her responsibilities" (Selden et al 1999, p. 175). To measure the dependent variables along the two dimensions of neutrality versus proactive administration and managerial efficiency versus social equity, respondents were asked to indicate their agreement or disagreement with the following statements, on a scale from Strongly Disagree (1) to Strongly Agree (7).

[Neutrality]

- 1. My job is to follow the rules and regulations provided me.**
- 2. Public servants should behave according to the wishes of those set in authority over them.**
- 3. The more neutral and responsive I am, the better public servant I am.**

[Proactive Administration]

- 1. The public administrator charged with implementing legislation must ensure that the public interest is served.**
- 2. Government officials ought to recommend or actively advocate in favor of policy positions that represent general public needs and interests.**
- 3. As a public servant, I believe that I should take the initiative in proposing policies, mobilizing support for them, and questioning policies that might run counter to the public interest.**

[Managerial Efficiency]

1. Public servants should be responsible for finding the most efficient use of the resources that are entrusted to them.
2. If a government employee is forced to choose between the most efficient policy and the most equitable policy, the most efficient alternative should be chosen.
3. The extent to which I apply expertise and professionalism to the problems of government justifies my position.

[Social Equity]

1. Administrators should be committed to social equity as values.
2. Government officials should encourage procedures that result in greater and more equitable public access to programs and services.
3. I believe it is the duty of a public servant to recommend or actively advocate in favor of policies that address the needs and concerns of less privileged portions of the population.

The statements above are basically adapted from Q statements from the work of Selden et al, who developed the Q statements through extensive literature review and interviews with scholars and practitioners to measure government employees' conception of roles, responsibilities, and values (1999). Although no antecedent has been studied in the context of government employees' conceptions of roles and responsibilities, the demographic variables used before were included again as control variables.

Translation

All the survey questions were translated and used because the respondents in this study are Korean. To minimize potential problems arising from mistranslation, the following people were consulted: a native speaker of English who understood Korean culture and

history very well; a Korean graduate student majoring in Teaching English as a Second Language (TESOL), and a Korean-American who was born and raised in Korea until he was 27 years old, and has then lived in the U.S more than 20 years.

The JDI and OCQ are so widely used that it was expected that there were some existing Korean versions. Two articles were found to utilize JDI and OCQ in a Korean Journal of Public Administration (Song 1998, Cho 1997). In the U.S., only one doctoral dissertation was located that used both the JDI and OCQ in a Korean version of the measures in the index (Oh 1995). Because it involved a comparative study between Koreans and Americans on the impact of job satisfaction and organizational commitment on the withdrawal behavior, precise translation was a methodologically critical factor in the study. For that reason, it was the study most frequently referred to in the translation process of the two measures. The two Korean resource people were asked to evaluate the Korean translations of the JDI and the OCQ. At the same time the native speaker was consulted on the precise meaning of the English version. Survey items which the three resource people thought were not clear were slightly modified.

All the survey items in the Public Service Motivation and Role Conceptions categories were newly translated. The translation process took place as follows: first, the author and the two Korean resource people made independent translations, and discussed their versions until agreement was finally reached. The final version was confirmed after a critical review by several researchers in Korean Institute of Public Administration (KIPA) who received their Ph.D degrees in public administration in English speaking countries.

Survey Procedures for Data Collection

For this study, two independent surveys were conducted to obtain data on the relevant variables; the surveys differed in terms of purpose and respondents. First, to answer Research Question 1 by testing Hypothesis 1, samples of paired comparable groups—Certified Public Accountants (CPAs), one from the private sector, and the other from the public sector—were surveyed using Perry’s full version of the PSM questionnaire. The purpose of Survey 2 was to seek answers to the second and third Research Questions; it was designed to test Hypotheses 2 through 7 by collecting data from a sample of Korean national government officials.

Survey 1

Sampling

As discussed in the literature review, a comparison of the private and public sectors is not an easy task; it involves great methodological difficulties. Although we can conceptually distinguish both sectors and perceptually consider each as generic, both are comprised of heterogeneous professions. Profession, according to Nalbandian and Edwards (1983), is a critical independent variable affecting value preferences. Without careful consideration of the methodological pitfalls, researchers, especially when dealing with perceptual data using an inter-sector comparative method, are likely to commit the common error of comparing dissimilar elements. Therefore, securing matching groups to the highest degree possible in order to control for possible independent variables other than sector difference was crucial. Based on this reasoning and the research results of Nalbandian and Edwards, samples of the first survey were drawn from CPAs working in the public sector and in the private sector.

Also, because most of them had majored in business and economics, focusing on them was expected to control possible intervening effects from their academic background (Marwell and Ames 1981).

Initial research revealed the existence of the Korean Association for Certified Public Accountants (KACPA), which issued an annual membership list. The current list was released in late June 2001, and acquired in early July. This membership list contains basic contact information: work place, phone number, e-mail address. A population of 93 CPAs working for public organizations was identified. Two kinds of employment were found. Almost equal numbers of CPAs were working either for government organizations or for non-profit organizations. As shown in table 4-1, BAI (Board of Audit and Inspection), MOFE (Ministry of Finance and Economy), MOCIE (Ministry of Commerce, Industry and Energy), FTC (Fair Trade Commission), and NTS (National Tax Service) are government organizations, while the FSS (Financial Supervisory Service) and BOK (Bank of Korea) are non-government and non-profit organizations. Because this study mainly focuses on government employees, the CPAs working for the government organizations were the major target of Survey 1. However, it was decided to include the CPAs working for the non-profit organizations for the following reasons: first, the organizations are, in nature, public ones, and, second, according to the results of comparative studies of PSM which included the non-profit sector, the employees of non-government and non-profit organizations showed almost identical reward orientation (Gabris and Simo 1995) and same levels of PSM (Wittmer 1991) to government employees. The CPAs working for the FSS and BOK were also surveyed, and the levels of PSM of the three groups of CPAs—government, non-profit, and private—were compared with one another.

Investigation revealed there were three types of employment available to CPAs working in the private sector: working for large accounting firms, running a personal office, and working for small or mid-scale accounting companies—usually somewhere between 20-60 CPAs. Of these groups, CPAs in the first category were surveyed, because only they were working in an organizational environment similar to the CPAs in the public sector—a large-scale hierarchical organizational structure.

Administration

Rather than using the mail survey method, this study utilized survey assistants working for the target organizations to conduct the surveys. Mail surveys are not widely used in Korea; most researchers prefer the on-site survey method utilizing survey assistants (Oh 1995, Song 1998, Kim 1996, Chung 1996, Seo 1992, Cho 1997). Six years of working experience as a government official in Korean allowed the author to locate at least one person in each organization who was willing to administer the surveys. Samples of CPAs with the five largest private accounting firms were selected by a random sampling method. Each survey assistant was asked to use a simple systematic sampling technique by selecting every n th CPA, for example 15th, from the extension directory of all CPAs, which was provided for internal communication. For CPAs with public organizations, most of them were requested to be surveyed because the number is much smaller. In the BAI and FSS that had large number of CPAs, research assistants helped to distribute and collect the questionnaire. Questionnaires were sent by mail to the CPAs working for the other public organizations. All the respondents were informed that responses provided by participants would be kept confidential and be used only for statistical analysis as collective data. For each research assistant, remind calls were made once or twice. Follow-up e-mails were sent

to CPAs to whom the survey questionnaires were mailed to encourage participation. Survey 1 was conducted from July 31st through September 4th 2001. Table 4-1 shows figures representing the numbers of survey questionnaires distributed and collected in the both sectors.

Table 4-1: The Number of Questionnaires Distributed and Collected in Survey 1

Public Sector			Private Sector		
Organization	Distribution	Collection	Organization	Distribution	Collection
BAI *	35	27	Acc. Firm 1 (196)	25	17
MOFE	5	2	Acc. Firm 2 (148)	20	10
MOCIE	2	2	Acc. Firm 3 (194)	25	14
FTC	2	1	Acc. Firm 4 (537)	60	28
NTS	3	1	Acc. Firm 5 (206)	25	18
FSS *	42	32			
BOK	5	2			
Total	94	67		160	87

Note: Except for FSS and BOK all the organization are government organizations. The numbers in parentheses beside Acc. Firm present the number of CPAs employed in each of the firm.

* For brief explanation for the BAI and FSS that have large numbers of CPAs in the public sector, see note 3.

Survey 2

Sampling

The population of Survey 2 is Korean national government officials. As of July 2001, the Korean national government was comprised of eighteen ministries, four offices, sixteen administrations and various small-sized agencies. Among them, the ministries were the focal agencies because they are the main bodies dealing with policy matters in specific policy areas. These ministries were broken down into three groups according to their major governmental functions—general administration, the economy, and social work. The Ministry of Defense, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, and the Ministry of Justice were excluded. Finally, ten ministries were selected out of the remaining fifteen to represent

the entire range of national government organizations. To secure a representative sample it was decided that at least 400 valid respondents should be included. Also, a stratified sampling method was used to obtain 40 percent of samples from government officials belonging to Grade 5 and above.

Administration

As in Survey 1, survey assistants in each ministry administered the survey. Questionnaires were randomly distributed by the simple systematic sample method using the extension directory. All the respondents were also fully informed that anonymity was guaranteed and that their responses would be used for only academic purpose. Survey 2 began July 31st and ended 14th Aug 2001. Of total 421 responses 13 were unusable because they had some missing values in PSM measures. Table 4-2 shows the numbers of questionnaires distributed and collected from each ministry surveyed.

Table 4-2: The Number of Questionnaires Distributed and Collected in Survey 2

Ministry	Distribution	Collection	Percent
MOFE	60	45	11.0
MOEHRD	60	42	10.3
MOU	60	38	9.3
MOGAHA	60	50	12.3
MCT	60	35	8.6
MOCIE	60	51	12.5
MOHW	60	34	8.6
MOE	60	31	7.6
MOL	60	49	12.0
MOCT	60	33	8.1
Total	600	408	100.0

Note: Acronyms used above are as follows: MOEHRD (Ministry of Education and Human Resources Development, MOU (Ministry of Unification), MOGAHA (Ministry of Government Administration and Home Affairs), MCT (Ministry of Culture and Tourism), MOHW (Ministry of Health and Welfare), MOE (Ministry of Environment), MOL (Ministry of Labor), and MOCT (Ministry of Construction and Transportation).

Data Analysis

The issue of the levels of the variables used in this study needs to be explained because it is closely related to choice of the type of statistical analysis. All the variables except for demographic variables both in Survey 1 and Survey 2 were measured as numeric variables. The demographic variables are categorical.

To test Hypothesis 1, analysis of variance (ANOVA) was conducted to see whether there would be a statistically significant difference in PSM scores between the three groups of samples. Since the independent variable, workplace, and other potential explaining variables drawn from the literature review such as age, gender and income, are all categorical variables, and PSM, the dependent variable, is a numeric variable, ANOVA was considered to be a good statistical method to test Hypothesis 1. The statistical analysis can single out independent categorical variable(s) having net effect on dependent variable while other explaining variables are being controlled (Fox 1995).

Hypotheses 2 through Hypotheses 7 involve a numeric dependent variable and multiple independent variables the levels of which are mixed: numeric and categorical. To examine the relationships between job satisfaction and PSM (Hypothesis 2) and organizational commitment and PSM (Hypothesis 3), Analysis of Covariance (ANCOVA) was used. ANCOVA is a well-known statistical method that is ideal for the analysis of the situation where a numeric dependent variable is explained by both categorical and numeric independent variables (Bryman and Duncan 1997).

For the same reason, ANCOVA method was also used to test Hypotheses 4 through 7.

All the data were analyzed with the Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS) version 10.0.

Note

1. Perry reported that such demographic variables as education level, age, gender, and income were found to have a statistically significant impact on the level of PSM, especially the factor of commitment to the public interest/civic duty. Income had a negative effect; that is, higher income was related to lower PSM scores. Men were more likely than women to show higher PSM levels (Perry 1997, p. 189. Exhibit 3). In another study, age was found to be positively related to PSM (Tschirhart 1998, p.41. Table 1). Naff and Crum (1999) also found that race, gender and education level can act as antecedents of PSM. However, their study, as opposed to Perry's finding, reported that women showed higher PSM levels than men (1999).

2. The survey items which measured the five variables developed in Hackman and Oldham's study were as follows:

[Skill Variety]

How much variety is there in your job? That is, to what extent does the job require you to do many different things at work, using a variety of your skills and talents?

1-----2-----3-----4-----5-----6-----7

Very little; the job requires me to do the same things over and over again

Moderate variety

Very much: the job requires me to do many different things using a number of different skills and talents.

[Task Identity]

To what extent does your job involve doing a "whole" and identifiable piece of work? That is, is the job a complete piece of work that has an obvious beginning and end? Or is it only a small part of the overall piece of work, which is finished by other people?

1-----2-----3-----4-----5-----6-----7

My job is only a tiny part of the overall piece of work; the results of my activities cannot be seen in the final product or service.

My job is a moderate-sized "chunk" of the overall piece of work; my own contribution can be seen in the final outcome.

My job involves doing the whole piece of work. From start to finish; the results of my activities are easily seen in the final product or service.

[Task Significance]

In general, how significant or important is your job? That is, are the results of your work likely to significantly affect the lives or well-being of other people?

1-----2-----3-----4-----5-----6-----7

Not very significant; the outcome of my work are not likely to have important effects on other people.

Moderately significant

Highly significant; the outcomes of my work can affect other people in very important ways

[Autonomy]

How much autonomy is there in your job? That is, to what extent does your job permit you to decide on your own how to go about doing the work?

1-----2-----3-----4-----5-----6-----7

Very little; the job gives me almost no personal "say" about how and when the work is done.

Moderate autonomy; I can make some decisions about the work.

Very much; the job gives me almost complete responsibility for deciding how and when the work is done.

[Feedback]

To what extent does doing the job itself provides you with information about your work performance? That is, does the actual work itself provides clues about how well you are doing—aside from any "feedback" co-workers or supervisors may provide?

1-----2-----3-----4-----5-----6-----7

Very little; the job itself is set up so I could work forever without finding out how well I am doing.

Moderately; sometimes doing the job provides "feedback" to me; sometimes it does not.

Very much; the job is set up so that I get almost constant "feedback" as I work about how well I am doing.

Respondents were asked to circle the number which they thought describes their job most accurately.

3. The variables, devised by Buchanan (1974), were measured by quantifying respondents' responses to the following statements:

Peer group cohesion: The people with whom I work are friendly and close-knit.

Group's negative attitudes toward organization: The people I work with express mostly negative attitudes toward the organization.

Personal importance: It is generally accepted by those who matter that my work is important to the organization.

Respect from citizens: As a government employee I feel I get the respect I deserve for my work

A statement item for respect from citizens is drawn from Lomzek's study (1985).

Respondents were asked to indicate their agreement or disagreement from Strongly Disagree (1) to Strongly Agree (7).

4. The Board of Audit and Inspection (BAI) is an independent government organization performing equivalent functions to the General Accounting Office (GAO) in the U.S.

As to the Financial Supervisory Service (FSS), a more detailed explanation is necessary because of its mixed and complicated characteristics. With regard to the FSS's organizational setting, its relationship with the Financial Supervisory Commission (the FSC) should be understood. In April 1998, in the middle of the Asian Economic Crisis, the FSC was established as the nation's supreme and integrated financial supervisor under the Act on the Establishment of Financial Supervisory Organizations. The FSC, composed of nine members, each appointed by the President of Korea for a renewable term of three years, is a government organization and placed under the office of the Prime Minister and its standing members are government officials. However, the Commission performs its duties independently of any government organization. The Commission deliberates on and resolves policy matters relating to the inspection and supervision of financial institutions and the securities and futures markets (The FSC 2000). The Chairman of the FSC concurrently holds the position of Governor of the FSS.

In other words, the FSS is the implementing body of the FSC. The FSS is in charge of the supervision and examination of all financial institution in Korea under the guidance of the FSC. However, unlike the FSC, the FSS is not a government organization, and therefore, its employees are not government employees except for the governor and audit. In this context, it seems necessary to think about organizational type of the FSS based on some criteria organizational theorists have suggested to determine publicness or privateness of an organization. Most of the functions the FSC now performs were transferred from the Ministry of Finance and Economics (MOFE), in accordance with International Monetary Fund (IMF) recommendations. Contributions from the government are its main source of

funds (The FSC 2000). Any financial institution, if it disagrees with the results of the FSS's examination, should appeal first to the Office of Prime Minister before taking legal proceedings (The Act on the Establishment of Financial Supervisory Organizations, Article 70). In Korea, the special administrative procedure which demands an appeal for administrative decisions before seeking a judicial trial is only applied to administrative measures of government organizations. In addition, employees of the FSS are to be considered as government employees when they are subject to the punishment prescribed in the Criminal Law or other related laws (The Act on the Establishment of Financial Supervisory Organizations, Article 69). Judging from the discussion on the organizational setting, functions, funding, and legal clauses on appeal and its employees, it is no doubt that the FSS is a public organization.

5. To secure 95% of accuracy at the .05 level of confidence level, it is generally known that the minimal sample size should be 384, assuming a large population and maximum variability for a binomial variable (Corbett 1996, Jones and Olson 1996)

Chapter V: Research Findings

The purpose of this chapter is to present descriptions of the collected data and to report statistical findings with regard to the three research questions proposed in Chapter I.

Research findings are demonstrated along the analyses of the two surveys. In each analysis, the first part shows descriptive statistics of the major variables, including demographic data of the respondents, and the second part deals with tests of the hypotheses.

Analysis of Survey 1

Presentation of Descriptive Statistics

Survey 1 was designed to seek the answer to Research Question 1: Is PSM more prevalent in the public sector? To control for the effects of profession and educational background on PSM levels, three different groups of CPAs working for governmental organizations, non-profit organizations, and private accounting firms respectively were drawn and surveyed. Table 5-1 shows the distribution of respondents by their work places. A total of 154 CPAs participated in Survey 1, 87 from private accounting firms, and 67 from the public sector, with 34 from non-profit and 33 from governmental organizations.

Table 5-1: Workplace Distribution of Respondents

Workplace	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Private	87	56.5	56.5	56.5
Non-profit	34	22.1	22.1	78.6
Government	33	21.4	21.4	100.0
Total	154	100.0	100.0	

Survey 1 also collected data on the following demographic variables: age, gender, tenure, education, and income. Since it would be unnecessary to include a demographic variable as

an independent variable if any of those were already controlled for in the selection process, a series of chi-square tests was conducted to see whether the respondents in the three groups were distributed evenly to those variables. The cross-tabulation of age by workplace, the upper portion of Table 5-2, indicates that a majority of CPAs in private accounting firms and non-profit organizations belong to the 26-30 and 31-35 age groups, while most of the CPAs in governmental organizations fall into the 31-35 and 36-40 age categories.

Table 5-2: Cross-tabulation, Age by Workplace

Age	Workplace			Total
	Private	Non-profit	Government	
Under 25	2			2
26-30	37	13		50
31-35	43	12	9	64
36-40	4	6	17	27
41-45	1	2	4	7
46-50			1	1
51-55			2	2
Over 56		1		1
Total	87	34	33	154

Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Significance (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	69.629	14	.000
Likelihood Ratio	74.325	14	.000
Linear-by-Linear Association	43.921	1	.000
N of Valid Cases	154		

Chi-Square tests show that the distribution is statistically different among the three groups at .001 level. Since age was not controlled for in the selection process, it had to be included as an independent variable.

Table 5-3 shows the gender distribution of the respondents in the three groups. Male CPAs predominate in all the groups, but the portion of female CPAs in non-profit organizations is higher than that of the other groups.

Table 5-3: Cross-tabulation, Gender by Workplace

Gender	Workplace			Total
	Private	Non-profit	Government	
Male	82	23	31	136
Female	5	11	2	18
Total	87	34	33	154

Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Significance. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	18.053	2	.000
Likelihood Ratio	14.918	2	.001
Linear-by-Linear Association	1.044	1	.307
N of Valid Cases	154		

Because Chi-Square tests confirmed that there are statistically significant differences in gender distribution of the respondents in the three groups, gender was included as an independent variable.

The cross-tabulation analysis of tenure by workplace, shown in Table 5-4, also revealed that the difference in distribution of respondents in the three groups was statistically significant; therefore, tenure was also incorporated as an independent variable.

Table 5-4: Cross-tabulation, Tenure by Workplace

Ten	Workplace			Total
	Private	Non-profit	Government	
Under 5 years	67	16	11	94
6-10	17	11	12	40
11-15	3	5	5	13
16-20		1	1	2
21-25			3	3
Over 26 years		1	1	2
Tota	87	34	33	154

Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Significance (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	34.272	10	.000
Likelihood Ratio	34.674	10	.000
Linear-by-Linear Association	27.137	1	.000
N of Valid Cases	154		

Income was found to be another variable in which the respondents of the three groups were distributed differently. Table 5-4 reveals that while most CPAs in governmental and non-private organizations fall in the first two income level categories, CPAs in private accounting firms were found to have incomes spread out among the levels. As the low value of Chi-Square tests confirmed this observation, income had to be considered as an independent variable.

Table 5-5: Cross-tabulation, Income by Workplace

Income	Workplace			Total
	Private	Non-profit	Government	
Less than 30 million	14	9	18	41
30-35	21	11	8	40
36-40	12	1	2	15
41-45	6	5	3	14
46-50	12	5	2	19
51-55	7	1		8
56-60	4			4
More than 60 million	11	2		13
Total	87	34	33	154

Note: Unit of income is Korean Won. 1US \$=1,331 Korean Won as of July 25th 2001.

Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Significance (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	31.867	14	.004
Likelihood Ratio	36.408	14	.001
Linear-by-Linear Association	19.354	1	.000
N of Valid Cases	154		

The three groups of respondents were also found to have markedly dissimilar educational distribution.

Table 5-6: Cross-tabulation, Education by Workplace

Education	Workplace			Total
	Private	Non-profit	Government	
Undergraduate	74	30	15	119
Pursuing Graduate Study	3	1		4
Master's or higher degree	10	3	18	31
Total	87	34	33	154

Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Significance (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	31.449	4	.000
Likelihood Ratio	27.926	4	.000
Linear-by-Linear Association	19.833	1	.000
N of Valid Cases	154		

Table 5-6 shows that only a minority of respondents, 13 out of 87 in private accounting firms and 4 in non-profit organizations, were pursuing or had finished their graduate studies, whereas more respondents in governmental organizations hold graduate degrees. Age, gender, tenure, income, and education as well as workplace had to be included as independent variables in an Analysis Of Variance (ANOVA) model which was designed to identify categorical independent variables (the six demographic variables in this study) affecting numerical dependent variable (PSM).

Table 5-7 shows descriptive statistics of PSM. The information about Skewness and Kurtosis in the table indicates that PSM takes on a shape close to normal distribution. 1

Table 5-7: Descriptive Statistics of PSM

	N	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std. Deviation	Std. Skewness	Std. Error	Kurtosis	Std. Error
PSM	154	57.00	134.00	102.9351	15.6467	-.055	.195	-.358	.389
Valid N (listwise)	154								

On the other hand, reliability tests of PSM measurement in Survey 1 show α values of the following four sub-scales of PSM: attraction to public policy ($\alpha = .6495$), public interest/civic duty ($\alpha = .6815$), compassion ($\alpha = .7530$), and self-sacrifice ($\alpha = .8633$). 2

Test of Hypothesis 1: The Prevalence of PSM in the Public Sector

Hypothesis 1 states that public employees show a higher level of PSM than private employees. To test this hypothesis, an ANOVA model was established in which PSM was a

dependent variable and the six demographic variables, including workplace, were independent variables. The procedure was conducted in the following fashion: first, a maximum of three-way interactions among independent variables was investigated. Interactions greater than three-way are very rare in the real world; in such cases, if they were to occur, they are likely to be spurious, although ANOVA can conduct full factorial model. Second, to secure a meaningful model, all interactions were removed if they were statistically insignificant. Table 5-8 was derived through this process. None of two-way and three-way interactions were significant. The table shows that only gender ($p = .030$) and workplace ($p = .044$) have a significant effect on PSM.

Table 5-8: Analysis of Variance of PSM (Model 1)

Source	Type III Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.	Eta Squared
Corrected Model	8415.662	24	350.653	1.558	.061	.225
Intercept	107765.040	1	107765.040	478.681	.000	.788
AGE	984.489	7	140.641	.625	.735	.033
GENDER	1081.944	1	1081.944	4.806	.030	.036
TENURE	179.616	5	35.923	.160	.977	.006
WORKPLACE	1439.535	2	719.768	3.197	.044	.047
INCOME	1328.116	7	189.731	.843	.554	.044
EDUCATION	57.220	2	28.610	.127	.881	.002
Error	29041.689	129	225.129			
Total	1669184.000	154				
Corrected Total	37457.351	153				

R Squared = .225 (Adjusted R Squared = .080)

However, the high value of the significance of the entire model ($p = .061$) indicates this model is marginally significant. In the next analysis, the variables of age, tenure, and education proved to be highly insignificant and were removed from the model.

Table 5-9 indicates results of the ANOVA. As insignificant variables were removed, not only was the significance level of the entire model substantially improved (from .061 to .001), but the adjusted R squared value also increased (from .080 to .125).

Table 5-9: Analysis of Variance of PSM (Model 2)

Source	Type III Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.	Eta Squared
Corrected Model	6830.455	10	683.045	3.189	.001	.182
Intercept	389674.598	1	389674.598	1819.429	.000	.927
GENDER	899.244	1	899.244	4.199	.042	.029
WORKPLACE	4025.606	2	2012.803	9.398	.000	.116
INCOME	1645.478	7	235.068	1.098	.368	.051
Error	30626.896	143	214.174			
Total	1669184.000	154				
Corrected Total	37457.351	153				

R Squared = .182 (Adjusted R Squared = .125)

The table also reveals that workplace and gender have significant effects on PSM, at .001 and .05 levels, respectively. As the eta squared value indicates, the workplace has a much stronger effect on PSM than gender: the workplace can explain 11.6 percent of variation of PSM, while gender can explain only 3%.

Table 5-9 does not provide any information about which workplace and which gender show higher PSM. Tables 5-10 and 5-11 shows PSM levels according to workplace and gender.

Table 5-10: Descriptive Statistics of PSM by Workplace

Workplace	N	Mean	Std. Deviation	Std. Error	Minimum	Maximum
Private	87	99.6207	15.0056	1.6088	57.00	134.00
Non-profit	34	102.1471	16.0721	2.7563	74.00	133.00
Government	33	112.4848	13.2078	2.2992	84.00	133.00
Total	154	102.9351	15.6467	1.2608	57.00	134.00

Table 5-11: Descriptive Statistics of PSM by Gender

Gender	N	Mean	Std. Deviation	Std. Error	Minimum	Maximum
Male	136	103.9338	15.5483	1.3333	57.00	134.00
Female	18	95.3889	14.6735	3.4586	76.00	122.00
Total	154	102.9351	15.6467	1.2608	57.00	134.00

As expected, CPAs working for governmental organizations marked the highest mean score of PSM followed by those working for non-profit organizations. CPAs in private accounting

firms showed the lowest level of PSM among the three groups. Males were found to show higher level of PSM than females.

With regard to Hypotheses 1, although we now know that workplace is an independent variable affecting PSM levels, one important question is not yet answered: Where does the statistically significant difference in PSM exist among the three groups of respondents? To seek the answer, post hoc tests were conducted to identify where the differences in PSM levels exist by comparing all possible pairs of groups. To calculate values of the post hoc tests, the Least Significant Differences (LSD), and the Bonferroni, and Tukey Honestly Significant Difference (HSD) tests were selected, based on the fact that while the LSD is the most liberal test and Bonferroni is the most conservative one, the Tukey HSD falls somewhere in between the other two (George and Mallery 2001, p135).

Table 5-12: Post Hoc Multiple Comparison Tests of PSM

			Mean Difference (I-J)	Std. Error	Sig.
(I) WORKPLACE (J) WORKPLACE					
Tukey HSD	Private	Non-profit	-2.5264	2.9666	.671
		Government	-12.8642***	2.9988	.000
	Non-profit	Private	2.5264	2.9666	.671
		Government	-10.3378*	3.5844	.011
	Government	Private	12.8642***	2.9988	.000
		Non-profit	10.3378*	3.5844	.011
LSD	Private	Non-profit	-2.5264	2.9666	.396
		Government	-12.8642***	2.9988	.000
	Non-profit	Private	2.5264	2.9666	.396
		Government	-10.3378**	3.5844	.005
	Government	Private	12.8642***	2.9988	.000
		Non-profit	10.3378**	3.5844	.005
Bonferroni	Private	Non-profit	-2.5264	2.9666	1.000
		Government	-12.8642***	2.9988	.000
	Non-profit	Private	2.5264	2.9666	1.000
		Government	-10.3378*	3.5844	.014
	Government	Private	12.8642***	2.9988	.000
		Non-profit	10.3378*	3.5844	.014

Note: Tests are based on observed means.

* $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$ *** $p < .001$

Table 5-12 reveals the results of the post hoc multiple comparisons. The respondents working for governmental organizations were found to show higher levels of PSM than those working for both non-profit organizations and private accounting firms. The differences were statistically significant in all three tests. Although the respondents in non-profit organizations showed higher levels of PSM than those in private accounting firms, the difference was not statistically significant; i.e., there is no difference in mean PSM scores between the respondents in non-profit organizations and those in private accounting firms.

Analysis of Survey 2

Presentation of Descriptive Statistics of Demographic Variables and PSM

In Survey 2, the answers to the following two research questions were sought: Does PSM have a positive effect on such desirable work-related attitudes as job satisfaction and organizational commitment? (Research Question 2). Does PSM affect government employees' conceptions of roles and responsibilities expressed and measured in terms of neutrality, managerial efficiency, proactive roles, and social equity? (Research Question 3). To secure a representative sample of the Korean national government employees, 600 survey questionnaires were distributed in ten ministries. Ultimately, 408 responses were collected as usable data set. In this part, the descriptive statistics of the respondents' demographic variables and their mean PSM scores are presented because these statistics would be commonly used in the following tests of hypotheses as key variables. Other variables used for a specific hypothesis are explained in the relevant section. Table 5-13 shows the respondents' distribution along age levels.

Table 5-13: Age Distribution of Respondents

Age	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Under 25	2	.5	.5	.5
26-30	44	10.8	10.8	11.3
31-35	123	30.1	30.1	41.4
36-40	87	21.3	21.3	62.7
41-45	87	21.3	21.3	84.1
46-50	49	12.0	12.0	96.1
51-55	15	3.7	3.7	99.8
Over 56	1	.2	.2	100.0
Total	408	100.0	100.0	

The mode was 31 to 35 years, while 72.7 percent of respondents belong to the 31-45 age groups. Table 5-14 indicates 6 to 10 years of work experience is the mode in tenure. It also shows that employees with less than ten years of work experience comprise 51% respondents, while nearly the same percentage of respondents (49%) had over ten years of work experience.

Table 5-14: Tenure Distribution of Respondents

Tenure	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Under 5 years	89	21.8	21.8	21.8
6-10	119	29.2	29.2	51.0
11-15	76	18.6	18.6	69.6
16-20	53	13.0	13.0	82.6
21-25	61	15.0	15.0	97.5
Over 26 years	10	2.5	2.5	100.0
Total	408	100.0	100.0	

Table 5-15 reveals that only 10.5% of respondents are females, reflecting the predominance of male employees in Korean governmental organizations. 3

Table 5-15: Gender Distribution of Respondents

Gender	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Male	364	89.2	89.4	89.4
Female	43	10.5	10.6	100.0
Total	407	99.8	100.0	
Missing	1	.2		
Total	408	100.0		

As for grade, Table 5-16 shows 57.7 percent of respondents were drawn from Grade 6 or below, with 43.2 percent from Grade 5 or higher. The mode is Grade 6.

Table 5-16: Grade Distribution of Respondents

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
8 ^m or Lower	7	1.7	1.7	1.7
7 th	80	19.6	19.7	21.4
6 th	148	36.3	36.4	57.7
5 th	128	31.4	31.4	89.2
4 th	40	9.8	9.8	99.0
3 rd or Higher	4	1.0	1.0	100.0
Total	407	99.8	100.0	
Missing	1	.2		
Total	408	100.0		

Table 5-17 indicates that nearly all the respondents have at least a university degree: 67.9 percent have a B.A degree and 27.9 percent hold a Master's or higher degree.

Table 5-17: Education Distribution of Respondents

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
High School Diploma	7	1.7	1.7	1.7
Associate Degree	10	2.5	2.5	4.2
B.A Degree	277	67.9	67.9	72.1
Master's or Higher Degree	114	27.9	27.9	100.0
Total	408	100.0	100.0	

Table 5-18 shows the descriptive statistics of PSM. The information on the values of Skewness and Kurtosis in the table implies that the mean PSM scores take a shape that is almost a perfectly normal distribution.

Table 5-18: Descriptive Statistics of PSM

	N	Mini mum	Maxi mum	Mean	Std. Deviation	Skewness	Std. Error	Kurtosis	Std. Error
PSM	408	66.00	150.00	109.3554	13.6489	-.052	.121	.185	.241
Valid N (listwise)	408								

Table 5-19 provides information on the reliability of PSM measurement, as well as comparing the α values of this study and Perry's along the four sub-scales of PSM.

Table 5-19: Comparison of Reliability Test results between This Study and Perry's (1996)

Sub scales	The number of Items	α Value of This Study	α Value of Perry's Study
Attraction to public policy	3	.5245	.77
Civic duty/ Public interest	5	.7356	.69
Compassion	8	.6767	.72
Self-sacrifice	8	.8436	.74

The major difference between this study and Perry's lies in attraction to public policy: the α value of this study (.5245) is much lower than that of Perry's (.77). Although the α value tends to be inflated as question items increase, and researchers more often than not accept an α value lower than .5 if fewer than 5 items are used (Oh 1995), the difference still seems to demand explanation. The three items on the survey which measure the respondents' attraction to public policy—Politics is a dirty word; The give-and-take of public policy making doesn't appeal to me; and I don't care much for politicians—originate from the assumption that people with stronger needs to serve public interest will more actively seek the opportunity to have an impact on public affairs (Naff and Crum 1999), and that they will have the desire to participate in the formulation of good public policy (Kelman 1987, Perry 1996). Therefore, those respondents ranking high in public service motives are expected to disagree with the three statements: first, politics is the arena of public policy, second; the give-and-take of public policy making has the same meaning as the formulation of public policy; and, third, politicians are the key actors involved in public policy making. With those three items, Perry acquired a relatively reasonable degree of internal consistency. However, a quite different result might occur in another political culture where a distrust of politicians prevails. In those cultures, the desire to participate in the formulation of good public policy may sharply deviate from the perception of politics and politicians. In other words, in a

political culture of mistrust, it is quite possible that people with a high PSM have a negative image of politics and politicians, while at the same time evaluating highly the act of public policy making. The author suspected that the response of Korean national government officials resulted from that line of reasoning.⁵ To examine the validity of the explanation, correlation tests were made. First, the author investigated interrelationships among the three question items. Table 5-20 shows the results.

Table 5-20: Intercorrelations of PSM and Three Statements of the Sub scale of Attraction to Public Policy Making

	1	2	3	4
1. PSM	1.000	.174	.484	.198
Sig. (2-tailed)	.	.000	.000	.000
2. Perception on Politics		1.000	.129	.563
Sig. (2-tailed)		.	.009	.000
3. Preference for Public Policy Making			1.000	.091
Sig. (2-tailed)				.067
4. Care for Politicians				1.000
Sig. (2-tailed)				.

As expected, perceptions on politics and care for politicians were highly correlated ($r = .563$), and preference for policy making was related either rather weakly to perceptions of politics ($r = .129$) or marginally to attitudes towards politicians ($r = .091$, $p = .061$). Second, to see which statement most closely reflects PSM, another correlation test was conducted among the three statements and mean PSM scores. Table 5-20 also reveals that the item relating to preference for public policy making is more highly correlated with mean PSM score ($r = .484$) than those on perception of politics ($r = .174$) and attitude towards politicians ($r = .198$). Based on the discussion, the following conclusion was drawn: although the attraction to the public policy sub scale of PSM measurement is still acceptable, it has a potential methodological weakness to tap other than PSM when applied in nations where

politicians are distrusted and politics is negatively perceived. Further study and discussion seem necessary to develop the sub scale into more scientific measurement. As a matter of fact, Perry himself admitted the potential flaw of his measurement along similar lines when he said "...it confounds whether the sub scale taps the attraction to policy making dimension or whether it also may tap cynicism or negative effect toward politics" (1996, p 9).

Test of Hypothesis 2: Relationship between Job Satisfaction and PSM

Explanation for the Model and Descriptive Statistics of the Variables Involved

Based on the literature review, a model was established to determine the presence of a positive relationship between job satisfaction and PSM, with the demographic variables and the five job characteristics (skill variety, task identity, task significance, autonomy, feedback) employed as independent variables. Because the model was composed of one numerical dependent variable, job satisfaction, and numerous independent variables at different levels—demographic variables are categorical and job characteristics and PSM are numerical—an Analysis of Covariance (ANCOVA) was used as the most appropriate statistical procedure. Numerical independent variables were incorporated as covariates. On the other hand, job satisfaction was measured in terms of five principal aspects: the work on the present job, pay, opportunities for promotion, supervision, and coworkers. In other words, five ANCOVA models were tested with each aspect of job satisfaction set as a dependent variable. The group of independent variables was generally used in the five models.

Table 5-21 shows the descriptive statistics of job satisfaction and five job characteristics. All the items were almost normally distributed. Notable are the low mean scores of

satisfaction with pay and promotion. The low values of the sub scales seem to support the explanation for the Korean bureaucracy made in Chapter III.

Table 5-21: Descriptive Statistics of Five Aspects of Job Satisfaction and Job Characteristics

	N	Mini mum	Maxi mum	Mean	Std. Deviation	Skew ness	Std. Error	Kurtosis	Std. Error
Work Satisfaction	397	6.00	48.00	25.9068	10.3935	.108	.122	-.773	.244
Pay Satisfaction	388	.00	24.00	5.7423	5.3864	1.124	.124	.787	.247
Promotion Satisfaction	388	.00	27.00	7.4381	5.6859	.921	.124	.653	.247
Supervision Satisfaction	392	3.00	54.00	41.0944	11.5446	-1.043	.123	.334	.246
Coworker Satisfaction	395	.00	54.00	37.9013	11.9698	-.539	.123	-.589	.245
VARIETY	405	1.00	7.00	4.3728	1.3830	-.465	.121	.160	.242
IDENTITY	406	1.00	7.00	4.3128	1.4583	-.358	.121	-.174	.242
SIGNIFICANCE	406	1.00	7.00	4.5271	1.5628	-.359	.121	-.402	.242
AUTONOMY	407	1.00	7.00	4.0983	1.3299	-.421	.121	.083	.241
FEEDBACK	407	1.00	7.00	4.0860	1.2014	-.372	.121	.439	.241
Valid N (listwise)	380								

Table 5-22 presents the results of the reliability test for each of the five sub scales in this study.

Table 5-22: Reliability Test Results of Five Aspects of Job Satisfaction

Sub scales	Number of Items	α Value
Work satisfaction	18	.7644
Pay satisfaction	9	.7565
Satisfaction with promotion	9	.7446
Satisfaction with supervision	18	.8787
Satisfaction with coworkers	18	.8861

The high values signify that the JDI measurement of job satisfaction was very reliable in this study.

Relationship between Work Satisfaction and PSM

As in the analysis of Survey 1, the effects of two or three interactions among independent variables were investigated in the first stage. Interactions and independent variables were

removed if they were proved to be highly insignificant. Table 5-23 shows an ANCOVA model in which only the main effects of independent variables were analyzed.

Table 5-23: Analysis of Covariance of Work Satisfaction (Model 1)

Source	Type III Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.	Eta Squared
Corrected Model	12832.963	27	475.295	5.901	.000	.304
Intercept	66.822	1	66.822	.830	.363	.002
AGE	630.009	7	90.001	1.117	.351	.021
GENDER	91.665	1	91.665	1.138	.287	.003
TENURE	158.871	5	31.774	.395	.853	.005
GRADE	213.641	5	42.728	.531	.753	.007
EDUCATION	220.403	3	73.468	.912	.435	.007
PSM	1112.650	1	1112.650	13.814	.000	.036
VARIETY	1145.130	1	1145.130	14.218	.000	.037
IDENTITY	4.377E-03	1	4.377E-03	.000	.994	.000
SIGNIFICANCE	369.810	1	369.810	4.591	.033	.012
AUTONOMY	368.672	1	368.672	4.577	.033	.012
FEEDBACK	35.797	1	35.797	.444	.505	.001
Error	29398.095	365	80.543			
Total	306134.000	393				
Corrected Total	42231.059	392				

R Squared = .304 (Adjusted R Squared = .252)

None of the interactions were statistically significant. Although the model already identified four independent variables with statistically significant effects on work satisfaction, other insignificant variables, the p values of which were higher than .200, were removed from the model to secure more accurate data. Table 5-24 is the final model obtained through the process.

Table 5-24: Analysis of Covariance of Work Satisfaction (Model 2)

Source	Type III Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.	Eta Squared
Corrected Model	11774.708	4	2943.677	37.032	.000	.275
Intercept	196.509	1	196.509	2.472	.117	.006
PSM	1225.194	1	1225.194	15.413	.000	.038
VARIETY	1087.327	1	1087.327	13.679	.000	.034
SIGNIFICANCE	685.733	1	685.733	8.627	.004	.022
AUTONOMY	570.552	1	570.552	7.178	.008	.018
Error	31001.191	390	79.490			
Total	307979.000	395				
Corrected Total	42775.899	394				

R Squared = .275 (Adjusted R Squared = .268)

The model was significant at the .001 level and explained 26.8 percent of the variation in work satisfaction. PSM, skill variety, task significance, and autonomy were found to have significant effects on work satisfaction. However, because the table does not provide any information on the direction between work satisfaction and the independent variables a multiple regression analysis was conducted.

Table 5-25: Regression Analysis of Work Satisfaction

Model Summary

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate
1	.525	.275	.268	8.9157

Predictors: (Constant), AUTONOMY, PSM, VARIETY, SIGNIFICANCE

Coefficients

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
		B	Std. Error			
1	(Constant)	-5.885	3.743		-1.572	.117
	PSM	.134	.034	.174	3.926	.000
	VARIETY	1.614	.436	.214	3.698	.000
	SIGNIFICANCE	1.201	.409	.180	2.937	.004
	AUTONOMY	1.129	.421	.143	2.679	.008

Table 5-25 shows that all the four independent variables identified in the ANCOVA model have positive effects on work satisfaction. Thus, it is confirmed, as hypothesized, that there is a positive relationship between work satisfaction and PSM.

Relationship between Pay Satisfaction and PSM

Table 5-26 indicates the main effects of each independent variable on pay satisfaction. None of the two or three way interactions were found to be significant. In the second analysis, the independent variables which were proved insignificant were removed.

Table 5-26: Analysis of Covariance of Pay Satisfaction (Model 1)

Source	Type III Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.	Eta Squared
Corrected Model	1430.348	27	52.976	1.962	.003	.130
Intercept	38.015	1	38.015	1.408	.236	.004
PSM	202.351	1	202.351	7.494	.007	.021
AGE	314.233	7	44.890	1.663	.117	.032
GENDER	276.754	1	276.754	10.250	.001	.028
TENURE	86.157	5	17.231	.638	.671	.009
GRADE	137.549	5	27.510	1.019	.406	.014
EDUCATION	4.401	3	1.467	.054	.983	.000
VARIETY	66.595	1	66.595	2.466	.117	.007
IDENTITY	.519	1	.519	.019	.890	.000
SIGNIFICANCE	60.246	1	60.246	2.231	.136	.006
AUTONOMY	2.243	1	2.243	.083	.773	.000
FEEDBACK	39.557	1	39.557	1.465	.227	.004
Error	9612.392	356	27.001			
Total	23624.000	384				
Corrected Total	11042.740	383				

R Squared = .130 (Adjusted R Squared = .064)

Table 5-27 shows the final results.

Table 5-27: Analysis of Covariance of Pay Satisfaction (Model 2)

Source	Type III Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.	Eta Squared
Corrected Model	1169.779	11	106.344	3.967	.000	.105
Intercept	26.446	1	26.446	.986	.321	.003
PSM	279.147	1	279.147	10.412	.001	.027
AGE	389.444	7	55.635	2.075	.045	.037
GENDER	352.640	1	352.640	13.154	.000	.034
VARIETY	46.095	1	46.095	1.719	.191	.005
SIGNIFICANCE	29.176	1	29.176	1.088	.298	.003
Error	9999.779	373	26.809			
Total	23913.000	385				
Corrected Total	11169.558	384				

R Squared = .105 (Adjusted R Squared = .078)

This model can explain the 7.8 percent variation of pay satisfaction and it was significant at .001 level. PSM, age, and gender were found to have statistically significant effects on pay satisfaction. Females reported higher pay satisfaction than males. Table 5-28 compares the mean values of pay satisfaction of each gender.

Table 5-28: Comparison of Pay Satisfaction Levels of Public Employees by Gender

GENDER	Mean	Std. Error	95% Confidence Interval	
			Lower Bound	Upper Bound
Male	5.364	.856	3.682	7.046
Female	9.299	1.125	7.086	11.511

Note: Evaluated at covariates appeared in the model: PSM = 109.6124.

	Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.	Eta Squared
Contrast	474.158	1	474.158	17.526	.000	.044
Error	10199.501	377	27.054			

Note: The F test is based on the linearly independent pairwise comparisons among the estimated marginal means.

The ANOVA test, based on estimated marginal means of pay satisfaction, shows that gender has a net effect after controlling for the effects from other independent variables. To see the direction of the relationship between pay satisfaction and PSM and age a multiple regression analysis was also made. 6 Table 5-29 presents the results.

Table 5-29: Regression Analysis of Pay Satisfaction
Model Summary

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate
1	.125	.016	.010	5.3582

Predictors: (Constant), AGE, PSM

Coefficients						
Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
		B	Std. Error	Beta		
1	(Constant)	.353	2.247		.157	.875
	PSM	4.955E-02	.020	.125	2.432	.015
	AGE	-9.154E-03	.204	-.002	-.045	.964

Only PSM still was found to have a positive effect on pay satisfaction at .05 level. 7

Relationship between Satisfaction with Promotion and PSM

Table 5-30 presents the main effects of each independent variable on satisfaction with promotion. In this model, likewise, no significant interaction was found among independent variables to affect satisfaction with promotion.

Table 5-30: Analysis of Covariance of Promotion Satisfaction (Model 1)

Source	Type III Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.	Eta Squared
Corrected Model	2166.741	27	80.250	2.786	.000	.175
Intercept	52.760	1	52.760	1.831	.177	.005
PSM	68.829	1	68.829	2.389	.123	.007
AGE	605.964	7	86.566	3.005	.004	.056
GENDER	.753	1	.753	.026	.872	.000
TENURE	313.826	5	62.765	2.179	.056	.030
GRADE	643.567	5	128.713	4.468	.001	.059
EDUCATION	52.161	3	17.387	.604	.613	.005
VARIETY	12.062	1	12.062	.419	.518	.001
IDENTITY	.795	1	.795	.028	.868	.000
SIGNIFICANCE	151.941	1	151.941	5.274	.022	.015
AUTONOMY	24.110	1	24.110	.837	.361	.002
FEEDBACK	81.538	1	81.538	2.830	.093	.008
Error	10226.930	355	28.808			
Total	33855.000	383				
Corrected Total	12393.671	382				

R Squared = .175 (Adjusted R Squared = .112)

As before, after highly insignificant variables were removed, Table 5-31 was derived.

Table 5-31: Analysis of Covariance of Promotion Satisfaction (Model 2)

Source	Type III Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.	Eta Squared
Corrected Model	2129.309	20	106.465	3.753	.000	.171
Intercept	53.644	1	53.644	1.891	.170	.005
PSM	77.612	1	77.612	2.736	.099	.007
AGE	626.048	7	89.435	3.153	.003	.057
TENURE	336.568	5	67.314	2.373	.039	.032
GRADE	1004.224	5	200.845	7.080	.000	.089
SIGNIFICANCE	171.980	1	171.980	6.062	.014	.016
FEEDBACK	175.513	1	175.513	6.187	.013	.017
Error	10326.233	364	28.369			
Total	33865.000	385				
Corrected Total	12455.543	384				

R Squared = .171 (Adjusted R Squared = .125)

This model can explain 12.5 percent of the variation in satisfaction of promotion at .001 level. Age, tenure, grade, significance, and feedback were found to significantly affect the

dependent variable. PSM did not make any meaningful difference in satisfaction with promotion. To examine the direction of the effect, a multiple regression analysis was made with the independent variables which were found to affect the dependent variable in the ANCOVA model.

Table 5-32: Regression Analysis of Promotion Satisfaction
Model Summary

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate
1	.334	.111	.100	5.4043

Predictors: (Constant), FEEDBACK, TENURE, GRADE, SIGNIFICANCE, AGE

Coefficient		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients		t	Sig.
Model		B	Std. Error	Beta			
1	(Constant)	4.862	1.363			3.568	.000
	AGE	-1.213	.413	-.289		-2.940	.003
	TENURE	.148	.384	.038		.385	.700
	GRADE	1.637	.316	.282		5.184	.000
	SIGNIFICANCE	-.407	.220	-.112		-1.852	.065
	FEEDBACK	.853	.289	.178		2.954	.003

Table 5-32 shows that grade and feedback have positive effects on satisfaction with promotion whereas age and significance have negative effects. Tenure lost its significance. It is quite understandable that, on satisfaction with promotion, grade and feedback have a positive effect, while age has a negative one; the higher the position one has, the more likely he or she is to be satisfied. Getting informed of the quality of one's work also seems to operate as a source of satisfaction with promotion. Getting old can lead to impatience with promotion, especially in such a Confucian culture as Korea. However, it seems to go against common sense that task significance has a negative effect on promotion satisfaction. That may be explained this way: the more significance one places on the job, the less likely he or she is to perceive that the deserved grade should be higher than the current one.

Relationship between Satisfaction with Supervision and PSM

Table 5-33 presents the main effect of each independent variable on satisfaction with supervision. No interaction among independent variables made a difference on satisfaction with supervision.

Table 5-33: Analysis of Covariance of Supervision Satisfaction (Model 1)

Source	Type III Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.	Eta Squared
Corrected Model	8932.280	27	330.825	2.790	.000	.173
Intercept	706.941	1	706.941	5.963	.015	.016
AGE	636.366	7	90.909	.767	.616	.015
GENDER	.179	1	.179	.002	.969	.000
TENURE	340.294	5	68.059	.574	.720	.008
GRADE	410.151	5	82.030	.692	.630	.010
EDUCATION	320.065	3	106.688	.900	.441	.007
VARIETY	53.493	1	53.493	.451	.502	.001
IDENTITY	108.186	1	108.186	.912	.340	.003
SIGNIFICANCE	70.427	1	70.427	.594	.441	.002
AUTONOMY	1340.662	1	1340.662	11.308	.001	.031
FEEDBACK	17.379	1	17.379	.147	.702	.000
PSM	2223.185	1	2223.185	18.751	.000	.050
Error	42563.182	359	118.560			
Total	705080.000	387				
Corrected Total	51495.463	386				

R Squared = .173 (Adjusted R Squared = .111)

It is notable that all the variables except for PSM and autonomy are highly insignificant. To obtain a more accurate model, the insignificant variables were removed in the second analysis. Table 5-34 shows the final output.

Table 5-34: Analysis of Covariance of Supervision Satisfaction (Model 2)

Source	Type III Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.	Eta Squared
Corrected Model	6692.008	2	3346.004	28.589	.000	.128
Intercept	944.871	1	944.871	8.073	.005	.020
PSM	2179.439	1	2179.439	18.622	.000	.046
AUTONOMY	3106.945	1	3106.945	26.546	.000	.064
Error	45411.035	388	117.039			
Total	712165.000	391				
Corrected Total	52103.043	390				

R Squared = .128 (Adjusted R Squared = .124)

As before, the value of adjusted R squared improved. PSM and autonomy were found to affect satisfaction with supervision at .001 level. To see the direction of the relationship, a multiple regression analysis was made. Table 5-35 confirmed that PSM as well as autonomy have positive effects on satisfaction with supervision.

**Table 5-35: Regression Analysis of Supervision Satisfaction
Model Summary**

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate
1	.358	.128	.124	10.8184

Predictors: (Constant), PSM, AUTONOMY

Coefficients

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
		B	Std. Error	Beta		
1	(Constant)	12.761	4.491		2.841	.005
	AUTONOMY	2.184	.424	.250	5.152	.000
	PSM	.177	.041	.209	4.315	.000

Relationship between Satisfaction with Coworkers and PSM

The fifth ANCOVA model was run exactly as the previous models.

Table 5-36: Analysis of Covariance of Coworker Satisfaction (Model 1)

Source	Type III Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.	Eta Squared
Corrected Model	11715.812	27	433.919	3.534	.000	.209
Intercept	192.460	1	192.460	1.567	.211	.004
PSM	2860.653	1	2860.653	23.299	.000	.060
AGE	1830.942	7	261.563	2.130	.040	.040
GENDER	384.830	1	384.830	3.134	.078	.009
TENURE	717.706	5	143.541	1.169	.324	.016
GRADE	987.746	5	197.549	1.609	.157	.022
EDUCATION	429.803	3	143.268	1.167	.322	.010
VARIETY	261.354	1	261.354	2.129	.145	.006
IDENTITY	133.750	1	133.750	1.089	.297	.003
SIGNIFICANCE	13.163	1	13.163	.107	.744	.000
AUTONOMY	1154.833	1	1154.833	9.406	.002	.025
FEEDBACK	19.030	1	19.030	.155	.694	.000
Error	44447.018	362	122.782			
Total	614318.000	390				
Corrected Total	56162.831	389				

R Squared = .209 (Adjusted R Squared = .150)

Interactions among independent variables were not found to be significant. Table 5-36 reveals the independent effect of each variable on coworker satisfaction. PSM, age, and autonomy were found to have statistically significant effects on coworker satisfaction. However, as highly significant variables were removed from the model, a slight change occurred. As shown in Table 5-37, age became insignificant whereas grade became significant. ⁹

Table 5-37: Analysis of Covariance of Coworker Satisfaction (Model 2)

Source	Type III Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.	Eta Squared
Corrected Model	10481.321	16	655.083	5.349	.000	.187
Intercept	106.817	1	106.817	.872	.351	.002
PSM	2993.536	1	2993.536	24.443	.000	.062
AGE	1451.649	7	207.378	1.693	.109	.031
GENDER	303.124	1	303.124	2.475	.117	.007
GRADE	1474.721	5	294.944	2.408	.036	.031
VARIETY	244.425	1	244.425	1.996	.159	.005
AUTONOMY	1659.829	1	1659.829	13.553	.000	.035
Error	45681.510	373	122.471			
Total	614318.000	390				
Corrected Total	56162.831	389				

R Squared = .187 (Adjusted R Squared = .152)

The result of the regression analysis in Table 5-38 shows that PSM and autonomy have positive effects, while grade has a negative effect on satisfaction with coworkers. ¹⁰

**Table 5-38: Regression Analysis of Coworker Satisfaction
Model Summary**

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate
1	.371	.138	.131	11.1659

Predictors: (Constant), PSM, GRADE, AUTONOMY

Coefficients

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients		t	Sig.
		B	Std. Error	Beta			
1	(Constant)	13.151	4.806			2.737	.006
	GRADE	-2.256	.608	-.185		-3.707	.000
	AUTONOMY	2.231	.460	.246		4.856	.000
	PSM	.211	.042	.240		4.985	.000

Similar to the category of satisfaction with supervision, autonomy positively affected satisfaction with coworkers. The negative relationship between coworker satisfaction and grade can be explained in two ways: First, there is high level of competition for promotion or performance bonus in the Korean government organizations which may be responsible for the relationship. Competition becomes more severe as one goes up the hierarchical ladder. In contrast, in the lower grades, employees may feel less stress. Second, if respondents had in mind their subordinates as coworkers when they were surveyed, the negative relationship may represent an expectation gap which supervisors felt about their staff. Because higher positions involve more responsibilities, those in higher positions tend to expect more from their staff, and higher expectations may easily bring disappointment.

Test of Hypotheses 3: Relationship between Organizational Commitment and PSM

Explanation for the Model and Descriptive Statistics of the Variables Involved

To test Hypothesis 3, which proposes a positive relationship between organizational commitment and PSM, another ANCOVA model was established with organizational commitment as the dependent variable. Based on literature review, the following three groups of independent variables were included in the model: personal characteristics, job characteristics, and work experience. The variables belonging to the first two categories refer to demographic variables and the five variables representing job characteristics, which were already used in the study on the relationship between job satisfaction and PSM. The same data were reused. Variables such as peer group cohesion, group's negative attitudes toward organization, personal importance, and respect from citizens were measured for the final category. All the numerical independent variables were incorporated in the model as

covariates. Table 5-39 shows the descriptive statistics of the newly emerged variables in the model. All the variables were normally distributed.

Table 5-39: Descriptive Statistics of Key Variables in Hypothesis 3

	N	Mini mum	Maxi mum	Mean	Std. Deviation	Skew ness	Std. Error	Kurtosis	Std. Error
ORGCOMMITMENT	408	21.00	105.00	65.5221	13.3262	-.214	.121	.295	.241
GRCOHESION	405	1.00	7.00	4.6568	1.1250	-.406	.121	.092	.242
NEGA ATTITUDE IMPORTANCE	405	1.00	7.00	3.6691	1.2305	.058	.121	-.502	.242
RESPECT	404	1.00	7.00	3.8045	1.2033	-.228	.121	-.005	.242
Valid N (listwise)	404								

The result of the reliability test for organizational commitment question items indicated a high level of reliability ($\alpha = .8981$).

Presentation of Statistical Analysis

As in previous analyses, effects from all of the possible two- or three- way interactions were checked first, but none of them were found to be significant.

Table 5-40: Analysis of Covariance of Organizational Commitment (Model 1)

Source	Type III Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.	Eta Squared
Corrected Model	34852.881	31	1124.286	11.413	.000	.490
Intercept	704.178	1	704.178	7.148	.008	.019
RESPECT	3231.888	1	3231.888	32.808	.000	.082
GRCOHESION	146.703	1	146.703	1.489	.223	.004
NEGA ATTITUDE	1035.930	1	1035.930	10.516	.001	.028
IMPORTANCE	1548.249	1	1548.249	15.717	.000	.041
AGE	637.438	7	91.063	.924	.487	.017
GENDER	259.789	1	259.789	2.637	.105	.007
TENURE	535.902	5	107.180	1.088	.367	.015
GRADE	335.594	5	67.119	.681	.638	.009
EDUCATION	516.184	3	172.061	1.747	.157	.014
VARIETY	169.845	1	169.845	1.724	.190	.005
IDENTITY	745.722	1	745.722	7.570	.006	.020
SIGNIFICANCE	134.935	1	134.935	1.370	.243	.004
AUTONOMY	563.232	1	563.232	5.718	.017	.015
FEEDBACK	3.575	1	3.575	.036	.849	.000
PSM	4413.444	1	4413.444	44.802	.000	.109
Error	36251.509	368	98.510			
Total	1795336.000	400				
Corrected Total	71104.390	399				

R Squared = .490 (Adjusted R Squared = .447)

Table 5-40 is the output of the ANCOVA model in which main effects of each independent variable were included. After removing highly insignificant independent variables, the results contained in Table 5-41 were acquired as final output.

Table 5-41: Analysis of Covariance of Organizational Commitment (Model 2)

Source	Type III Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.	Eta Squared
Corrected Model	34007.809	12	2833.984	29.070	.000	.473
Intercept	1001.332	1	1001.332	10.271	.001	.026
GENDER	218.525	1	218.525	2.242	.135	.006
EDUCATION	526.916	3	175.639	1.802	.146	.014
RESPECT	3855.133	1	3855.133	39.545	.000	.092
GRCOHESION	191.201	1	191.201	1.961	.162	.005
NEGA ATTITUDE	1731.235	1	1731.235	17.759	.000	.044
IMPORTANCE	1541.603	1	1541.603	15.813	.000	.039
IDENTITY	563.349	1	563.349	5.779	.017	.015
SIGNIFICANCE	262.848	1	262.848	2.696	.101	.007
AUTONOMY	562.204	1	562.204	5.767	.017	.015
PSM	4909.266	1	4909.266	50.358	.000	.115
Error	37922.300	389	97.487			
Total	1800674.000	402				
Corrected Total	71930.109	401				

R Squared = .473 (Adjusted R Squared = .457)

The six independent variables found to have a significant effect on organizational commitment in the first model remained the same. However, the value of adjusted R squared was improved. Respect from citizens, negative group attitude towards organization, personal importance, identity, autonomy, and PSM were found to affect organizational commitment to a statistically significant degree. Substantial portion of the variation in organizational commitment (Adjusted R squared= .45.7) was explained by the model. PSM has the strongest impact on organizational commitment, alone explaining 11.5 percent of the variation of the dependent variable. With the variables found to have a significant effect on organizational commitment, a multiple regression analysis was made to see the directions of the relationships. Table 5-42 shows the result.

**Table 5-42 Regression Analysis of Organization Commitment
Model Summary**

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate
1	.675	.456	.448	9.9435

Predictors: (Constant), RESPECT, NEGA ATTITUDE, IDENTITY, PSM, IMPORTANCE, AUTONOMY

Coefficients		Unstandardized Coefficients	Std. Error	Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
Model		B		Beta		
	(Constant)	15.865	4.927		3.220	.001
	PSM	.286	.039	.288	7.257	.000
	IDENTITY	-.762	.442	-.083	-1.725	.085
	AUTONOMY	1.391	.483	.138	2.881	.004
	NEGA ATTITUDE	-1.855	.428	-.170	-4.335	.000
	IMPORTANCE	2.773	.493	.246	5.623	.000
	RESPECT	2.856	.452	.257	6.319	.000

Again, PSM was found to have the strongest positive impact on organizational commitment ($\beta = .288$). Variables belonging to personal experience, such as personal importance and respect had a strongly positive effect on organizational commitment. The negative attitude of the peer group towards organization was found to negatively affect organizational commitment ($\beta = -.170$). The positive relationship between organizational commitment and autonomy is also understandable ($\beta = .138$). Although it may run against common sense that identity has a negative β value, it was negligible ($\beta = .083$) and at best marginally significant ($p = .085$).

Tests of Hypotheses 4 through 7: Relationship between Government Employees' Conception of Roles and Responsibilities and PSM

Explanations for the Models and Descriptive Statistics of Variables Involved

This part seeks the answer to Research Question 3: Does PSM affect government employees' conception of roles and responsibilities? PSM and demographic variables are

used as independent variables. Dependent variables are the following four sets of conception of roles and responsibilities: neutrality, proactive administration, managerial efficiency, and social equity. As in the analyses of the relationship between job satisfaction and PSM, four ANCOVA models were established with each type of role conception set as dependent variable. The same independent variables were used in all the models. Table 5-43 presents the descriptive statistics of newly employed variables in the models. Like the previous variables, they are all found to be normally distributed.

Table 5-43: Descriptive Statistics of Four Conceptions of Roles and Responsibilities of Public Employees

	N	Mini mum	Maxi mum	Mean	Std. Deviation	Skewness	Std. Error	Kurtosis	Std. Error
NEUTRALITY	408	3.00	20.00	12.2941	3.0454	-.217	.121	-.165	.241
PROACTIVE	408	9.00	21.00	17.2181	2.5136	-.749	.121	.441	.241
EFFICIENCY	408	4.00	14.00	10.4632	1.8423	-.394	.121	.057	.241
EQUITY	408	3.00	21.00	16.9926	2.5618	-1.003	.121	.430	.241
Valid N (listwise)	408								

The results of reliability tests for the conception of roles and responsibilities were as follows: neutrality ($\alpha = .6456$), proactive administration ($\alpha = .8214$), managerial efficiency ($\alpha = .5916$), social equity ($\alpha = .8585$). //

Relationship between Neutrality and PSM

As with previous analyses, first, interactions among the independent variables were checked to determine if they have any significant effect on the dependent variable. Then, interactions and independent variables which were proven to be insignificant were removed from the model. Table 5-44 shows the main effect of each independent variable on neutrality. There was no statistically significant interaction. The model is significant ($p = .006$), but its ability to explain the effects between variables was quite weak (Adjusted R squared = .051).

Table 5-44: Analysis of Covariance of Neutrality (Model 1)

Source	Type III Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.	Eta Squared
Corrected Model	385.562	22	17.526	1.982	.006	.102
Intercept	451.822	1	451.822	51.105	.000	.118
PSM	50.328	1	50.328	5.692	.018	.015
AGE	43.233	7	6.176	.699	.673	.013
GENDER	2.814E-02	1	2.814E-02	.003	.955	.000
TENURE	62.768	5	12.554	1.420	.216	.018
GRADE	113.183	5	22.637	2.560	.027	.032
EDUCATION	51.540	3	17.180	1.943	.122	.015
Error	3386.142	383	8.841			
Total	65102.000	406				
Corrected Total	3771.704	405				

R Squared = .102 (Adjusted R Squared = .051)

In the next stage, age, gender, and tenure, all of which were found to be insignificant, were removed. The new model was rerun. Table 5-45 presents the final output.

Table 5-45: Analysis of Covariance of Neutrality (Model 2)

Source	Type III Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.	Eta Squared
Corrected Model	345.238	14	24.660	2.819	.000	.091
Intercept	515.029	1	515.029	58.871	.000	.131
PSM	55.413	1	55.413	6.334	.012	.016
TENURE	94.968	5	18.994	2.171	.057	.027
GRADE	118.594	5	23.719	2.711	.020	.033
EDUCATION	50.861	3	16.954	1.938	.123	.015
Error	3429.381	392	8.748			
Total	65298.000	407				
Corrected Total	3774.619	406				

R Squared = .091 (Adjusted R Squared = .059)

PSM and grade were found to affect public employees' conception of neutrality. A multiple regression test was made to clarify the direction of the relationship. Table 5-46 implies that, as opposed to Hypothesis 4, PSM has a positive effect on the conception of neutrality principle while grade lost its significance. ¹²

Table 5-46: Regression Analysis of Neutrality

Model Summary				
Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate
1	.131	.017	.012	3.0302

Predictors: (Constant), GRADE, PSM

Coefficients

		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
Model	Model	B	Std. Error	Beta		
1	(Constant)	9.041	1.269		7.124	.000
	PSM	2.912E-02	.011	.130	2.623	.009
	GRADE	2.114E-02	.154	.007	.137	.891

Relationship between Proactive Roles and PSM

Another ANCOVA model was tested to seek the answer to Hypothesis 5: Government employees with a high level of PSM are more likely to advocate proactive roles. Table 5-47 provides information on the main effect of each independent variable. Again, no statistically significant interaction existed.

Table 5-47: Analysis of Covariance of Proactive Administration (Model 1)

Source	Type III Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.	Eta Squared
Corrected Model	642.374	22	29.199	5.882	.000	.253
Intercept	302.734	1	302.734	60.982	.000	.137
PSM	488.568	1	488.568	98.417	.000	.204
GENDER	29.316	1	29.316	5.905	.016	.015
EDUCATION	21.908	3	7.303	1.471	.222	.011
AGE	11.527	7	1.647	.332	.939	.006
TENURE	14.368	5	2.874	.579	.716	.008
GRADE	21.366	5	4.273	.861	.508	.011
Error	1901.323	383	4.964			
Total	123061.000	406				
Corrected Total	2543.697	405				

R Squared = .253 (Adjusted R Squared = .210)

A more accurate model was obtained by deleting age, grade, and tenure from the first model.

Table 5-48: Analysis of Covariance of Proactive Administration (Model 2)

Source	Type III Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.	Eta Squared
Corrected Model	573.515	5	114.703	23.339	.000	.225
Intercept	374.169	1	374.169	76.133	.000	.160
PSM	518.440	1	518.440	105.489	.000	.208
GENDER	21.982	1	21.982	4.473	.035	.011
EDUCATION	24.387	3	8.129	1.654	.176	.012
Error	1970.775	401	4.915			
Total	123385.000	407				
Corrected Total	2544.290	406				

R Squared = .225 (Adjusted R Squared = .216)

Table 5-48 shows that the model explains 21.6 percent of the variation in the conception of proactive roles at .001 level. PSM and gender were found to have statistically significant effects on the dependent variable. Table 5-49 shows that females are more likely to support proactive roles than are males.

Table 5-49: Comparison of Conception of Proactive Administration between Female and Male Public Employees

GENDER	Mean	Std. Error	95% Confidence Interval	
			Lower Bound	Upper Bound
Male	17.003	.289	16.435	17.571
Female	17.769	.434	16.915	18.623

Note: Evaluated at covariates appeared in the model: PSM = 109.4472.

In a simple linear regression analysis which was conducted to determine the direction of the relationship between proactive roles and PSM, it was confirmed that PSM has a positive effect on support for proactive administration.

Table 5-50: Simple Regression Analysis for PSM Predicting Conception of Proactive Administration

Model Summary						
Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate		
1	.463	.214	.212	2.2311		
Predictors: (Constant), PSM						
Coefficients						
Model	Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients		t	Sig.
	B	Std. Error	Beta			
1 (Constant)	7.899	.893			8.846	.000
PSM	8.522E-02	.008	.463		10.518	.000

Table 5-50 also shows that a considerable amount of variation of the dependent variable (21.2 %) can be explained by PSM.

Relationship between Managerial Efficiency and PSM

Hypothesis 6 proposed that government employees with a high level of PSM are likely to have less regard for efficiency. Table 5-51 shows the main effects of each independent variable on the conception of efficiency of government employees. No interaction was found to be significant in this model. In the first model, only PSM was found to have a significant effect on the dependent variable at .05 level.

Table 5-51: Analysis of Covariance of Managerial Efficiency (Model 1)

Source	Type III Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.	Eta Squared
Corrected Model	206.179	22	9.372	3.076	.000	.150
Intercept	186.122	1	186.122	61.092	.000	.138
PSM	115.151	1	115.151	37.797	.000	.090
AGE	6.967	7	.995	.327	.942	.006
GENDER	10.266	1	10.266	3.370	.067	.009
TENURE	20.859	5	4.172	1.369	.235	.018
GRADE	28.459	5	5.692	1.868	.099	.024
EDUCATION	9.244	3	3.081	1.011	.388	.008
Error	1166.838	383	3.047			
Total	45841.000	406				
Corrected Total	1373.017	405				

R Squared = .150 (Adjusted R Squared = .101)

As age and education were taken out of the model, gender tuned into a significant variable ($p = .019$). As table 5-47 indicates, the overall power of the model to explain the relationships was quite strong (Adjusted R squared = .113) at .001 level.

Table 5-52: Analysis of Covariance of Managerial Efficiency (Model 2)

Source	Type III Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.	Eta Squared
Corrected Model	191.314	12	15.943	5.302	.000	.139
Intercept	220.193	1	220.193	73.230	.000	.157
PSM	122.341	1	122.341	40.687	.000	.094
GENDER	16.705	1	16.705	5.556	.019	.014
TENURE	31.358	5	6.272	2.086	.066	.026
GRADE	26.317	5	5.263	1.750	.122	.022
Error	1181.703	393	3.007			
Total	45841.000	406				
Corrected Total	1373.017	405				

R Squared = .139 (Adjusted R Squared = .113)

Table 5-53 containing estimated values of the dependent variable by gender shows that females are likely to have more regard for managerial efficiency than males.

Table 5-53: Comparison of Conception of Managerial Efficiency between Female and Male Public Employees

GENDER	Mean	Std. Error	95% Confidence Interval	
			Lower Bound	Upper Bound
Male	10.600	.215	10.178	11.022
Female	11.307	.332	10.655	11.959

Note: Evaluated at covariates appeared in the model: PSM = 109.4039.

To clarify the direction of the effect of PSM on government employees' conception of efficiency, a simple regression analysis was made.

Table 5-54: Simple Regression Analysis for PSM Predicting Conception of Managerial Efficiency

Model Summary							
Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate			
1	.316	.100	.098	1.7500			
Predictors: (Constant), PSM							
Coefficients							
Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients		t	Sig.
		B	Std. Error	Beta			
1	(Constant)	5.798	.700			8.278	.000
	PSM	4.266E-02	.006	.316	6.713	.000	

Table 5-54 shows that PSM has a positive effect ($\beta = .316$) on the dependent variable and also that PSM is responsible for a considerable portion of the variation in the conception of efficiency (Adjusted R squared = .098). The result was contrary to Hypotheses 6.

Relationship between Conception of Social Equity and PSM

The final ANCOVA model was designed to test Hypothesis 7, which proposed that government employees with a high level of PSM are likely to put more emphasis on social

equity. Since any significant interaction was not found, values of the main effects of each independent variable on the dependent variable are shown in Table 5-55.

Table 5-55: Analysis of Covariance of Equity (Model 1)

Source	Type III Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.	Eta Squared
Corrected Model	624.188	22	28.372	5.375	.000	.236
Intercept	290.068	1	290.068	54.949	.000	.125
PSM	531.557	1	531.557	100.695	.000	.208
AGE	27.077	7	3.868	.733	.644	.013
GENDER	59.833	1	59.833	11.335	.001	.029
TENURE	7.673	5	1.535	.291	.918	.004
GRADE	8.638	5	1.728	.327	.896	.004
EDUCATION	.108	3	3.594E-02	.007	.999	.000
Error	2021.803	383	5.279			
Total	120048.000	406				
Corrected Total	2645.990	405				

R Squared = .236 (Adjusted R Squared = .192)

Even in the first model, PSM and gender clearly distinguished as statistically significant independent variables. The second model with no insignificant variables represents greater clarity (Adjusted R squared: from .192 to .214).

Table 5-56: Analysis of Covariance of Equity (Model 2)

Source	Type III Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.	Eta Squared
Corrected Model	575.592	2	287.796	56.158	.000	.218
Intercept	387.059	1	387.059	75.527	.000	.158
PSM	555.512	1	555.512	108.398	.000	.212
GENDER	63.553	1	63.553	12.401	.000	.030
Error	2070.399	404	5.125			
Total	120337.000	407				
Corrected Total	2645.990	406				

R Squared = .218 (Adjusted R Squared = .214)

Estimated value of the dependent variable shown in Table 5-57 confirms that females are likely to put more emphasis on social equity than males.

Table 5-57: Comparison of Conception of Equity between Male and Female Public Employees

GENDER	Mean	Std. Error	95% Confidence Interval	
			Lower Bound	Upper Bound
1.00	16.868	.119	16.634	17.101
2.00	18.168	.349	17.482	18.853

Note: Evaluated at covariates appeared in the model: PSM = 109.4472.

The result of a simple regression analysis examining the strength and direction of PSM's effect on government employees' conception of social equity as a basis of their roles and responsibilities shows that it is strong and positive (Adjusted R squared = .198 and $\beta = .447$).

Table 5-58: Simple Regression Analysis for PSM Predicting Conception of Equity

Model Summary							
Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate			
1	.447	.200	.198	2.2945			
Predictors: (Constant), PSM							
Coefficients							
Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients		t	Sig.
		B	Std. Error	Beta			
1	(Constant)	7.820	.918			8.515	.000
	PSM	8.388E-02	.008	.447		10.066	.000

Thus, the results presented in Table 5-58 supported Hypothesis 7.

Summary

This chapter presented the statistical analyses of the data collected through the two independent surveys that were designed and conducted to seek answers to the three research questions by testing the seven hypotheses. To answer Research Question 1 which asked if PSM is more prevalent in the public sector than in the private sector, Hypothesis 1, stating that public employees show higher PSM than their counterparts in the private sector, was tested. A total of 154 CPAs, 87 from private accounting firms, and 67 from the public sector, with 34 from non-profit and 33 from governmental organizations, were surveyed. The results of analysis of variance and subsequent post hoc tests revealed that workplace was the variable that affected respondents' PSM levels most strongly and that CPAs in governmental organizations had the highest mean score of PSM, which was found to be significantly different from those of the other two groups. Thus, the null hypothesis of Hypothesis 1 was

largely rejected; CPAs in governmental organizations, rather than in the public organizations in a broad sense, showed higher levels of PSM than CPAs in the private sector. The result strongly supports the theory proposing that PSM is more prevalent in governmental organizations than in the private sector.

Research Question 2 asked if PSM had a positive effect on such work-related attitudes as job satisfaction and organizational commitment. The answers were sought by testing Hypotheses 2 and 3. A series of ANCOVA and regression analyses confirmed that PSM had a considerable amount of positive effect—at least the second largest positive effect among variables included in each model—on four aspects of job satisfaction: satisfaction with work, pay, supervision, and coworkers. PSM failed to make any significant difference only in promotion satisfaction. Therefore, the null hypothesis of Hypotheses 2 was mostly rejected. The test result of Hypothesis 3 identified PSM as the most powerful explaining variable of organizational commitment. The null hypothesis of Hypothesis 3 was completely rejected. Thus, the overall results of the analyses provide compelling evidence to support the theory that PSM has a positive effect on desirable work-related attitudes of government employees.

Hypotheses 4 through 7 were tested to see if PSM affected government employees' conception of roles and responsibilities, which was Research Question 3. A series of ANCOVA and simple regression analyses showed that PSM had a positive effect on the conception of proactive administration and social equity but also of neutrality and efficiency. The latter results were contrary to expectations, so the null hypotheses of Hypothesis 4 and 6 were not rejected. Rather, the results strongly support a new theory proposing that PSM positively affects government employees' conception of neutrality, proactive administration, efficiency, and social equity as values representing their roles and responsibilities.

Note

1. A value between ± 1.0 in Kurtosis and Skewness is considered excellent for parametric tests. A value between ± 2.0 , in many cases, is still considered as acceptable (George and Mallery 2001, p. 86-7).

2. Although there is no set interpretation as to what is an acceptable α value, the values measured in this study seem to be high enough to be accepted because a rule of thumb suggests .5 as a cut-off point for unacceptable values (George and Mallery 2001, p. 217)

3. As of Dec. 31st 1999, of 54,329 general service employees working for the national government in grade 7 or above, 4,892 (9.0%) were female employees. Considering that the Korean government has been pursuing an affirmative action program to increase female recruits, the portion of the female employees in the survey seems to precisely reflect that of the population (Mogaha 2001, p. 154).

4. That is because the value of Cronbach α , or coefficient α is determined by the following formula:

$$\alpha = rk / [1 + (K-1) r]$$

k: the number of items in the scale, r: the mean of the inter item correlation.


5. In a recent survey, government officials in their 30's recruited through the Senior Civil Service Examination identified personal, selfish political motives of politicians as one of the most serious obstacles in achieving their ministries policy goals. (Dong-A Daily Newspaper 2001 b). The perceptual gap between preference for public policy and the other two items—perception of politics and care for politicians—seems to be felt wider in government employees than any other group.


6. It is a hotly debated methodological issue whether ordinal level variables can be used in regression analysis. However, more scholars seem to believe that, with care in interpretation, regression analysis can be utilized with ordinal level variables (Bryman and Cramer 1997, p117-8). As a matter of fact, regression analysis is one of the most commonly used procedures in the social sciences today, where most variables are ordinal.

7. The reason that age was found to have an independent effect in the ANCOVA model but yet turned out to be insignificant in the regression model is probably because the variation of pay satisfaction occurred at certain age levels, so that the relationship between pay satisfaction and age is not linear.

8. The means plot drawn, based on the estimated marginal mean scores of satisfaction with promotion, explains why tenure turned out to be insignificant while grade and age remain significant. It becomes clear from the profile plot that tenure and satisfaction with promotion are not in the linear relationship, which is the case for age and grade.

Figure 5-1: The Means Plot of Satisfaction with Promotion In Relation to Age, Tenure, and Grade






9. This is mainly because spurious relationships disappeared and hidden relationships were revealed as insignificant variables were taken out of the model. That is another reason to remove insignificant variables to get a more accurate model.

10. Means plot of satisfaction with coworkers by grade clearly indicates the negative linear relationship between the two variables in this table.

Figure 5-2: The Means Plot of Satisfaction with Coworkers in Relation to Grade



11. Managerial efficiency was originally measured by the following three question items: 1. Public servants should be responsible for finding the most efficient use of the resources that are entrusted to them, 2. If a government employee is forced to choose between the most efficient policy and the most equitable policy, the most efficient alternative should be chosen, 3. The extent to which I apply expertise and professionalism to the problems of government justifies my position. However, a correlation test revealed that while Question #1 and Question #3 were highly correlated, Question #2 had quite a weak relationship to each of the other two items.

Table 5-59: Correlation Matrix of Managerial Efficiency Items

	Q #1	Q #2	Q #3
Q #1	1.0000		
Q #2	.1941	1.0000	
Q #3	.4228	.2469	1.0000

N of Cases = 408. All correlation is significant at .005 level.

Also, Item-total Statistics shows that Q #2 has the lowest value of item total correlation and that if Q #2 is deleted α value improves and scale variance becomes smaller.

Table 5-60: Item-total Statistics of Managerial Efficiency Items

	Scale Mean If Item Deleted	Scale Variance if Item Deleted	Corrected Item- Total Correlation	Alpha if Item Deleted
Q #1	8.8775	4.1029	.3754	.3900
Q #2	10.4632	3.3942	.2631	.5916
Q #3	9.3113	3.5908	.4125	.3123

All the information means that Question #2 had little and insignificant contribution to measuring the efficiency concept, so it was dropped. Only Question #1 and #3 were used to measure the variable of managerial efficiency.

12. As explained before, that means there exists no linear relationship between neutrality and grade.

Chapter VI: Conclusion

This concluding chapter consists of four parts. In the first part, summary and discussion of the research findings are presented. The second and third parts deal with theoretical and practical implications of the findings. Some suggestions for future study are proposed in the final part.

Summary of the Research Findings

This study was initially inspired by some organization theorists' criticism of existing motivation theories. For the reasons explained in Chapter 1, they argued that current motivation theories, which have been based largely on research in business organizations, had only limited validity and usefulness when applied in the public sector. PSM theory, a new kind of motivation theory with the primary focus on the public sector, emerged in that context. Even though most research showed impressive results concerning the prevalence of PSM in the public sector and behavioral implications of PSM, the literature review soon revealed that PSM theory, in its initial stage, had some theoretical and methodological weaknesses. First, very little, if any, consensus exists on measurement or even on a definition of PSM. Second, pairs of comparable groups were not satisfactorily secured. Third, researchers employed not only differing measurement of job related variables, such as job satisfaction and organizational commitment, but they also largely omitted possible control variables. Fourth, the scope of the existing studies remained within the organization. The impact of PSM on the relationship between public employees and citizens and the question of

whether, and how, PSM can impact government employees' conception of responsibilities and roles has been largely ignored. Finally, PSM theory has never been tested outside the U.S.

This study was designed to resolve those flaws in existing PSM research. A more widely accepted measurement of PSM (Perry's full version of PSM), job satisfaction (JDI), and organizational commitment (OCQ) was used. Also, an extensive range of variables was included as a control. In order to match comparable groups, CPAs working for the private and public sectors were selected and surveyed. To extend the scope of PSM theory, the relationship between government employees' conception of their roles and responsibilities was explored. This is an important research area in that the ultimate goal of public administration is to serve the general public, and how government employees conceptualize their roles and responsibilities is likely to affect the quality of public service they are rendering. Finally, to test the universal value of PSM theory, answers to the three research questions—the prevalence of PSM in the public sector, the positive effect of PSM on such job-related attitudes as job satisfaction and organizational commitment, and the effect of PSM on government employees' conception of roles and responsibilities—were sought in the Korean setting, a very different culture from the U.S. 1

The analysis of Survey 1, in which a total of 154 CPAs participated, revealed that, of the various potential antecedents incorporated in the analysis, only workplace and gender significantly affected PSM. Eta squared coefficient also showed that the workplace explains a much greater variation of PSM than gender. Post hoc tests revealed that PSM levels are higher among CPAs in government organizations than those in private accounting firms and non-profit organizations.² This finding comparing employees in government and non-profit organizations did not agree with the findings of Wittmer (1991) and Gabris and Simo (1995).

However, this issue was not further dealt with, because it was on the difference between government employees and their counterparts in the private sector or government organizations compared with business organizations that this study placed the greatest emphasis.

Because of the small numbers of sampled groups and focus on a specific profession of Survey 1, one may question if the results can be generalized. To address the potential flaws, first, PSM scores of the Korean national government employees measured in Survey 2 were compared with those of the three groups of CPAs. Table 6-1 presents descriptive statistics of mean PSM scores of the four groups.

Table 6-1: Descriptive Statistics of Korean National Government Employees and Three Groups of CPAs

	N	Mean	Std. Deviation	Std. Error	Minimum	Maximum
Public Servants	408	109.3554	13.6489	.6757	66.00	150.00
Private CPAs	87	99.6207	15.0056	1.6088	57.00	134.00
Non-Gov CPAs	34	102.1471	16.0721	2.7563	74.00	133.00
Government CPAs	33	112.4848	13.2078	2.2992	84.00	133.00
Total	562	107.5961	14.4961	.6115	57.00	150.00

Table 6-2 provides post hoc tests results.

Table 6-2: Post Hoc Multiple Comparison Tests of PSM between Public Servants and Three Groups of CPAs

	(I) WKPLACE	(J) WKPLACE	Mean Difference (I-J)	Std. Error	Sig.
Tukey HSD	Public Servants	Private CPAs	9.7347***	1.6527	.000
		Non-Gov CPAs	7.2083*	2.4982	.020
		Government CPAs	-3.1295	2.5329	.604
	Private CPAs	Public Servants	-9.7347***	1.6527	.000
		Non-Gov CPAs	-2.5264	2.8306	.809
		Government CPAs	-12.8642***	2.8612	.000
	Non-Gov CPAs	Public Servants	-7.2083*	2.4982	.020
		Private CPAs	2.5264	2.8306	.809
		Government CPAs	-10.3378*	3.4199	.013
	Government CPAs	Public Servants	3.1295	2.5329	.604
		Private CPAs	12.8642***	2.8612	.000
		Non-Gov CPAs	10.3378*	3.4199	.013

Table 6-2 is continued.

LSD	Public Servants	Private CPAs	9.7347***	1.6527	.000
		Non-Gov CPAs	7.2083**	2.4982	.004
		Government CPAs	-3.1295	2.5329	.217
	Private CPAs	Public Servants	-9.7347***	1.6527	.000
		Non-Gov CPAs	-2.5264	2.8306	.372
		Government CPAs	-12.8642***	2.8612	.000
	Non-Gov CPAs	Public Servants	-7.2083**	2.4982	.004
		Private CPAs	2.5264	2.8306	.372
		Government CPAs	-10.3378**	3.4199	.003
Government CPAs	Public Servants	3.1295	2.5329	.217	
	Private CPAs	12.8642***	2.8612	.000	
	Non-Gov CPAs	10.3378**	3.4199	.003	
Bonferroni	Public Servants	Private CPAs	9.7347***	1.6527	.000
		Non-Gov CPAs	7.2083*	2.4982	.024
		Government CPAs	-3.1295	2.5329	1.000
	Private CPAs	Public Servants	-9.7347***	1.6527	.000
		Non-Gov CPAs	-2.5264	2.8306	1.000
		Government CPAs	-12.8642***	2.8612	.000
	Non-Gov CPAs	Public Servants	-7.2083*	2.4982	.024
		Private CPAs	2.5264	2.8306	1.000
		Government CPAs	-10.3378*	3.4199	.016
	Government CPAs	Public Servants	3.1295	2.5329	1.000
		Private CPAs	12.8642***	2.8612	.000
		Non-Gov CPAs	10.3378*	3.4199	.016

Note: * $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$ *** $p < .001$

There was no statistically significant difference in PSM levels between CPAs in government organizations and Korean national government employees, implying that they are homogeneous in terms of PSM levels. Also, differences in PSM levels were significant between the Korean government employees and CPAs in private accounting firms and non-profit organizations. The post hoc multiple comparison results strongly suggest that as far as PSM is concerned, the 33 samples of CPAs in government organizations represent well the whole body of employees of the Korean national government.

Second, it can be argued that CPAs are likely to have relatively higher levels of PSM than employees of other professions in the private sector. Because their tasks, including honest auditing, provide the basic information on which a free market economy is based, CPAs, as their title implies, have been regarded as a bulwark of capitalism. As their mission

is perceived as important, so a great deal of emphasis has been placed on their public service ethic (The Seoul Economic Daily 2001, Dong-A Daily Newspaper 2001 a). If that is the case, the result of the analysis of Survey 1 provided the answer to Research Question 1 in a methodologically rigorous manner: PSM is more prevalent in government organizations than in the private sector. The conclusion also suggests that in spite of wide-spread distrust of government (Nye, Zelikow, and King 1996), government is still perceived as the main entity for pursuing the public interest.

Research Question 2 addressed the relationship between PSM and job satisfaction and organizational commitment. Studies by Rainey (1982), Brewer and Selden (1998), and Naff and Crum (1999) attempted to determine if PSM had a positive effect on job satisfaction. As fully discussed in the literature review, however, their research involved some methodological flaws: either using arbitrary measurements of the key variables, or failing to control for necessary potential antecedents. With those methodological weaknesses in mind, this study employed JDI and incorporated an extensive range of control variables including job characteristics. The results of the analyses of Survey 2, in which 408 Korean national government employees participated, clearly showed that PSM has a strong positive effect on four aspects of job satisfaction: satisfaction with work, pay, supervision, and coworkers.

The impact of PSM on organizational commitment was also investigated. Only two previous studies, Crewson's (1997) and Brewer and Selden's (1998), had tackled this issue. Partly because their studies were based on the analysis of existing surveys, the researchers had to use measurements that they thought were similar to gauge the key concepts and could not take enough control variables into consideration. This study resolved those problems by employing OCQ and by incorporating all the potential antecedents which had been

previously identified. In the analysis of the ANCOVA model, PSM was found to have the most significant positive effect on organizational commitment among government employees.

This research confirmed the findings of the previous studies, establishing the positive effect of PSM on job satisfaction and organizational commitment. Researchers confirmed a negative relationship of job satisfaction to absenteeism and turnover which were likely to increase personnel cost and to decrease organizational effectiveness (Scott and Taylor 1985, Lawler 1973, Caster and Spector 1987). From a humane point of view, employees' job satisfaction is important in its own right. Numerous studies also revealed that organizational commitment was negatively correlated with such undesirable behaviors as tardiness, turnover, and the intention to leave one's job (Mathieu and Zajac 1998). Similar to Eisenberger and his colleagues' findings that employees with higher levels of organizational commitment perform their jobs more willingly (1990), organizational commitment was found to lower passive and risk-averse work styles among Korean government employees (Song 1998). The findings combined, then, strongly suggest that PSM deserves much more attention from the point of view of organizational management.

This study also examined whether and how PSM affects government employees' conception of responsibilities and roles. Throughout the history of public administration, it has been hotly debated which value is the most important and should be pursued. Because administrative values are the guiding principles for public employees, the discussion of conflicting values has been directly reflected in the issue of government employees' responsibilities and roles (Gawthrop 1998, Maranto 1992). However, no academic review had focused on the possible relationship between government employees' conception of roles and responsibilities and PSM until Selden *et al.* and Wise addressed the question recently.

Suggesting social equity, proactive administration, efficiency, and neutrality as four major values of public administration, they linked PSM to the first two values (Selden *et al* 1998, Wise 1999). This research was the first empirical study to seek the answer to the question of whether, and how PSM can affect government employees' conception of roles and responsibilities. Based on Selden *et al*'s and Wise's arguments, it was hypothesized that proactive administration and social equity were positively related to PSM, while neutrality and efficiency showed a negative relationship.

The results of statistical analyses showed that PSM, as expected, positively affected proactive administration and social equity. However, as opposed to the arguments of Selden *et al* and Wise, PSM was also found to have positive impacts on neutrality and efficiency. Although the effect of PSM on neutrality and efficiency was less powerful than on proactive administration and social equity, the direction of the effect was clearly positive. That means that government employees with higher levels of PSM put more emphasis on proactive administration and social equity, but also on neutrality and efficiency, as values representing their roles and responsibilities.

How can it be possible for government employees to have similar attitudes and perceptions towards seemingly contradictory administrative values? As Hood (1991) argued, although a specific value can dominate in a specific era, if each of the administrative values is indispensable because it played a unique role in public administration in the real world, it would be difficult for public service-oriented government employees to abandon any of those values. In other words, at the minimum, government employees possessing high levels of PSM would accept all the administrative values, on which they would base their conception of roles and responsibilities. Dedicated government employees would rarely if ever impose

their interpretation of public interest over that of political appointees or of their superiors in the organizational hierarchy. Neither would they ignore efficiency as a pillar of public administration. However, that does not mean government employees regard each of the administrative values equally. The discussion fits nicely with the results of the empirical study. Although emphasizing proactive administration and social equity more strongly, government employees with higher levels of PSM were found to attach more importance to neutrality and efficiency.

One of the important goals of this study was to test PSM theory in a different administrative environment to see if it could be viable as a universal, scientific theory. By and large, the objective seems to be met, considering that this research generally confirmed the two important topics on which previous PSM studies had focused: the prevalence of PSM in the government organizations and the existence of a positive relationship between job satisfaction and organizational commitment and PSM. However, it is arguable as to whether the precedent studies would have reached the same results had they employed the measurements and methods adopted in this study. To deal with the question, Naff and Crum's research was chosen for a more detailed comparison with this study, because their research is the only one that used the same measurement to gauge the most important variable, PSM; Naff and Crum adopted Perry's PSM construct although they used an abbreviated version (six questionnaire items out of twenty-four). Second, this study and Naff and Crum's study targeted comparable groups: a representative sample of Korean national government employees and U.S. federal government employees, respectively. Third, although Naff and Crum's study did not compare PSM levels between the private and the public sector, it dealt with various aspects of government employees' behavior with regard to

PSM, thus providing diverse opportunities for testing PSM theory from a comparative perspective.

For comparison, survey items of PSM measurement except for Naff and Crum's were excluded, and respondents' PSM scores were recalculated. Unfortunately, however, one item cannot be used because it was excluded from Perry's final version of the PSM construct which this study employed. Naff and Crum analyzed the survey results by using two statistical analysis techniques: t-test and logistic regression. For a t-test analysis, Naff and Crum divided their respondents into two groups according to their PSM scores: one group had high PSM scores (22 or over), while the other had scores of 21 or below. Because they used a five-point Likert scale, possible PSM scores ranged from 0 to 30. They then compared the mean responses of the two groups to various questionnaire items. Table 6-2 shows the results of their t-test.

Table 6-3: T-tests of the Responses of Employees with High and Low PSM Scores on Key Survey Items

Survey Items	High PSM	Low PSM	Difference
I would recommend the federal government as a place to work.	3.52	3.24	0.28
The work performed by my work unit provides the public a worthwhile return on their tax dollars.	4.18	3.90	0.28
Overall, I am satisfied with my pay.	3.14	3.03	0.11
N	3,492	3,487	

Note: Among the items to which Naff and Crum asked their respondents to indicate their attitudes and opinions, some were on the National Performance Review (NPR). Items about NPR were excluded here because NPR has not been implemented in Korea. All differences significant at $p < .001$ level.

Source: Excerpted from Naff and Crum (1999, p.11, Table 2).

According to their analyses, to a statistically significant degree, more federal employees in the high group than those in the low group were likely to recommend the federal government

as a workplace, to evaluate positively work performance by their work unit, and to be satisfied with their pay.

Naff and Crum also conducted logistic regression analyses to see if PSM and other potential antecedents have an effect on job satisfaction, performance, and turnover. Table 6-4 shows the results of their logistic regression analyses.

Table 6-4: Effect of Public Service Motivation: Logistic Regression Coefficients

	Job Satisfaction	Performance	Leave Government
PSM	.079***	.040***	-.019*
Race (Nonminority)	.204***	.261***	-.285***
Gender (female)	.054	.278***	-.152*
Education	-.062**	-.26	.196***
Age	.095***	-.013	-.212***
Tenure with Government	-.049**	-.009	-.118***
Grade level	.043***	.053***	-.026*
Job type (white collar)	-.093	-.238**	-.008
Constant	-.129***	-.192***	-.327

Note: Positive attitude about NPR was excluded again. * $p < .05$ ** $p < .01$ *** $p < .001$

Source: Excerpted from Naff and Crum (1999, p.12, Table 3).

PSM was found to have a statistically significant, positive effect on job satisfaction and performance. There was a negative relationship between turnover and PSM.

Although some survey items used by Naff and Crum were not included in the hypotheses of this study, the author measured them for this comparative objective. Instead of the same statistical analysis methods as in Naff and Crum's study, multiple regression analysis was utilized to analyze the data in this study. Table 6-5 shows the results of multiple regression analyses of this study. It is presented in the same format as in Naff and Crum's study so that easier comparison could be made.

PSM measured by an abbreviated version of PSM measurement was found to have positive effects on four aspects of job satisfaction: satisfaction with work, promotion, supervision, and co-workers. Pay satisfaction was the only facet of job satisfaction on which

PSM failed to show a positive effect. It was also found that PSM positively affected recommendation of government job, evaluation of work unit performance, and individual performance. Finally, there was a negative relationship between turnover (leave government) intention and PSM. Except for the relationship with pay satisfaction, PSM demonstrated identical relationships with the focal variables in the two studies.

Table 6-5: Multiple Regression Analyses for Comparative Study of PSM: β Coefficients

Aspects of Job Satisfaction:	Work	Pay	Promotion	Supervision	Co-workers
PSM	.248***	.053	.111*	.241***	.284***
Gender (female)	-.019	.213***	.004	-.016	.039
Education	.087	-.045	.048	.014	.029
Age	-.061	.000	-.284**	-.069	.005
Tenure with Government	.028	.070	.042	.036	.063
Grade level	.106	.050	.257***	.137*	-.138*

Table 6-5 is continued

	Recommendation of Gov. Job	Work Unit Performance	Performance	Turnover
PSM	.269***	.262***	.176***	-.190***
Gender (female)	.040	.035	-.114*	.012
Education	.050	.057	.175***	-.122*
Age	-.067	.007	-.029	.057
Tenure with Government	.145	.079	.147	-.096
Grade level	-.042	-.021	.101	.013

Note: Because the respondents of this study were Korean national government employees in General Service, race and job type (white/ blue collar) were not included as independent variables.

It cannot be a coincidence considering that the relationships which the other demographic variables have with the dependent variables are almost totally different in the two studies. The diverse behavioral implications of PSM that had been empirically confirmed in the U.S. were also found to exist in the different cultural and administrative environment of Korea. The results imply that it is possible that PSM theory may be viable as a universal and scientific theory.

Theoretical Implications of PSM

Motivation theories and PSM

Motivation theories are commonly classified into two categories: content theories and process theories. Content theories, which include Maslow's hierarchy of need theory, McGregor's theory X and Y, and Herzberg's motivation-hygiene theory, attempt to identify the needs and drives that motivate human behavior. Content theories are based on the premise that human needs are universal and that real motivation derives from higher-level needs. Because higher-level needs can be satisfied with intrinsic rewards coming from work itself, the best way to motivate employees is to make their jobs meaningful and to change the structure of the organization to allow them control over and responsibility for their jobs (Heffron 1989).

Process theories, which pay more attention to specifying external environmental factors that influence behavior, admit that employees can have differing needs and desires, thus showing individual differences in reward preferences. In short, process theories focus on how the motivational process works (Rainey 1997). Thus, a crucial point in process theories is that organizational incentive systems must be designed to reward desired performance (Heffron 1989). Vroom's expectancy theory and Adam's equity theory fall into this category.

However, neither type of motivation theory encompasses the concept of PSM. As already discussed in Chapter 1, PSM arose as a new kind of motivation theory. The need to serve the general public, which transcends the limited concept of personal need, has never been identified in any content theory (Wise 1999). Although process theories do not have any bias against intrinsic rewards, they have been largely developed in connection with extrinsic rewards. It is standard practice to trace the theoretical background of variable-pay programs

to expectancy theory, and skill-based pay plans to equity theory. From the viewpoint of process theories, PSM challenges their narrow focus on the immediate linkage of performance and reward. Public service motivation is a broad need embracing social values and norms that can be realized in a relatively long time frame.

There is also strong empirical evidence linking PSM to positive influences on productivity, which all motivation theories aim to boost. As shown before, PSM was found to have a positive effect on job satisfaction and organizational commitment which, in turn, were reputed to lower undesirable work-related behaviors. Another point that should be emphasized is that PSM theory, unlike any existing motivation theory, concentrates on government employees. Considering that the validity and usefulness of existing motivation theories have occasionally been called into question partly because the theories have been largely based on numerous studies of employees in business organizations, the importance of PSM theory cannot be easily ignored; in fact, it is expected to provide a more valid explanation of the motivation of government employees.

Rational Choice Theory and PSM

Rational choice theory, a generic term representing the economic approach to politics, has rapidly developed since the seminal works of Arrow, Anthony Downs, and Mancur Olson. Now rational choice theory is increasing its influence both in theory and in practice: it not only finds proponents in various sub fields in the political science discipline, but serves as a theoretical background for market-oriented administrative reform.

Rational choice theory is based on the assumption that human beings are rational utility maximizers. A majority of rational choice theorists define utility as narrowly understood self-

interest: wealth, income, power, or the perquisites of office. 6 Rationality also explains that human beings choose the most efficient alternative to achieve a given goal. The rationality assumption is an axiom of rational choice theory because it has “not been proved scientifically but nevertheless accepted as a basic principle” (Hoogerwerf 1992). Rational choice theory also denies any other entity besides the individual as political actor. Groups, organizations, or even nations are viewed as collections of individuals. Rational choice theory is grounded in the same psychological assumptions as economics. Tullock explained this very tersely, “Mr. Smith buys and votes; he is the same man in the supermarket and in the voting booth” (quoted in Green and Shapiro 1994, p.1). Rational choice theorists then try to explain collective outcomes in the political arena with the same perspective as when they analyze outcomes of the competitive market. It is at this point that rational choice theorists’ analysis of politics deviates from that of economics: while the pursuit of self-interest by individuals in the marketplace automatically leads to maximum social welfare, in politics, the very same act brings catastrophe (Kelman 1987). Because government policies that restrict access to important resources create special benefits, citizens exert political influence to obtain them. Politicians preoccupied with the desire to be reelected use government resources to maintain their position and power. Bureaucrats also actively participate in this battle for securing self-interest. Widely known is a thesis which sees the bureaucrat as budget-maximizer. Niskanen argues that bureaucrats can achieve their goal because they have an obvious advantage in obtaining valuable information as a monopoly supplier of public services (Niskanen 1971, 1991). As the size of government increases, the private sector increasingly shrinks. The phenomena not only widen and deepen ineffective allocations of sparse resources but also suffocate free society.

Unlike in the marketplace, the “invisible hand” does not exist in the realm of public affairs. Focusing the discussion on the government bureaucracy, with regard to its relationship with citizens, government agencies rarely compete with each other for better service. Nor is there a fully developed “separate and selective incentive” system to stimulate employees inside of the government bureaucracy (Olson 1965, p. 51). Consequently, in the eyes of rational choice theorists, minimal government is the best government (Todaro 1996), and government should be run as much as possible like a business (Box 1999, Peters and Savoie 1994).

PSM theory mainly challenges the axiom and prescription of rational choice theory. Criticism of the practical implications of rational choice theory will be discussed in detail subsequently in relation to market-oriented administrative reform.⁷ Because rational choice theory is structured in a deductive way, the argument centering around the rational choice theory axiom of human nature is crucial (Hoogerwerf 1992, Green and Shapiro 1994). Fundamental shortcomings embedded in the theorem would affect explanations of the phenomena as well as further prescriptions for the remedies. Focusing on government employees, this study empirically showed that they are attracted to a civil service career by public service motivation rather than by self-interest. The research findings that government employees show higher PSM levels than their counterparts in the private sector challenge the rational choice theory axiom that all human beings are driven by their self interest. The findings clearly do not support the rational choice theory axiom. However, this is different from saying that every government employee is always driven only by public service motivation. The point is rather that rational choice theory is not sufficient to explain much of the phenomena, given that the theorem is unsubstantiated, and that PSM, as a distinguishing

motivational basis of government employees, should be admitted and considered in both theory and practice in public management.

Market-oriented Administrative Reforms and PSM

In the last two decades, large-scale market-oriented administrative reforms have taken place in advanced countries on both sides of the Atlantic. From the 1980s to the early 1990s, the main purpose of these reforms was the reduction of government size so that the private sector, the vital portion of a national economy, could lighten its burden. Privatization, downsizing, and contracting out were the golden keys to successful reforms. President Ronald Reagan eloquently represented the idea:

“I have always thought of government as a kind of organism with an insatiable appetite for money... By cutting taxes, I wanted not only to stimulate the economy but to curb the growth of government and reduce its intrusion into the economic life of the country.”

The second wave of reforms resulted in more attention being paid to how efficiently government was doing its tasks. To make government work more like a private enterprise, various types of programs such as pay-for-performance, internal markets, performance contract, and program review were introduced. In New Public Management (NPM) and National Performance Review—later changed to National Partners for Reinvention, the term “citizens” was replaced by “customers,” and “customer satisfaction” became the key word. The importance of accountability was shifted from processes to results, and ministers or secretaries were encouraged to think of themselves as CEOs in a private company (Gore 1993, Cohn 1997).

As one may have already noticed, the administrative reforms largely followed the prescriptions of rational choice theory. In other words, the reform movements, based on the rational choice axiom of human nature, were designed to establish a new kind of administrative system similar to the marketplace, where competition among self-interested individuals for their personal well-being would lead to the maximization of the utility of the whole society. Competition, incentives to bring in competition, and a pricing system were ambitiously employed in government. Under the circumstances, the more people acted as assumed—that is self-interestedly—the better the system would work as designed.

Here one important question arises from the viewpoint of PSM theory: how would market oriented reform movements affect public service motivation? Because rational choice theory, the intellectual basis of the reform movements, denies any entity in political action other than an individual, it sees public interest as fiction, because it goes beyond individual interests. Also, a market-like government operates with the energy derived from competition among self-interested bureaucrats; thus, individuals with a public spirit are seen as obstacles to the efficiency of the institutions (Hoogerwerf 1992).

It is in this regard that Stein (1990) and Kelman (1987) worry about its normative implication and that Terry asks “Public choice theory and organizational economics...assume that public managers are inclined to cheat, lie, and engage in other opportunistic behaviors. Is this the kind of image we want for public manager?” (1998, p. 197). Gregory also argued that, using New Zealand as an example, market-oriented administrative reform tended to corrode ethical integrity in the bureaucracy (1999). Then, what is the outcome if market-oriented reforms discourage public service motivation? PSM was found to positively affect government employees’ job satisfaction and organizational commitment, clearly desirable

work-related variables in their own right. In addition, these factors also have the effect of lowering undesirable work-related attitudes such as absenteeism, turnover, and tardiness, which are likely to increase personnel cost and decrease organizational effectiveness. If market-oriented reforms negatively affect PSM, then the expected effect of increased productivity which the administrative reforms promised would be limited. Furthermore, more value-laden questions await an answer: what kind of efficiency would citizens want, efficiency deriving from voluntary acts from government employees concerned more about public interest, or efficiency produced by a system run by self-interested bureaucrats?

Another finding of this study was that government employees with higher levels of PSM are likely to have a regard for social equity, proactive administration, and even neutrality as administrative values on which to base their conception of roles and responsibilities. Then, what impact would the introduction of market-oriented reforms have on the quality of public services? It is likely that we would have bureaucrats who focus primarily on delivering public service in an efficient manner out of a keen interest in material incentives, paying not much attention to the other administrative values involved in the very service they are rendering. Those bureaucrats are pursuing what Frederickson and Hart called careerism (1985). The two scholars identified the kind of bureaucracy, preoccupied with developing personal career and thereby lacking any care about implications of their service for the entire society, with the bureaucracy in the Nazi era. Then, the efforts to bring in market-like efficiency in public administration may come at the expense of the other precious values in public administration. When reviewed from the perspective of PSM, the issue of market-oriented administrative reform becomes a very critical issue that demands serious debate, and goes beyond a simple matter of utilizing a management fad.

Implications for the Civil Service Reform in Korea

In Chapter 3, a brief explanation of the Korean bureaucracy was presented from historical and institutional perspectives. Traditionally, civil service had been a highly respected profession. In modern Korean history, government employees have been regarded as agents for change through their great contribution to the rapid economic development of Korea since the 1960s. It was in a large part possible, because, despite having relatively lower pay levels than the private sector, the Korean national government has attracted the best and brightest of the young workforce. That chapter also discussed the fact that, in recent years, the amount of criticism for alleged incompetence, administrative misconduct, and undesirable work attitudes such as risk-averse behavior has been rising. In the meantime, the Asian economic crisis in 1997 gave momentum to the market-oriented administrative reform undertaken by the Korean government since the early 1990s. Pay related programs and the open position system were explained in detail as major civil service reforms leading towards entrepreneurial government. With the advent of democratic regimes, the Korean bureaucracy now faces multiple challenges: in addition to efficient delivery of public service, it is asked to be more responsive to citizens' needs and to redress the negative legacies of rapid economic development such as unequal income distribution. In this part, with that general background in mind, the practical implications of the findings of this study are discussed in relation to the two administrative reform measures in personnel management.

Performance Related Pay Program

The issue of the performance-related pay program, or pay-for-performance system, has been highly debated. The primary strength of the performance related pay program is that it makes good sense; no one can easily deny the premise that motivation is dependent upon

incentives. Linking reward to performance also fits well with the concept of fairness and equity. On the other hand, critics have pointed out that the success of the program hinges on the existence of a well-designed and widely accepted performance appraisal process, which often turns out to be a difficult condition to satisfy in government jobs. The small size of merit increases relative to total compensation is another criticism of the unsuccessful merit pay policy. Whereas these negative points of the pay-for-performance system are technical in nature, Lovrich addressed the core question in a direct way: he examined the impact of the merit pay program on motivation, using as research subjects over four hundred employees of the state of Washington. He found that the reward/performance link had only a marginal impact on the respondents' motivational levels. Based on his research, Lovrich argues, "...merit pay at best can present only a temporary boon to motivation." (1987, p.67). However, few scholars studied pay for performance from the perspective of PSM.

A big concern for the author about the performance related program with regard to PSM centers on whether the program brings about a replacement of the goal. The Korean government employees chose their career with the knowledge that they would be working at relatively lower pay levels than if they had chosen to work in the private sector. Although this should not be used as a justification for the current levels of compensation, it signifies that one important motivational basis for their choice of career is to serve the public. Now, they are being asked to expend their energies to receive small incentives on which they placed less regard. If higher pay had been the most important factor in their career decision, then most of them could have easily found better-paid jobs in the private sector. It seems that the more interest government employees feel for performance bonus or merit increases, the more they regret their choice to work for government. This situation will be exacerbated if

the program is pushed to the extent that government employees feel frustrated about their public service motives.

What is happening in Korea provides a great deal of insight in this context. The National Teachers' Union (NTU) is now campaigning against the performance-related pay program; one of the major reasons for their campaign is that the program is a dangerous policy experiment that will distort the ultimate goal of education. According to them, teaching is a service, the responsibility of which involves children's lifelong development; it is clearly different from any kind of commercial acts. Furthermore, because the effect of education goes beyond any short-term evaluation, encouraging teachers to pay more attention to immediate, visible results would be harmful (Dong-A Daily Newspaper 2001 c, Chosun Daily Newspaper 2001 c).⁸ The following anecdotal evidence supports the possibility that the pay-for-performance program may undermine the public service motivation of government employees. Since the Korean government tightened its market-oriented civil service reform measures, more government employees than ever have voluntarily left their workplace (Chosun Daily Newspaper 1999). Considering that the unemployment rate has been very high, and that government jobs have been highly esteemed because of job security during this period, this unprecedented phenomenon can be partly understood by this explanation. Combined with the result of Lovrich's study, the findings of this research on PSM make the author suspect that we may be pursuing a poorly-grounded program at the expense of PSM by seriously misreading the elements of motivation of the Korean government employees.

Open position system and PSM

The open position system in itself gives no theoretical reason for the negative impact on PSM. In fact, the open competitive entrance examination for Grade 7 and the senior civil service examination for Grade 5 represent a type of open position system because they allow new recruits to start their career from mid-levels in the government hierarchy. However, the exams are designed to recruit young employees who are expected to pursue lifelong career development as government employees, while the aim of the open position system is the utilization of professional knowledge at higher levels for a relatively short period, usually less than three years. Unfortunately, the open position system has not been successfully implemented until now. As of September 30th, 2001, 117 professionals were employed through the system. Of those, 103 or 88 percent were government employees at the time of the recruitment. Only 14, 12 percent, were selected from the private sector (The CSC 2001). Criticism about the low number of new recruits from outside of the government has arisen because one of the main purposes of the system was to transfer advanced professional knowledge from the private sector. That the program is ultimately reduced to a bureaucrats' banquet is the major theme of critics (Chosun Daily Newspaper 2001 b). However, government officials in charge of the new recruitment system suggest a completely different picture. They point out, first of all, that there have been few eligible and fewer competitive applicants from the private sector. One official expressed his personal opinion, "It looks like the private sector doesn't have a sufficient first class labor pool that can deal with unique public services" (Chosun Daily Newspaper 2001 a). Another working-level official explained his experience, "Although many called in to ask about the application process, most of them just hung up as soon as they heard about the salary" (Chosun Daily Newspaper 2001 a). It

seems that highly competent applicants are reluctant to apply, while only marginally competent job seekers show interest.

Meanwhile, government employees seem to suffer from a sense of shame. Although they passed one of the hardest examinations in order to be recruited and have been considered as elites in Korean society, they are now thought of as bungling bureaucrats who, without help from private sector professionals, can rarely do anything properly. At the same time they find themselves in unpopular jobs, even jobs avoided by candidates in the private sector. On top of that, government employees are blamed for being preoccupied with protecting their jobs. In these situations government employees overall began to demand levels of pay comparable with those of the private sector. Their argument is that once government decided to act like the market, and once serving the public no longer provided gratification, why should pay not be set the same way as in the market? (Yoon, 1999). In sum, the open position system has led to lowering of government employees' morale while failing to recruit private professionals. If this is the case, why was this seemingly disadvantageous program initiated? Partly because market-oriented civil service reform was believed to be a panacea for the reputed pathologies of the Korean bureaucracy. It was expected that opening up 20 percent of high ranking government positions would bring in competition, and that competition for position or promotion from both outside and inside government would result in high productivity. Had PSM been recognized and understood, the open position system could have been more carefully designed and implemented. Then the negative side effects of the system that seems to undermine the PSM of government employees could have been avoided.

Concluding Remarks

PSM theory can pave the road to better management and recruitment. The first finding of this research, that government employees showed higher PSM levels than private employees, means PSM is an important motivational basis of government employees. It strongly suggests that management should focus on how to help them to realize their public service motives. The second finding, that PSM positively affects job satisfaction and organizational commitment, clearly shows the argument is not just rhetoric. It provides empirical evidence that PSM has practical implications for better public management.

These findings also imply that government is still perceived as the workplace where government employees can realize their public service motives. Government organizations have a clear advantage of PSM in recruitment over private corporations; PSM provides government organizations with a differential strategy for recruiting new blood with public spirit. Taking into account increasing budgetary pressures on government organizations in Korea reflected in the current low pay levels and even shrinking welfare benefits in pension systems, these implications of PSM on better management and recruitment are crucial.

Finally, the third finding that government employees with higher levels of PSM were found to base the four important values of public administration more on their conception of roles and responsibilities, implies that PSM helps government employees to reconcile seemingly contradictory administrative values. In other words, while PSM encourages government employees to render public service that is social equity-oriented, they remain concerned about efficiency as an indispensable criterion. It also suggests that government employees with higher levels of PSM carry out their tasks in a more active manner, while simultaneously recognizing the importance of the neutrality principle. Considering that the

Korean bureaucracy is faced with a multifaceted mission (see Chapter 3), and that these issues are difficult to resolve with a specific-value-oriented management or reform movement, the third finding is of great significance.

All the findings of this study make us wonder, as Wise once lamented, why the nurturing of a public service motivation has received so little attention in government organizations, society, or even the research community (1999). The findings also strongly suggest that it is an urgent task to recognize and initiate research on PSM, and develop PSM theory in Korea, thus redressing one-sided theory and practices of market-oriented management and administrative reform. 9

Suggestions for Future Research

PSM theory, still a nascent theory, provides ample opportunities for fruitful research. First, another comparative study could be conducted in a different political culture, for example, an Islamic country. If confirmed in a dissimilar political and administrative environment, PSM theory could be more strongly supported as a general theory. Research could also focus on making attraction to public policy subscale more precise. As briefly discussed, the measurement of PSM using the current subscale items may be inter-culturally unstable by tapping into political cynicism rather than the attraction to public policy. For students whose academic interest includes methodology, it might be a good challenge. The third area which awaits research is an exploration of conditions affecting government employees' PSM levels. Because it is unlikely that PSM levels will remain constant, it is worth asking what factors negatively or positively affect PSM in government organizations. As a matter of fact, once we found that PSM is a valuable concept in public management and

recruitment, identifying its independent variables should be the next question if we want to maintain and further develop PSM among government employees. This has not as yet been dealt with. There has been no answer to Perry's question "To what extent do [sic] an individual's motivation upon entry into an organization and subsequent experiences influence PSM?" (1997, p. 188). Finally, comparative research on PSM could be conducted among various levels of governments within a country. A comparison of PSM for federal (central or national) and local government employees may yield new information. Or comparisons could be made among government employees working for governments at the same levels. Researchers may attempt to utilize the data in explaining some potential differences in the governments or communities in those comparisons.

Note

1. Hofstede compared cultures across 50 countries along the four dimensions of power distance, individualism, masculinity, and uncertainty avoidance. According to his research, the cultures of Korea and the U.S.A are indicated as follows:

Table 6-6: Comparison of Korean Culture with that of the U.S.A by Hofstede Scale

Dimensions	Power Distance		Individualism		Masculinity		Uncertainty Avoidance	
	Index	Rank	Index	Rank	Index	Rank	Index	Rank
Korea	60	27-28	18	43	39	41	85	16-17
U.S.A	40	38	91	1	62	15	46	43

Source: Hofstede (1991).

2. The pattern was consistent along the four sub-scales of PSM measurement. In other words, CPAs in government show higher levels of PSM than CPAs in private accounting firms and non-profit organizations in all four sub-scales: attraction to public policy, civic duty/public interest, compassion, and self-sacrifice.

Table 6-7: Post Hoc Multiple Comparisons Tests of Attraction to Public Policy among the three Groups of CPAs

	(I) WKPLACE	(J) WKPLACE	Mean Difference (I-J)	Std. Error	Sig.
Tukey HSD	private	non-profit	.1934	.6560	.953
		government	-2.0972	.6631	.004
	non-profit	private	-.1934	.6560	.953
		government	-2.2906	.7926	.011
	government	private	2.0972	.6631	.004
		non-profit	2.2906	.7926	.011
LSD	private	non-profit	.1934	.6560	.769
		government	-2.0972	.6631	.002
	non-profit	private	-.1934	.6560	.769
		government	-2.2906	.7926	.004
	government	private	2.0972	.6631	.002
		non-profit	2.2906	.7926	.004
Bonferroni	private	non-profit	.1934	.6560	1.000
		government	-2.0972	.6631	.006
	non-profit	private	-.1934	.6560	1.000
		government	-2.2906	.7926	.013
	government	private	2.0972	.6631	.006
		non-profit	2.2906	.7926	.013

Table 6-8: Post Hoc Multiple Comparisons Tests of Public Interest/ Civic Duty among the three Groups of CPAs

			Mean Difference (I- J)	Std. Error	Sig.
		(I) WKPLACE	(J) WKPLACE		
Tukey HSD	private	non-profit	-.3212	.7690	.908
		government	-2.5172	.7773	.003
	non-profit	private	.3212	.7690	.908
		government	-2.1961	.9291	.048
	government	private	2.5172	.7773	.003
		non-profit	2.1961	.9291	.048
LSD	private	non-profit	-.3212	.7690	.677
		government	-2.5172	.7773	.001
	non-profit	private	.3212	.7690	.677
		government	-2.1961	.9291	.019
	government	private	2.5172	.7773	.001
		non-profit	2.1961	.9291	.019
Bonferroni	private	non-profit	-.3212	.7690	1.000
		government	-2.5172	.7773	.004
	non-profit	private	.3212	.7690	1.000
		government	-2.1961	.9291	.058
	government	private	2.5172	.7773	.004
		non-profit	2.1961	.9291	.058

Table 6-9: Post Hoc Multiple Comparisons Tests of Compassion among the three Groups of CPAs

			Mean Difference (I- J)	Std. Error	Sig.
		(I) WKPLACE	(J) WKPLACE		
Tukey HSD	private	non-profit	-.8222	1.1344	.749
		government	-3.4514	1.1467	.007
	non-profit	private	.8222	1.1344	.749
		government	-2.6292	1.3707	.134
	government	private	3.4514	1.1467	.007
		non-profit	2.6292	1.3707	.134
LSD	private	non-profit	-.8222	1.1344	.470
		government	-3.4514	1.1467	.003
	non-profit	private	.8222	1.1344	.470
		government	-2.6292	1.3707	.057
	government	private	3.4514	1.1467	.003
		non-profit	2.6292	1.3707	.057
Bonferroni	private	non-profit	-.8222	1.1344	1.000
		government	-3.4514	1.1467	.009
	non-profit	private	.8222	1.1344	1.000
		government	-2.6292	1.3707	.171
	government	private	3.4514	1.1467	.009
		non-profit	2.6292	1.3707	.171

Table 6-10: Post Hoc Multiple Comparisons Tests of Self-Sacrifice among the three Groups of CPAs

			Mean Difference (I-J)	Std. Error	Sig.
	(I) WKPLACE	(J) WKPLACE			
Tukey HSD	private	non-profit	-1.5764	1.3294	.462
		government	-4.7983	1.3438	.001
	non-profit	private	1.5764	1.3294	.462
		government	-3.2219	1.6062	.111
	government	private	4.7983	1.3438	.001
		non-profit	3.2219	1.6062	.111
LSD	private	non-profit	-1.5764	1.3294	.238
		government	-4.7983	1.3438	.000
	non-profit	private	1.5764	1.3294	.238
		government	-3.2219	1.6062	.047
	government	private	4.7983	1.3438	.000
		non-profit	3.2219	1.6062	.047
Bonferroni	private	non-profit	-1.5764	1.3294	.713
		government	-4.7983	1.3438	.001
	non-profit	private	1.5764	1.3294	.713
		government	-3.2219	1.6062	.140
	government	private	4.7983	1.3438	.001
		non-profit	3.2219	1.6062	.140

3. The six items Naff and Crum used were as follows:

- 1) The give and take of public policy making doesn't appeal to me.
- 2) Meaningful public service is important to me.
- 3) I am prepared to make enormous sacrifices for the good of society.
- 4) I am often reminded by daily events about how dependent we are on one another.
- 5) Making a difference in society means more to me than personal achievements.
- 6) I am not afraid to go to bat for the rights of others even if it means I will be ridiculed.

The first five items were used in this study to measure PSM for the comparative objective.

4. Naff and Crum measured job satisfaction, performance and turnover with the following questionnaire items used in Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB) survey:

Job satisfaction: In general, I'm satisfied with my job.

Naff and Crum coded Agree and Strongly Agree as 1, and 0 for the others.

Performance: Which of the following most closely describes the performance rating you received at your last appraisal?

- a. outstanding
- b. exceeds fully successful
- c. fully successful
- d. pass
- e. minimally successful
- f. unacceptable
- g. fail

Naff and Crum coded the response to outstanding as 1, the others as 0.

Turnover (Leave Government): Do you plan to look for another job in the coming year?

- a. No
- b. Yes, but only within the Federal Government.
- c. Yes, but only outside of the Federal Government.
- d. Yes, I plan to look both inside and outside of the Federal Government.

Responses marked on options a and b were coded as 0, and c and d as 1 in Naff and Crum's study.

For a precise comparison, this study used question items as closely as possible to those employed in Naff and Crum's study. However, as explained, job satisfaction was measured by JDI. Pay satisfaction was also measured as an aspect of job satisfaction with the same index. Respondents were asked to indicate their agreement or disagreement with the following statements, from Strongly Disagree (1) to Strongly Agree (7):

Recommendation of Government Job: I would recommend a government job to my children.

Work Unit Performance: The work performed by my work unit provides the public a worthwhile return on their tax dollars.

Turnover: I have the intention to quit my job as a government employee.

Respondents were asked to mark a response which they thought best described their opinion regarding the following question:

Performance: Compared with your co-workers, how would you describe your performance for the last year?

1. fail
2. unacceptable
3. minimally successful
4. pass
5. fully successful
6. exceeds fully successful
7. outstanding.

5. In this case, multiple regression analysis has methodological advantages over t-test and logistic regression. In a t-test, the mean difference in dependent variables was analyzed only with respect to one independent variable, so the potential effects of other explaining variable cannot be removed. Logistic regression is used when the dependent variable is dichotomous. If the value of a dependent variable has more than two levels or a numerical variable, multiple regression is a better choice because by reducing levels of the dependent variable, we may lose delicate relationships between the dependent variable and independent variables.

6. Rational choice theorists who specify self-interest are called thick-rational whereas scholars who do not called thin-rational theorists (Green and Shapiro 1994, p. 17-9). As for

thin-rationality assumption, a powerful criticism is that it can be so elusive that no one can easily falsify a theory based on thin rationality.

7. For criticisms of various rational choice theory explanation of pathologies of government agencies, see Kelman and Green and Shapiro for general issues, and Manning (1995) for testing the hypothesis based on the budget maximizer thesis.

8. Bohte and Meier (2000) argue that, when performance is evaluated in terms of numerical outputs, bureaucrats are likely to attempt to maximize the outputs regardless of whether the maximization is the desirable strategy for achieving social outcomes. They termed the phenomenon, a form of goal displacement, organizational cheating. Using school districts in Texas as a case, Bohte and Meier reported their observation that, when performance was assessed by student pass rates on standardized examination, school districts as public agencies, cheated by liberally exempting students whose G.P.A. were low from these examinations with a view to raising overall pass rate.

9. As in government policies, the concept of market-oriented administrative reform idea seems to dominate the academic circle of public administration in Korea. Most scholars accept, advocate and attempt to apply the theory and practices of the economic theory of public management and the market administrative reform movement. Although a few researchers take different approaches toward better public management (Song 1998, Cho 1997, Park 1999), or question the validity and usefulness of market-based administrative reform (Park 1997), no study has been conducted based on PSM. The basic argument of the scholars who support the economic theory of public management and reform centers on a readjustment of the scope of the government and on an introduction of competition into the government administration. Their two-fold argument is first that the Korean national government should focus its concern and resources on such policy areas as welfare, the environment, and education where market principles do not operate well enough to provide public goods in optimal quantity and quality, and, second, that government organizations should be managed like a business to obtain market-like efficiency (Lee et al. 1997, Hwang).

However, because their argument ignores PSM, it leaves certain crucial questions unanswered: first, they limit the managerial tools of government organizations to narrow extrinsic incentives, especially monetary rewards, by failing to recognize PSM as an important motivational basis of government employees. However, is it possible for government organizations to provide enough monetary incentives compared to private corporations to secure the highest performance and to attract and recruit the best and brightest? Given the current low pay levels and even shrinking welfare benefits such as pension systems, for government employees in Korea, it seems almost impossible. If government organizations cannot compete with private corporations in terms of the capability to provide monetary incentives, then, according to their logic, there is nothing left except to tolerate the reputedly second-rate public service because, as Heffron relevantly pointed out, "...we really do get what we pay for and the price of increased productivity may be more than we are willing to pay" (1989, p. 269). Neither can government organizations hope to recruit the best-qualified applicants. Thus, the scholars should clearly recognize that they are actually proposing a gloomy picture of public management and recruitment.

Second, the scholars advocating economic theory of public management simply assume that the introduction of competition for extrinsic incentives automatically leads to competition for services without any plausible theoretical explanation of the linkage. As already discussed, however, competition for extrinsic incentives may result in quite different outcomes if PSM is considered.

Besides the issues of possibility and desirability, the market-based management and administrative reform argument contains a logical flaw. Many scholars suggest that government functions should be limited to market failure areas such as welfare, the environment, and education. At the same time, they argue that government failure should be remedied by running government like a business, and by treating employees the same way as their counterparts in private corporations. Their argument that government organizations and employees should follow the marketplace rules while working to provide public service that cannot be generated under the same rules does not sound logically convincing.

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Appendices

Appendix A: The Questionnaire of Survey 1 (English)

The purpose of this survey is to obtain the opinions of Certified Public Accountants on society. All the responses will only be used as data for a Ph.D dissertation and will be kept confidential. Please answer all the questions as truthfully as possible. Thank you for your cooperation.

Part I

1. What is your age?

- (1) Under 25 (2) 26-30 (3) 31-35 (4) 36-40
 (5) 41-45 (6) 46-50 (7) 51-55 (8) Over 56

2. Please indicate your gender. (1) Male (2) Female

3. How many years have you been a CPA?

- (1) Under 5 years (2) 6-10 (3) 11-15 (4) 16-20
 (5) 21-25 (6) Over 26 years

4. Please indicate your current workplace.

- (1) Private Accounting Firm (2) Non-Profit Organization
 (3) Government Organization

5. What is your annual income level? (unit= Korean Won)

- (1) Less than 30 million (2) 30-35 (3) 35-40 (4) 40-45
 (5) 45-50 (6) 51-55 (7) 55-60 (8) More than 60 million

6. What is your highest educational level?

- (1) High school diploma (2) Associate Degree (3) B.A Degree
 (4) Master' or Higher Degree

Part II

Please indicate the degree to which you agree or disagree with each of the following statements. You can choose from (1), Strongly Disagree through (4) Neutral to (7) Strongly Agree.

1. Politics is a dirty word. ()
2. The give and take of public policy making doesn't appeal to me. ()
3. I don't care much for politicians. ()
4. It is hard for me to get intensely interested in what is going on in my community. ()
5. I unselfishly contribute to my community. ()
6. I consider public service my civic duty. ()
7. Meaningful public service is very important to me. ()
8. I would prefer seeing public officials do what is best for the whole community even if it harmed my interests. ()
9. It is difficult for me to contain my feelings when I see people in distress. ()
10. Most social programs are too vital to do without. ()
11. I am often reminded by daily events how dependent we are on one another. ()
12. I am rarely moved by the plight of the underprivileged. ()
13. To me, patriotism includes seeing to the welfare of others. ()
14. I have little compassion for people in need who are unwilling to take the first step to help themselves. ()
15. There are few public programs that I wholeheartedly support. ()
16. I seldom think about the welfare of people I don't know personally. ()
17. Doing well financially is definitely more important to me than doing good deeds. ()
18. Much of what I do is for a cause bigger than myself. ()
19. Serving other citizens would give me a good feeling even if no one paid me for it. ()
20. Making a difference in society means more to me than personal achievements. ()

21. I think people should give back to society more than they get from it. ()
22. I am prepared to make enormous sacrifices for the good of society. ()
23. I am one of those rare people who would risk personal loss to help someone else.
24. I believe in putting duty before self. ()

Appendix B: The Questionnaire of Survey 2 (English)

The purpose of this survey is to obtain various opinions on diverse aspects of work situations with which government employees dealing. All the responses will only be used as data for a Ph.D dissertation and will be kept confidential. Please answer all the questions as truthfully as possible. Thank you for your cooperation.

Part I

1. What is your age?

- (1) Under 25 (2) 26-30 (3) 31-35 (4) 36-40
 (5) 41-45 (6) 46-50 (7) 51-55 (8) Over 56

2. Please indicate your gender. (1) Male (2) Female

3. How many years have you been a government employee (excluding military service)?

- (1) Under 5 years (2) 6-10 (3) 11-15 (4) 16-20
 (5) 21-25 (6) Over 26 years

4. What is your current grade classification?

- (1) 8th or Lower (2) 7th (3) 6th (4) 5th (5) 4th (6) 3rd or Higher

5. Please indicate your current ministry.

- (1) Finance and Economics (2) Education and Human Resources Development
 (3) Unification (4) Government Administration and Home Affairs
 (5) Culture and Tourism (6) Commerce, Industry and Energy
 (7) Health and Welfare (8) Environment
 (9) Labor (10) Construction and Transportation

6. What is your highest educational level?

- (1) High school diploma (2) Associate Degree (3) B.A Degree
 (4) Master' or Higher Degree

Part II

Read the following words that describe many aspects of a job.

Then, in the parenthesis beside each word, write

(O) if it describes a specific phase of your job well.

(X) if it does NOT describe it

(?) if you can not decide.

Work Itself

- | | | | |
|-----------------|-----|-----------------------------------|-----|
| 1. Fascinating | () | 2. Routine | () |
| 3. Satisfying | () | 4. Boring | () |
| 5. Good | () | 6. Creative | () |
| 7. Respected | () | 8. Uncomfortable | () |
| 9. Pleasant | () | 10. Useful | () |
| 11. Tiring | () | 12. Healthful | () |
| 13. Challenging | () | 14. Too much to do | () |
| 15. Frustrating | () | 16. Simple | () |
| 17. Repetitive | () | 18. Gives sense of accomplishment | () |

Pay

- | | |
|--|-----|
| 1. Income adequate for normal expenses | () |
| 2. Fair | () |
| 3. Barely live on income | () |
| 4. Bad | () |
| 5. Income provides luxuries | () |
| 6. Insecure | () |
| 7. Less than I deserve | () |
| 8. Well paid | () |
| 9. Underpaid | () |

Promotion

- 1. Good opportunities for promotion ()
- 2. Opportunities somewhat limited ()
- 3. Promotion based on ability ()
- 4. Dead end job ()
- 5. Good chance for promotion ()
- 6. Unfair promotion policy ()
- 7. Infrequent promotions ()
- 8. Regular promotion ()
- 9. Fairly good chance for promotion ()

Supervision

- 1. Asks my advice ()
- 2. Hard to please ()
- 3. Impolite ()
- 4. Praises good work ()
- 5. Tactful ()
- 6. Influential ()
- 7. Up-to-date ()
- 8. Insufficient supervision ()
- 9. Has favorites ()
- 10. Provides feedback ()
- 11. Annoying ()
- 12. Stubborn ()
- 13. Knows job well ()
- 14. Bad ()
- 15. Intelligent ()
- 16. Poor planner ()
- 17. Around when needed ()
- 18. Lazy ()

Co-Workers

- 1. Stimulating ()
- 2. Boring ()
- 3. Slow ()
- 4. Helpful ()
- 5. Stupid ()
- 6. Responsible ()
- 7. Fast ()
- 8. Intelligent ()
- 9. Easy to make enemies ()
- 10. Talk too much ()

Co-Workers (continued)

- | | | | |
|----------------|------------|---------------------|------------|
| 11. Smart | () | 12. Lazy | () |
| 13. Unpleasant | () | 14. Gossipy | () |
| 15. Active | () | 16. Narrow interest | () |
| 17. Loyal | () | 18. Stubborn | () |

Part III

Following are statements describing feelings an employee can have about his workplace. Read carefully, then indicate your opinion about each statement. You can choose from (1) Strongly Disagree through (4) Neutral to (7) Strongly Agree.

1. I am willing to put in a great deal of effort beyond what is normally expected in order to help this organization be successful. ()
2. I talk up this organization to my friends as a great organization to work for. ()
3. I feel very little loyalty to this organization. ()
4. I would accept almost any type of job assignment in order to keep working for this organization. ()
5. I find that my values and the organization's values are very similar. ()
6. I am proud to tell others that I am part of this organization. ()
7. I could just as well be working for a different organization as long as the type of work was similar. ()
8. This organization really inspires the best job performance I can give. ()
9. It would take very little change in my present circumstances to cause me to leave this organization. ()
10. I am extremely glad I chose this organization to work for over others I was considering at the time I joined. ()
11. There's not much to be gained by sticking with this organization indefinitely. ()
12. Often, I find it difficult to agree with this organization's policies on important matters relating to its employees. ()

13. I really care about the fate of this organization. ()
14. For me, this is the best of all organizations for which to work. ()
15. Deciding to work for this organization was a definite mistake on my part. ()

Part IV

The following statements describe diverse opinions about society. In the same manner as before, please indicate your opinion about each statement. You can choose from (1) Strongly Disagree through (4) Neutral to (7) Strongly Agree.

1. Politics is a dirty word. ()
2. The give and take of public policy making doesn't appeal to me. ()
3. I don't care much for politicians. ()
4. It is hard for me to get intensely interested in what is going on in my community. ()
5. I unselfishly contribute to my community. ()
6. I consider public service my civic duty. ()
7. Meaningful public service is very important to me. ()
8. I would prefer seeing public officials do what is best for the whole community even if it harmed my interests. ()
9. It is difficult for me to contain my feelings when I see people in distress. ()
10. Most social programs are too vital to do without. ()
11. I am often reminded by daily events how dependent we are on one another. ()
12. I am rarely moved by the plight of the underprivileged. ()
13. To me, patriotism includes seeing to the welfare of others. ()
14. I have little compassion for people in need who are unwilling to take the first step to help themselves. ()
15. There are few public programs that I wholeheartedly support. ()
16. I seldom think about the welfare of people I don't know personally. ()

17. Doing well financially is definitely more important to me than doing good deeds. ()
18. Much of what I do is for a cause bigger than myself. ()
19. Serving other citizens would give me a good feeling even if no one paid me for it. ()
20. Making a difference in society means more to me than personal achievements.()
21. I think people should give back to society more than they get from it. ()
22. I am prepared to make enormous sacrifices for the good of society. ()
23. I am one of those rare people who would risk personal loss to help someone else.
24. I believe in putting duty before self. ()

Part V

Please think about roles and responsibilities of government employees, then read the following statements. In the same manner as before, indicate your opinion about each statement.

1. My job is to follow the rules and regulations provided me. ()
2. Public servants should behave according to the wishes of those set in authority over them. ()
3. The more neutral and responsive I am, the better public servant I am. ()
4. The public administrator charged with implementing legislation must ensure that the public interest is served. ()
5. Government officials ought to recommend or actively advocate in favor of policy positions that represent general public needs and interests. ()
6. As a public servant, I believe that I should take the initiative in proposing policies, mobilizing support for them, and questioning policies that might run counter to the public interest. ()
7. Public servants should be responsible for finding the most efficient use of the resources that are entrusted to them. ()

8. If a government employee is forced to choose between the most efficient policy and the most equitable policy, the most efficient alternative should be chosen. ()
9. The extent to which I apply expertise and professionalism to the problems of government justifies my position. ()
10. Administrators should be committed to social equity as values. ()
11. Government officials should encourage procedures that result in greater and more equitable public access to programs and services. ()
12. I believe it is the duty of a public servant to recommend or actively advocate in favor of policies that address the needs and concerns of less privileged portions of the population. ()

Part VI

Finally, in the same way as above, please indicate your opinion about each statement describing your work environment.

1.Skill Diversity

How much variety is there in your job? That is, to what extent does the job require you to do many different things at work, using a variety of your skills and talents?

1-----2-----3-----4-----5-----6-----7

Very little; the job requires me to do the same things over and over again

Moderate variety

Very much: the job requires me to do many different things using a number of different skills and talents.

2.Task Identity

To what extent does your job involve doing a “whole” and identifiable piece of work? That is, is the job a complete piece of work that has an obvious beginning and end? Or is it only a small part of the overall piece of work, which is finished by other people?

1-----2-----3-----4-----5-----6-----7

My job is only a tiny part of the overall piece of work; the results of my activities cannot be seen in the final product or service.

My job is a moderate-sized “chunk” of the overall piece of work; my own contribution can be seen in the final outcome.

My job involves doing the whole piece of work. From start to finish; the results of my activities are easily seen in the final product or service.

3. Task Significance

In general, how significant or important is your job? That is, are the results of your work likely to significantly affect the lives or well-being of other people?

1-----2-----3-----4-----5-----6-----7

Not very significant; the outcome of my work are not likely to have important effects on other people.

Moderately significant

Highly significant; the outcomes of my work can affect other people in very important ways

4.Autonomy

How much autonomy is there in your job? That is, to what extent does your job permit you to decide on your own how to go about doing the work?

1-----2-----3-----4-----5-----6-----7

Very little; the job gives me almost no personal “say” about how and when the work is done.

Moderate autonomy; I can make some decisions about the work.

Very much; the job gives me almost complete responsibility for deciding how and when the work is done.

5. Feedback

To what extent does doing the job itself provides you with information about your work performance? That is, does the actual work itself provides clues about how well you are doing—aside from any “feedback” co-workers or supervisors may provide?

1-----2-----3-----4-----5-----6-----7

Very little; the job itself is set up so I could work forever without finding out how well I am doing.

Moderately; sometimes doing the job provides “feedback” to me; sometimes it does not.

Very much; the job is set up so that I get almost constant “feedback” as I work about how well I am doing.

6. The people with whom I work are friendly and close-knit.
7. The people I work with express mostly negative attitudes toward the organization.
8. It is generally accepted by those who matter that my work is important to the organization.
9. As a government employee I feel I get the respect I deserve for my work.
10. I would recommend a government job to my children.
11. The work performed by my work unit provides the public a worthwhile return on their tax dollars.
12. I have the intention to quit my job as a government employee.
13. Compared with your co-workers, how would you describe your performance for the last year?
 (1) fail (2) unacceptable (3) minimally successful (4) pass
 (5) fully successful (6) exceeds fully successful (7) outstanding.

Appendix C: The Questionnaire of Survey 1 (Korean)

안녕하십니까?

이 설문조사는 직무수행과 관련된 여러 측면들에 대해서 공인회계사 자격증을 가지고 계신 여러분들의 다양한 의견을 알아보는데 그 목적이 있습니다. 설문에 참여해 주신 분들의 응답내용은 박사학위논문작성을 위한 소중한 데이터로 활용하겠습니다. 하지만 모든 답변내용은 통계자료로만 사용될 것이며 개인 신상은 절대 알려지지 않을 것입니다. 바쁘시겠지만 잠시만 시간을 내어 모든 질문에 대해 솔직하게 답변해 주시기 바랍니다.
협조해 주셔서 감사합니다.

제1부

다음 질문들에 대하여 해당되는 항목에 O표 해 주십시오.

1. 귀하의 연령을 표시하여 주십시오.
(1) 25세 이하 (2) 26-30세 (3) 31-35세 (4) 36-40세
(5) 41-45세 (6) 46-50세 (7) 51-55세 (8) 56세 이상
2. 귀하의 성별을 표시하여 주십시오. (1) 남자 (2) 여자
3. 지금 하시는 직업에 종사하신 기간을 표시해 주시기 바랍니다.
(1) 5년이하 (2) 6-10년 (3) 11-15년 (4) 16-20년
(5) 21-25년 (6) 26년 이상
4. 귀하께서는 현재 어떤 곳에서 근무하십니까?
(1) 회계법인 (2) 공공기관 (준공무원) (3) 국가기관 (공무원)
5. 귀하의 연수입을 표시해 주시기 바랍니다.
(1) 3,000 만원 미만 (2) 3,000-3,500 만원 (3) 3,500-4,000 만원
(4) 4,000-4,500 만원 (5) 4,500-5,000 만원 (6) 5,000-5,500 만원
(7) 5,500-6,000 만원 (8) 6,000 만원이상
6. 귀하의 학력을 표시하여 주시기 바랍니다.
(1) 고졸 이하 (2) 전문대졸 이하 (3) 대졸이하
(4) 대학원 재학 (6) 대학원졸업 이상

제2부

아래에는 사회에 대해 개인들이 가질 수 있는 다양한 진술들이 서술되어 있습니다. 각 진술들에 대한 귀하의 의견을 1부터 7까지의 숫자로 답해 주시기 바랍니다. 각 진술에 반대 하실수록 작은 숫자 (최소1)를, 동의 하실수록 큰 숫자(최대7)를 ()안에 기입하여 주십시오. 4는 중립적 표현 (그저 그렇다)을 의미합니다.

1. 나는 정치란 용어 자체에 대하여 혐오감을 느낀다.----- ()
2. 공공정책 형성과정에서는 쟁점사안들에 대해 토론하고 논의하는 것이 필수적인바 나는 그런 것들에 별로 관심이 없다. ----- ()
3. 나는 정치가들에게 호감을 갖고 있지 않다.----- ()
4. 나는 지역사회에서 일어나고 있는 사안들에 대해 거의 관심이 없다.----- ()
5. 나는 공공에 대한 봉사를 나의 시민 된 의무라고 생각한다.----- ()
6. 공공에 대한 의미 있는 봉사는 내게 매우 중요하다.----- ()
7. 나는 지역사회에 사심 없이 봉사한다.----- ()
8. 나는 비록 나의 이익에 반하더라도 공무원들이 전체 공동체를 위하여 최선의 행정을 펼치는 것을 보고 싶다.-- ----- ()
9. 곤경에 처한 사람들을 보면 감정을 주체하기 힘들다.----- ()
10. 대부분의 사회(복지)사업들은 매우 중요해서 폐지해서는 안 된다.----- ()
11. 나는 일상생활에서 우리가 얼마나 서로 서로에게 의지하면서 살아가고 있는가를 종종 깨닫는다.----- ()
12. 나는 사회적 약자들의 예로에 대해 별로 마음을 쓰지 않는 편이다.----- ()
13. 내게 있어 애국심이란 다른 사람들의 삶의 질을 돌보는 것을 포함한다.----- ()
14. 나는 어려움에 처해 있으나 자립하기 위해 노력할 의사가 없는 사람들을 동정하지 않는다.----- ()
15. 내가 진심으로 지지하는 사회(복지)사업은 거의 없다.----- ()
16. 나는 개인적으로 모르는 사람들의 삶의 질에 대하여 생각해 본 적이 별로 없다.----- ()
17. 내게는 경제적으로 성공하는 것이 선행을 하는 것보다 더 중요하다.----- ()
18. 내가 하는 행동의 대부분은 내 자신의 이익보다는 사회적 가치의 실현을 위해서 행해진다.----- ()
19. 시민들에 대한 봉사는 아무런 대가 없이도 나에게 좋은 느낌을 줄 것이다.----- ()
20. 사회를 위해 뭔가 보람있는 일을 하는 것이 내게는 개인적인 성취보다 더 중요하다.----- ()
21. 나는 사람들이 사회로부터 받은 것 보다 더 많이 사회에 기여해야 한다고 생각한다.----- ()
22. 나는 사회의 선을 위해 개인적 희생을 감수할 준비가 되어 있다.----- ()
23. 나는 남을 돕기 위해 개인적 손실을 감수할 수 있다.----- ()
24. 나는 자기 자신보다는 의무를 먼저 내세워야 한다는 신념을 지니고 있다.----- ()

Appendix D: The Questionnaire of Survey 2 (Korean)

안녕하십니까?

이 설문조사는 직무수행과 관련된 여러 측면들에 대해서 공무원 여러분들의 다양한 의견을 알아보는데 그 목적이 있습니다. 설문에 참여해 주신 분들의 응답내용은 박사학위논문작성을 위한 소중한 데이터로 활용하겠습니다. 하지만 모든 답변내용은 통계자료로만 사용될 것이며 개인 신상은 절대 알려지지 않을 것입니다. 잠시만 시간을 내어 모든 질문에 대해 솔직하게 답변해 주시기 바랍니다.

협조해 주셔서 감사합니다.

제1부

다음 질문들에 대하여 해당되는 항목에 O표 해 주십시오.

1. 귀하의 연령을 표시하여 주십시오.
(1) 25세 이하 (2) 26-30세 (3) 31-35세 (4) 36-40세
(5) 41-45세 (6) 46-50세 (7) 51-55세 (8) 56세 이상
2. 귀하의 성별을 표시하여 주십시오. (1) 남자 (2) 여자
3. 귀하는 공무원으로서 얼마나 오래 근무하셨습니다? (군경력 제외)
(1) 5년이하 (2) 6-10년 (3) 11-15년 (4) 16-20년
(5) 21-25년 (6) 26년 이상
4. 일반직을 기준으로 귀하의 직급을 표시하여 주십시오.
(1) 8급 이하 (2) 7급 (3) 6급 (4) 5급 (5) 4급 (6) 3급이상
5. 귀하의 현재 소속부처를 표시하여 주십시오.
(1) 재정경제부 (2) 교육인적자원부 (3) 통일부 (4) 행정자치부
(5) 문화관광부 (6) 산업자원부 (7) 보건복지부 (8) 환경부
(9) 노동부 (10) 건설교통부
6. 귀하의 최종학력은 무엇입니까?
(1) 고졸이하 (2) 전문대학졸업 이하 (3) 대졸이하 (4) 대학원졸업이상

제2부

아래에는 직무의 다양한 측면에 대한 진술들이 기술되어 있습니다. 각 진술을 읽으신 다음 각 항목이 귀하의 일을 제대로 묘사하면 “그렇다”인 뜻인 ○을, 잘 묘사하지 않으면 “아니다”의 뜻인 X를, 그런지 아닌지 결정할 수 없으면 “모르겠다”의 뜻인 ?을 괄호안에 기입하여 주십시오.

귀하가 현재 하시는 일

흥미진진하다	()	일상적이다	()
만족스럽다	()	지루하다	()
창의적이다	()	존중받는다	()
존중받는다	()	불편하다	()
유용하다	()	즐겁다	()
지치게 한다	()	건강에 좋다	()
도전해 볼만하다	()	너무 일이 많다	()
좌절감을 준다	()	단순하다	()
반복적이다	()	성취감을 준다	()

귀하의 봉급

보통 생활비로 충분하다	()
적절한 수준이다	()
간신히 생활할 수 있다	()
형편없다	()
넉넉하게 살 수 있다	()
불안한 삶을 살게 한다	()
내 노력의 대가로는 부족하다	()
후하다	()
박하다	()

귀하의 승진기회

승진의 기회가 많다	()
기회가 다소 제한되어 있다	()
능력에 따라 승진이 된다	()
앞이 짝 막힌 직책이다	()
승진 가능성이 크다	()

- 승진에 관한 회사 정책이 공정치 않다 ()
 승진이 드물다 ()
 정기적 승진이 있다 ()
 승진 가능성이 꽤 있는 편이다 ()

귀하의 직장상사

- 내게 조언을 구한다 ()
 흠족해 하는 적이 거의 없다 ()
 친절하지 않다 ()
 잘한 일은 칭찬한다 ()
 요령있게 대한다 ()
 영향력이 있다 ()
 최신정보에 밝다 ()
 관리감독을 충분히 하지 않는다 ()
 몇몇 직원을 총애한다 ()
 내가 업무처리를 어떻게 하고 있는지 알려준다 ()
 신경을 거슬리게 한다 ()
 완고하다 ()
 업무내용에 밝다 ()
 형편없다 ()
 지적이다 ()
 계획성이 없다 ()
 필요할 때 도움을 구하기 쉽다 ()
 게으르다 ()

귀하의 직장동료들

- 고무적이다 () 따분하다 ()
 느리다 () 도움을 준다 ()
 명청하다 () 책임감이 있다 ()
 빠르다 () 지적이다 ()
 적이 되기 쉽다 () 수다스럽다 ()
 똑똑하다 () 게으르다 ()
 불쾌하다 () 남의 얘기를 잘 한다 ()
 활동적이다 () 관심분야가 좁다 ()
 충직하다 () 완고하다 ()

제3부

아래에는 개인들이 자기의 직장에 대해 가질 수 있는 느낌들 중 대표적인 진술들이 나열되어 있습니다. 각 진술이 현재 직장에 대한 귀하의 느낌을 얼마나 잘 나타내는지를 1부터 7사이의 숫자로 표시하여 주십시오. 숫자가 작을수록 (최소 1) 귀하께서 해당진술에 적극 반대하는 것을 의미하고 숫자가 커질수록 (최대 7) 해당진술에 대해 적극 동의하는 것을 의미합니다. 4는 중립적 표현 (그저 그렇다)을 의미합니다.

1. 나는 내가 근무하는 조직의 성공을 위해 보통 요구되는 수준이상으로 노력할 용의가 있다. -----()
2. 나는 친구들에게 내가 근무하는 조직이 일할 만한 훌륭한 직장이라고 얘기한다. ---()
3. 나는 이 조직에 대한 충성심이 거의 없다.----- ()
4. 이 조직에서 계속 근무하기 위해서라면 어떠한 직무가 주어져도 마다하지 않겠다.----- ()
5. 나 개인의 가치관과 이 조직의 가치관이 매우 비슷하다고 생각한다.----- ()
6. 나는 내가 이 조직의 일원임을 남들에게 자랑스럽게 말한다.----- ()
7. 업무의 종류가 비슷하지만 하면 전직하여 다른 조직을 위해 일할 수 있다.----- ()
8. 진정 이 조직은 나의 진가를 발휘할 수 있게 해준다.----- ()
9. 조금만 더 나은 제의가 오면 나는 이 조직을 떠날 것이다.----- ()
10. 이 조직에서 근무하기로 한 것에 대해 매우 기쁘게 생각한다.----- ()
11. 이 조직에 끝까지 붙어 있어 봤자 얻을 게 별로 없다.----- ()
12. 직원에 관련된 중요 문제에 대해서 이 조직의 정책에 동의하기 힘들 때가 종종 있다.----- ()
13. 나는 이 조직의 성패에 대해 진심으로 염려한다.----- ()
14. 내게는 이 조직이 근무 가능성이 있는 직장 중 최선의 직장이다.----- ()
15. 이 조직에서 일하기로 결정한 것은 분명히 내 실수였다.----- ()

제4부

아래에는 사회에 대해 개인들이 가질 수 있는 다양한 진술들이 서술되어 있습니다. 앞에서와 마찬가지로 요령으로 각 진술 말미에 있는 ()안에 1부터 7까지의 숫자로 답해 주시기 바랍니다. 각 진술에 동의하지 않을수록 작은 숫자 (최소1)를 동의 하실수록 큰 숫자(최대7)를 ()안에 기입하여 주십시오

1. 나는 정치란 용어 자체에 대하여 혐오감을 느낀다.----- ()
2. 공공정책 형성과정에서는 쟁점사안들에 대해 토론하고 논의하는 것이 필수적인바 나는 그런 것들에 별로 관심이 없다. ----- ()

3. 나는 정치가들에게 호감을 갖고 있지 않다.----- ()
4. 나는 지역사회에서 일어나고 있는 사안들에 대해 거의 관심이 없다.----- ()
5. 나는 공공에 대한 봉사를 나의 시민 된 의무라고 생각한다.----- ()
6. 공공에 대한 의미 있는 봉사는 내게 매우 중요하다.----- ()
7. 나는 지역사회에 사심 없이 봉사한다.----- ()
8. 나는 비록 나의 이익에 반하더라도 공무원들이 전체 공동체를 위하여
최선의 행정을 펼치는 것을 보고 싶다.----- ()
9. 곤경에 처한 사람들을 보면 감정을 주체하기 힘들다.----- ()
10. 대부분의 사회(복지)사업들은 매우 중요해서 폐지해서는 안 된다.----- ()
11. 나는 일상생활에서 우리가 얼마나 서로 서로에게 의지하면서 살아가고
있는가를 종종 깨닫는다.----- ()
12. 나는 사회적 약자들의 애로에 대해 별로 마음을 쓰지 않는 편이다.----- ()
13. 내게 있어 애국심이란 다른 사람들의 삶의 질을 돌보는 것을 포함한다.----- ()
14. 나는 어려움에 처해 있으나 자립하기 위해 노력할 의사가 없는 사람들을
동정하지 않는다.----- ()
15. 내가 진심으로 지지하는 사회(복지)사업은 거의 없다.----- ()
16. 나는 개인적으로 모르는 사람들의 삶의 질에 대하여 생각해 본 적이
별로 없다.----- ()
17. 내게는 경제적으로 성공하는 것이 선행을 하는 것보다 더 중요하다.----- ()
18. 내가 하는 행동의 대부분은 내 자신의 이익보다는 사회적 가치의 실현을
위해서 행해진다.----- ()
19. 시민들에 대한 봉사는 아무런 대가 없이도 나에게 좋은 느낌을 줄 것이다.----- ()
20. 사회를 위해 뭔가 보람있는 일을 하는 것이 내게는 개인적인 성취보다
더 중요하다.----- ()
21. 나는 사람들이 사회로부터 받은 것 보다 더 많이 사회에 기여해야 한다고
생각한다.----- ()
22. 나는 사회의 선을 위해 개인적 희생을 감수할 준비가 되어 있다.----- ()
23. 나는 남을 돕기 위해 개인적 손실을 감수할 수 있다.----- ()
24. 나는 자기 자신보다는 의무를 먼저 내세워야 한다는 신념을 지니고 있다.----- ()

제5부

이번 설문에 답하시기 전에 공무원의 역할과 임무에 대한 귀하의 생각을 한번 정리해 보시기 바랍니다. 다음, 공무원의 역할과 임무에 관한 아래 진술들을 모두 읽어봐 주십시오. 그 다음, 앞에서와 같은 요령으로 각 진술에 대한 귀하의 의견을 표시하여 주십시오.

1. 나의 임무는 주어진 규칙과 규정을 충실히 따르는 것이다.----- ()
2. 공무원은 상급자들이 원하는 바대로 행동해야 한다.----- ()
3. 보다 중립적이고 상급자의 지시에 충실할수록 더욱 바람직한 공무원이다.----- ()

- 4. 정책의 집행을 책임진 공무원은 단순한 집행뿐 아니라 그 목적 (공익)이 실현되도록 적극적으로 돌볼 책임이 있다.----- ()
- 5. 공무원은 공공의 필요와 이익에 부합하는 정책을 제안, 추천하거나 적극적으로 옹호해야 한다.----- ()
- 6. 공무원으로서 나는 주도적으로 정책을 제안하고 필요한 지지를 확보하며 공익에 저해된다고 믿는 정책들에 대해서는 의문을 제기해야 한다는 신념을 지니고 있다.----- ()
- 7. 공무원의 주된 책임은 그에게 맡겨진 자원을 가장 효율적으로 사용하는데 있다.---- ()
- 8. 가장 효율성이 높은 정책과 가장 형평성이 높은 정책사이에서 선택을 해야 한다면 공무원은 전자를 선택해야 한다.----- ()
- 9. 공무원으로서 나의 존재의미는 공공문제들에 대하여 내가 전문 직업인으로서 전문지식을 얼마나 잘 적용하느냐에 달려 있다.----- ()
- 10. 공무원은 누구를 위한 효율인가를 항상 염두에 두고 소망스러운 가치로서 사회적 형평성을 중시해야 한다.----- ()
- 11. 공무원은 보다 많은 사람들이 공평하게 정부 정책과 서비스 혜택을 받을 수 있도록 절차와 제도를 개선해야 한다.----- ()
- 12. 나는 사회적으로 소외된 계층의 필요와 관심을 충족시켜줄 정책들을 제안하고 지지하는 것이 공무원의 의무라고 믿는다.----- ()

제6부

끝으로 아래의 진술들이 귀하의 근무환경을 묘사하고 있는 정도를 지금까지와 같은 방식으로 표시하여 주십시오.

1. 귀하께서 수행하시는 업무에는 어느 만큼의 다양성이 있습니까? 즉 귀하의 업무가 귀하께 다양한 기술과 능력을 요구하는 정도는 얼마나 됩니까? ()

1-----2-----3-----4-----5-----6-----7

매우 적다. 나는
정형화된 업무를
반복해서 처리한다.

중간정도의 다양성

매우 많다. 나는 다양
한 기술과 능력을 사용
하여 나의 업무를 처리
한다.

2. 귀하의 업무는 어느 정도로 전체로서의 완성도를 갖습니까? 다시 말하면, 귀하의 업무는 처음과 끝을 갖는 하나의 단위로서 존재합니까? 아니면 많은 다른 사람들에 의해 완성되어야 하는 전체업무의 작은 일부입니까? ()

1-----2-----3-----4-----5-----6-----7

나의 업무는 전체 업무의 극히 작은 일부분이다. 최종 서비스나 산출물에서 나의 노력이 어떻게 반영되었는가를 찾아보기 어렵다.

나는 전체업무의 중간크기정도의 비중이 있는 일을 한다. 내가 공헌한 부분을 최종 서비스나 산출물에서 확인할 수 있다.

나의 업무는 시작 부터 끝까지를 포함한다. 나의 노력과 공헌은 최종 산출물 또는 서비스로부터 쉽게 확인할 수 있다.

3. 종합적으로 볼 때 귀하의 업무는 얼마나 중요하며 의미가 있습니까? 다시 말하여, 귀하의 업무의 결과들이 얼마나 다른 사람들의 삶의 질에 중요한 영향을 미칩니까? ()

1-----2-----3-----4-----5-----6-----7

매우 제한적이다. 나의 업무는 다른 이들에 그리 큰 영향을 미치지 않는다.

중간정도의 중요성

매우 중요하다. 나의 업무의 결과는 타인들에게 여러 가지 방식으로 매우 큰 영향을 미친다.

4. 귀하의 업무는 어느 정도의 자율성을 가지고 있습니까? 환언하면, 귀하는 얼마나 자유롭게 귀하의 업무를 처리하는 방식을 결정하십니까? ()

1-----2-----3-----4-----5-----6-----7

매우 제한적이다. 나는 나의 업무를 처리하는 시점과 방법에 대해 별 발언권이 없다.

중간정도의 자율성
나는 업무에 관해 어느 정도의 의사 결정권이 있다.

폭넓은 자율성. 나는 내 책임 하에 언제 어떻게 업무를 처리할 것인가를 결정한다.

5. 귀하의 업무는 어느 정도로 귀하의 업무수행 성적에 대한 정보를 제공합니까? 상관이나 동료들로부터의 평가 외에 업무를 수행하는 자체가 귀하의 업무수행의 질에 대한 정보를 얼마나 잘 제공해 주는지 그 정도를 표시하여 주십시오.()

1-----2-----3-----4-----5-----6-----7		
매우 적다. 나는 내가 얼마나 나의 업무를 잘 해나가는지에 대한 평가없이 계속 주어진 일을 할 수 있을 정도이다.	중간정도. 그렇지 않을 때도 있지만 나의 업무는 내게 업무추진 성과에 대한 환류를 제공한다.	아주 잘 제공해준다. 나의 업무는 나의 업무성과에 대해 거의 언제나 내가 얼마나 잘 해 나가고 있는지 여부를 알 수 있게 해준다.

- 6. 내가 함께 일하는 조직 구성원들은 우호적이고 서로 긴밀한 관계를 유지하고 있다.----- ()
- 7. 내가 함께 일하는 조직 구성원들은 조직에 대하여 주로 부정적인 태도를 표현한다.----- ()
- 8. 일반적으로 내가 일하는 조직에서 중요한 위치에 있는 사람들은 나의 업무가 조직에 매우 중요하다는 점을 인정한다.----- ()
- 9. 나는 공무원으로서 국민 일반으로부터 나의 업무수행실적에 부합하는 수준의 존경을 받고 있다----- ()
- 10. 자녀가 공무원이 되겠다면 적극 권하겠다----- ()
- 11. 내가 속해 있는 업무단위는 국민들의 세금에 상응하는 양질의 서비스를 제공하고 있다.----- ()
- 12. 나는 공직을 그만두고 전직할 의향이 있다.----- ()
- 13. 동료들과 비교해 볼 때 귀하의 지난 1년간의 근무성적을 어떻게 평가하시겠습니까? ()
 (1) 매우 미흡 (2) 미흡 (3) 부분적으로 책임 완수 (4) 평균점
 (5) 전반적으로 성공적 (6) 매우 우수 (7) 최고점